Intro to CP Chapter 12 1x

classifying types of democracy Classifying Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies F IGURE 12.1 DEMOCRACIES No: PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES Yes: 2. Is the head of state popularly elected for a fixed term in office? 1. Is the government responsible to the elected legislature? Yes: SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL No: PARLIAMENTARY Source: Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). 3 / 50

classifying types of democracy Classifying Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies F IGURE 12.1 DEMOCRACIES No: PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES Yes: 2. Is the head of state popularly elected for a fixed term in office? 1. Is the government responsible to the elected legislature? Yes: SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL No: PARLIAMENTARY Source: Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). 6 / 50

parliamentary democracies • The government consists of a prime minister (PM) and the cabinet . • The prime minister is the political chief executive and head of the government. (Various titles: taoiseach (Ireland), chancellor (Germany), premier (Italy).) • The cabinet is composed of ministers whose job it is to head the various government departments. • In a parliamentary democracy, the executive branch and the government are the same thing. 9 / 50

government formation • In some countries, a potential government must explicitly demonstrate that it has such support before it can take office by winnning a formal investiture vote. • An investiture vote is a formal vote in the legislature to determine whether a proposed government can take office. • Even if the potential government does not have to pass an investiture vote, it must still have the implicit support of a legislative majority at all times. • This is because of the ability of the legislature to call a vote of no confidence at any time. 12 / 50

government formation • All we know is that the potential government must control a legislative majority. • There are no rules as to who should be in this legislative majority. • The tight discipline of the parties in most parliamentary democracies means that the actual business of forming a government is done by a small group of senior politicians in each party. 15 / 50

government formation • The ability to nominate cabinet members is one of the most important powers held by the prime minister. • In single-party governments, the PM has enormous discretion. • In coalition governments, the PM is more constrained. 18 / 50

a simple model of government formation • Now that we know how a government forms, can we say anything about which government will form in any particular situation? • Consider West Germany in 1987 again. Party Seats Percentage Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) 223 44.9 Social Democrats (SPD) 186 37.4 Free Democrats (FDP) 46 9.3 Greens 42 8.5 Total 497 100 Notes: Data are from Adam Carr’s webpage at http://psephos.adam-carr.net/. West German Legislative Elections in 1987 Table 12.3 21 / 50

a simple model of government formation Potential West German Governments in 1987 Table 12.4 Party Seats Percentage Surplus seats CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens + FDP 497 100 248 CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens 451 90.7 202 CDU/CSU + SPD + FDP 455 91.5 206 CDU/CSU + FDP + Greens 311 62.6 62 SPD + FDP + Greens 274 55.1 25 CDU/CSU + SPD 409 82.2 160 CDU/CSU + FDP 269 54.1 20 CDU/CSU + Greens 265 53.3 16 SPD + FDP 232 46.7 - 17 SPD + Greens 228 45.9 - 21 FDP + Greens 88 17.7 - 161 SPD 186 37.4 - 63 CDU/CSU 223 44.9 - 26 Greens 42 8.5 - 207 FDP 46 9.3 - 203 Note: “Surplus seats” indicate the number of seats controlled by each potential government that were not required for obtaining a legislative majority. • Are all of these potential governments equally plausible? Who will be the formateur? 22 / 50

a simple model of government formation • The leader of the CDU/CSU (Helmut Kohl) was appointed formateur because he controlled the largest party. • Obviously, Helmut Kohl was not going to form a government that did not include his own party. Thus, we can get rid of potential governments that do not include the CDU/CSU. 23 / 50

a simple model of government formation • Practically, the proposed government should control a majority of legislative seats. • As a result, we might think of eliminating potential governments that do not control a legislative majority. • Since the Bundestag had 497 seats, any combination of parties controlling 249 ([ 497 + 1 ] / 2 ) or more seats would have a legislative majority. 24 / 50

a simple model of government formation Potential Majority West German Governments Containing the CSU/CDU in 1987 Table 12.5 Party Seats Percentage Surplus seats CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens + FDP 497 100 248 CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens 451 90.7 202 CDU/CSU + SPD + FDP 455 91.5 206 CDU/CSU + FDP + Greens 311 62.6 62 CDU/CSU + SPD 409 82.2 160 CDU/CSU + FDP 269 54.1 20 CDU/CSU + Greens 265 53.3 16 • Seven potential governments remain — which one is most likely to form? 25 / 50

a simple model of government formation • Let us distinguish between office-seeking and policy-seeking parties: I An office-seeking party is interested in the intrinsic benefits of office; it wants to control as many ministerial portfolios as possible. I A policy-seeking party only wants to shape policy. 26 / 50

a simple model of government formation • In an office-seeking world, a formateur can get other parties to join the government only by giving them office (ministerial portfolios). • Strong empirical evidence exists that you have to give large parties more office than small parties. • Gamson’s Law : Cabinet portfolios will be distributed among government parties in strict proportion to the number of seats that each party contributes to the government’s legislative majority. 27 / 50

