Intro to CP Chapter 7 1x

political culture • In the last chapter, we examined how economic development and the structure of the economy influence the likelihood that a country will become and remain a democracy. • In this chapter, we focus on the relationship between culture and democracy. I Does democracy require a “democratic culture”? I Are certain cultures or religions incompatible with democracy? I What does support for democracy look like in the US and around the world? 3 / 69

political culture racy? In Figure 7.1, we illustrate some of the causal arguments that scholars have made concerning the interaction between culture, economic development, and democracy. F IGURE 7.1 Culture, Economic Development, and Democracy: Some Potential Causal Relationships Culture Democracy Economic development Culture Democracy Economic development a. b. Economic development Democracy Culture f. Economic development Culture Democracy d. Culture Economic development Democracy c. Economic development Democracy Culture e. Economic development Democracy Culture g. 6 / 69

political culture • Almond and Verba (1965) studied the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and Mexico. • Claiming that the United States and UK were the most stable democracies, they found that they also had political cultures that most closely resembled the civic culture. • Thus, Almond and Verba concluded that civic culture was necessary for democracy. 9 / 69

political culture F IGURE 7.2 A Cultural Map of the World Note : The cultural map of the world shown in Figure 7.2 is based on data from the sixth wave (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey. The different clusters indicate countries that Inglehart and Welzel identify as sharing similar cultural values—they represent distinct political cultures. Source: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp - 2.0 - 2.5 - 2.0 - 1.5 - 1.0 - 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 - 1.5 - 1.0 - 0.5 Survival vs. Self-Expression Values 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 Morocco Jordan Ghana Nigeria African-Islamic Zimbabwe Burkina Faso Rwanda Malaysia Kosovo Pakistan Mali Yemen Palestine Iraq Armenia Georgia Romania Orthodox Moldova Ukraine Bulgaria Belarus Lithuania Estonia Baltic China Latvia Russia Serbia Albania Bosnia Montenegro Tunisia Azerbaijan Traditional vs. Secular-Rational Values Muslim-majority countries are in italics Qatar Trinidad Ecuador Colombia Mexico Philipines Malta Latin America Guatemala Peru Brazil Poland Argentina Chile South Africa India South Asia Uruguay N. Ireland Ireland United States Great Britain Canada English Speaking New Zealand Australia Iceland Switzerland Netherlands Finland Norway Denmark Sweden Germany France Andorra Luxembourg Belgium Spain Slovakia Slovenia Czech Rep. Taiwan S. Korea Hong Kong Japan Confucian Hungary Catholic Europe Austria Protestant Europe Croatia Greece Portugal Bahrain Lebanon Kazakhstan Indonesia Kyrgyzstan Zambia Algeria Ethiopia Cyprus Thailand Vietnam Turkey Macedonia 12 / 69

political culture • It is not always easy to use surveys to study the emergence of democracy because surveys would need to be conducted in dictatorships. • Even if survey research is allowed in a dictatorship, would the respondents reveal their true preferences? • Social desirability bias: Tendency of individuals to overreport socially and politically acceptable opinions and behaviors and underreport unacceptable ones. • There are ways to address such complications using statistical methods that are beyond our class. 15 / 69

religion and democracy • What is a civilization? I A civilization is the “highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species.” I Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American, African. I Civilizations are coded primarily in terms of religion. • Huntington argues that the Western belief in the universality of the West’s values and its insistence on imposing those values through democratization efforts will only antagonize other civilizations and lead to conflict. 18 / 69

religion and democracy • Huntington, among others, also offered several arguments for why Islam is not compatible with democracy: I Islam has a violent streak that predisposes Islamic countries to authoritarianism. I Islam is unable to separate religious and political spheres. I Political culture in Muslim countries is fertile soil for authoritarianism because it mirrors the stark hierarchies of domestic life between men and women. 21 / 69

religion and democracy • Although the argument that some religions are incompatible with democracy has its supporters, there are good reasons to doubt its veracity. • A common thread in these arguments is that there is something in the doctrines of these religions that makes them incompatible with democracy. • The problem is that nearly all religions have doctrinal elements that are compatible with democracy and others that are incompatible with democracy. • Perhaps a more fruitful question to ask is under what circumstances do religious leaders emphasize certain doctrinal elements and de-emphasize others. 22 / 69

religion and democracy • All religions have historically been compatible with a broad range of political institutions. I With the exception of Iran since 1979 and Afghanistan under the Taliban, there have been few historical precedents for religious leaders exercising political power in Islamic countries. I For a long time, Catholicism opposed democracy and championed the monarch’s “divine right” to rule. Large parts of the Catholic church actively supported or were at least sympathetic towards fascist regimes such as Franco’s Spain and other post-WW II right-wing authoritarian regimes in Latin America. I Some protestant denominations were supportive of dictatorship (e.g., the Southern Baptist Convention, the Southern Methodists, and many Mormons supported slavery and/or segregation; the Dutch Reformed Church supported South African apartheid; large parts of German protestantism supported the Nazis). 23 / 69