a simple model of government formation Portfolio Allocation in Western Europe, 1945–2000 F IGURE 12.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1 Share of Government’s Legislative Seats Share of Cabinet Portfolios Perfect Proportionality Note: Based on data from Warwick and Druckman (2006). 28 / 50

a simple model of government formation • Smaller parties are somewhat overrepresented while larger parties are somewhat underrepresented. • What explains this bias? I Although smaller parties get more portfolios, they may get the less powerful/desirable ones. I Larger parties are buying the support of smaller parties to prevent them from leaving the coalition. 29 / 50

a simple model of government formation • An implication of the office-seeking logic is that formateurs do not want more parties in government than are strictly necessary to obtain a legislative majority: I As a result, formateurs will form a particular type of coalition government called a minimal winning coalition. I A minimal winning coalition (MWC) is one in which there are no parties that are not required to control a legislative majority. • A second implication is that formateurs will choose the smallest or least minimal winning coalition. • The least MWC is the MWC with the lowest number of surplus seats. 30 / 50

a simple model of government formation Potential Majority West German Governments Containing the CSU/CDU in 1987 Table 12.5 Party Seats Percentage Surplus seats CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens + FDP 497 100 248 CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens 451 90.7 202 CDU/CSU + SPD + FDP 455 91.5 206 CDU/CSU + FDP + Greens 311 62.6 62 CDU/CSU + SPD 409 82.2 160 CDU/CSU + FDP 269 54.1 20 CDU/CSU + Greens 265 53.3 16 • Which coalitions are MWCs? Which coalition is the least MWC? • If Helmut Kohl was a pure office-seeker, we would expect him to form a government between the CDU/CSU and the Greens. 31 / 50

a simple model of government formation • What if Helmut Kohl was a pure policy-seeker? What would he do? • To answer this question, we need to know something about the policy position of the parties along the salient issue dimension in West Germany in 1987. German Party Positions on the Left-Right Economic Dimension, 1987 F IGURE 12.3 Left Seats Right 42 Greens 186 SPD 223 CDU/CSU 46 FDP 32 / 50

a simple model of government formation • In a policy-seeking world, a formateur can get other parties to join the government only by giving them policy concessions. • That means that the formateur cannot implement policy at his own ideal point. Instead, he has to implement a coalition policy that is somewhere between the ideal points of all his coalition partners. • It is likely that a formateur will have to give more policy concessions to larger parties than to smaller parties. 33 / 50

a simple model of government formation • An implication of the policy-seeking logic is that formateurs will want to form coalitions with parties that are located close to them in policy space. I As a result, formateurs will form a particular type of coalition government called a connected coalition. I A connected coalition is one in which the member parties are located adjacent to each other in policy space. • A second implication is that formateurs will choose the connected least MWC because they do not want to “buy” more legislative seats with policy concessions than they strictly have to. 34 / 50

a simple model of government formation German Party Positions on the Left-Right Economic Dimension, 1987 F IGURE 12.3 Left Seats Right 42 Greens 186 SPD 223 CDU/CSU 46 FDP Potential Majority West German Governments Containing the CSU/CDU in 1987 Table 12.5 Party Seats Percentage Surplus seats CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens + FDP 497 100 248 CDU/CSU + SPD + Greens 451 90.7 202 CDU/CSU + SPD + FDP 455 91.5 206 CDU/CSU + FDP + Greens 311 62.6 62 CDU/CSU + SPD 409 82.2 160 CDU/CSU + FDP 269 54.1 20 CDU/CSU + Greens 265 53.3 16 • Which coalitions are connected? Which coalitions are connected MWC? Which coalition is the connected least MWC? 35 / 50

a simple model of government formation • Office-seeking world: I We would expect to observe least minimal winning coalitions. I In terms of our German example, the prediction would be a coalition between the CDU/CSU and Greens. • Policy-seeking world: I We would expect to observe connected least minimal winning coalitions. I In terms of our German example, the prediction would be a coalition between the CDU/CSU and the FDP. 36 / 50

a simple model of government formation • Helmut Kohl formed a government between the CDU/CSU and the FDP. • Does this mean that policy-seeking dominated office-seeking in West Germany? • In practice, it is likely that politicians care about both policy and office — they are always making trade-offs. 37 / 50

types of government • We know that a government must have the backing of an implicit legislative majority to come to power in a parliamentary democracy. • Until now, we have assumed that governments must contain enough parties that they control a majority of legislative seats. • This has led us to look at various types of minimal winning coalitions. • However, a quick glance around the world reveals that other types of government form quite often. 38 / 50

types of government Country Single party majority Minimal winning coalition Single party minority Minority coalition Surplus majority Total Belgium 3 16 2 1 11 33 Denmark 0 4 14 13 0 31 Germany 1 17 3 0 5 26 Greece 7 1 1 0 1 10 Italy 0 3 14 9 22 48 Luxembourg 0 15 0 0 1 16 Netherlands 0 9 0 3 10 22 Norway 6 3 12 5 0 26 Spain 2 0 6 0 0 8 Sweden 2 5 17 2 0 26 United Kingdom 19 0 1 0 0 20 Total 40 73 70 33 50 266 Government Types in Western Europe, 1945–1998 Table 12.6 Source: Data are from the Comparative Parliamentary Democracy (CPD) project (Müller and Strøm 2000; Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2003). Note : Data do not include caretaker or nonpartisan governments. 39 / 50

types of government 12: Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential Democracies 475 Surplus majority coalition 18.8% (50) Surplus majority coalition 13.9% Single-party majority 15.0% (40) Single-party majority 19.8% Single-party minority 26.3% (70) Single-party minority 22.6% Minimal winning coalition 27.4% (73) Minimal winning coalition 35.8% Minority coalition 12.4% (33) Minority coalition 8.0% a. Proportion of Governments of Different Cabinet Types, 1945–1998 b. Proportion of Time under Different Cabinet Types, 1945–1998 Government Types in Eleven Western European Parliamentary Democracies, 1945–1998 F IGURE 12.4 Source: Data are from the Comparative Parliamentary Democracy (CPD) project (Müller and Strøm 2000; Strøm, Müller, and Bergman 2003). Note: Data do not include caretaker or nonpartisan governments. The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of governments of different cabinet types. 40 / 50

minority governments • A minority government is one in which the government parties do not together command a majority of legislative seats. • Minority governments may be single-party minority governments or minority coalition governments. • A minority government can exist only as long as the opposition refrains from bringing it down. 41 / 50

minority governments • Every time we see a minority government, there must be an implicit majority in the legislature that supports it. • In some countries, we know who makes up this implicit majority because some opposition party publicly states that it will sustain the government against votes to dismiss it but does not want to be in the cabinet. • In other countries, the government does not rely on specific “support” parties. Instead, it builds legislative majorities on an ad hoc basis. 42 / 50

minority governments • Minority governments are more likely when the opposition is influential because of the structure of the legislature’s committee system. • Minority governments are also more likely when interest groups have a formal role in the policy-making process. • Under these circumstances, societal groups (and the parties fighting for their interests) do not feel the need to actually be represented in government in order to influence policy. 43 / 50

minority governments • Minority governments are less likely when an investiture vote is required. I An investiture vote forces opposition parties to openly support a minority government. I When an investiture vote is required, the burden is on the government to show that it has a legislative majority. When an investiture vote is not required, the burden is on the opposition to show that the government does not have a legislative majority. 44 / 50

surplus majority governments • A surplus majority government is one in which the cabinet includes more parties than are strictly necessary to control a legislative majority. • Surplus majority governments are more common in times of crisis. • Surplus majority governments may be required to change the constitution, so they are not really “oversized.” 45 / 50

surplus majority governments • It also may make strategic sense to form surplus majority governments. I In a MWC, any single party (no matter how small) can bring down the government whenever it wants to. I In a surplus majority government, small coalition parties cannot unilaterally threaten to bring down the government and thus no longer have the ability to blackmail their coalition partners. 46 / 50

duration of government formation • The government formation process can be quite complex — parties have to bargain over policy and office. • As a result, it can take a long time for a government to form. 47 / 50

duration of government formation Duration of Government Formation Process after Elections, 1945–1998 (Days) Table 12.7 Country Minimum Maximum Average N Belgium 2 148 59.7 17 Denmark 0 35 9.4 22 Germany 23 73 36.4 14 Greece 3 19 7.5 8 Italy 11 126 47.3 14 Luxembourg 19 52 31.2 12 Netherlands 31 208 85.7 16 Norway 0 16 2.5 14 Spain 2 58 28.6 7 Sweden 0 25 5.7 17 United Kingdom 1 21 8.7 15 All 0 208 29.9 156 Notes : Data come from the Comparative Parliamentary Democracy (CPD) project (Müller and Strom 2000; Strom, Müller, and Bergman 2003) and cover governments that formed after an election between 1945 and 1998. Bargaining duration measures the number of days between the election and the day on which the new government is officially inaugurated. 48 / 50

duration of government formation • Delays in the government formation process can have serious consequences for the behavior of economic and political actors, both domestic and international. I Affects exchange rate markets, stock market volatility, and the types of assets that market actors hold. I Legislation, important reforms, and foreign policy decisions are all likely to be delayed. 49 / 50

duration of government formation • How can it take so long to form a government? 1. Imperfect information I How much information do party elites have on the range of offers that would be acceptable to other party leaders? 2. Bargaining complexity is likely to increase as a function of I Number of parties in parliament. I Institutional hurdles for forming a government. I “Lumpiness” of policy issues. I Dimensionality of policy space. I Policy distances between parties. I Heterogeneity of ideal points within parties. 50 / 50