religion and democracy • One might still wonder whether certain religions are more or less compatible with democracy than others. • A number of recent studies have suggested that Islam is particularly bad for democracy. However, there are several reasons to question these results. • One problem is that these studies may be misleading because they examine the effect of Islam on democracy at a fixed point in time. Depending on the time point chosen, results might come out quite differently. I Despite Huntington’s claim that Western civilization is obviously compatible with democracy, this might not have been so obvious to someone living in Western Europe in the 1930s and 40s. I Most of the arguments that Catholicism is bad for democracy were made when there were few Catholic democracies in the world. I Today, people argue that Islam is bad for democracy because there aren’t many Islamic democracies. 24 / 69

some empirical evidence • We know that Protestant and Catholic countries are likely to be democratic and that Muslim countries are likely to be dictatorships today. I But this in itself does not establish a causal link between these religions and democracy. I What we want to know is whether democracy can be transplanted to countries dominated by different religions. I This requires examining the effect of religion on democracy over time. I Importantly, we need to take into account other known determinants of regime type. 25 / 69

some empirical evidence • Protestant hypothesis: Countries with a majority Protestant population are more likely to become and stay democratic. • Catholic hypothesis: Countries with a majority Catholic population are less likely to become and stay democratic. • Islam hypothesis: Countries with a majority Muslim population are less likely to become and stay democratic. • Ethnic group hypothesis: Countries with a large number of ethnic groups are less likely to become and stay democratic. • Religious group hypothesis: Countries with a large number of religious groups are less likely to become and stay democratic. • Cultural group hypothesis: Countries with a large number of cultural groups are less likely to become and stay democratic. 26 / 69

some empirical evidence Dependent variable: Probability that a country will be a democracy this year if it was a dictatorship last year Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Muslim majority –0.28** –0.18 –0.23 –0.25 –0.18 (0.12) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.16) Protestant majority –0.56 –0.42 –0.40 –0.45 –0.43 (0.35) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) Catholic majority 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.26** 0.26** 0.31** (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) GDP per capita 0.00004* 0.00003* 0.00003* 0.00004* (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) Growth in GDP per capita –0.02** –0.02** –0.02** –0.02** (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Oil production –0.15 –0.12 –0.13 –0.15 (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) Effective number of ethnic groups –0.02 (0.02) Effective number of religious groups –0.06 (0.09) Effective number of cultural groups 0.02 (0.08) Constant –2.06*** –2.05*** –1.94*** –1.91*** –2.06*** (0.07) (0.10) (0.13) (0.23) (0.19) Number of observations 4,379 2,578 2,563 2,578 2,563 Log-likelihood –418.75 –318.64 –317.85 –318.46 –318.35 * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 Note: Data on religious groups and whether a country is a democracy are from Przeworski and colleagues (2000), updated through 2000; data on GDP per capita and growth in GDP per capita are from the Penn World Tables 6.1 (2004; datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt61/); and data on ethnic and cultural groups are from Fearon (2003). The results shown in Table 7.2 come from a dynamic probit model. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Coefficient Standard error Cultural and Economic Determinants of Democratic Emergence T ABLE 7.2 27 / 69

some empirical evidence • Economic development makes transitions to democracy more likely. • High economic growth makes transitions to democracy less likely. • Countries that are predominantly Catholic are more likely to become democracies. • Having a Protestant or Muslim majority has no effect on whether a country becomes democratic or not. • Ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity do not appear to impede or aid the emergence of democracy. 28 / 69

some empirical evidence Dependent variable: Probability that a country will be a democracy this year if it was a democracy last year Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Muslim majority –0.61*** –0.30 –0.46 –0.48 –0.39 (0.18) (0.26) (0.28) (0.30) (0.27) Protestant majority † Catholic majority 0.02 –0.27* –0.41** –0.43* –0.39** (0.13) (0.16) (0.20) (0.22) (0.18) GDP per capita 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) Growth in GDP per capita 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) Oil production 0.29 0.43 0.35 0.40 (0.31) (0.31) (0.29) (0.31) Effective number of ethnic groups –0.09* (0.05) Effective number of religious groups –0.19 (0.15) Effective number of cultural groups –0.23 *** (0.12) Constant 2.06*** 1.50*** 1.88*** 1.92*** 1.99*** (0.10) (0.16) (0.28) (0.37) (0.30) Number of observations 2,408 1,784 1,784 1,784 1,784 Log-likelihood –252.28 –163.19 –161.41 –162.33 –161.74 * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 † No democracy with a Protestant majority ever failed to survive in this time period. As a result, it is not possible to include this variable. Note: Data on religious groups and whether a country is a democracy are from Przeworski and colleagues (2000), updated through 2000; data on GDP per capita and growth in GDP per capita are from the Penn World Tables 6.1 (2004; datacentre.chass.utoronto.ca); and data on ethnic and cultural groups are from Fearon (2003). The results shown in Table 7.3 come from a dynamic probit model. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Cultural and Economic Determinants of Democratic Survival T ABLE 7.3 29 / 69

some empirical evidence • Economic development helps democratic survival. • High economic growth helps democratic survival. • Having a Muslim majority does not harm democratic survival. • Having a Protestant majority is good for democratic survival. • Having a Catholic majority is bad for democratic survival. • Ethnic and cultural (but not religious) diversity seems to be bad for democratic survival. 30 / 69

experiments and culture • So far, we have examined how culture might affect democracy using survey evidence and statistical analyses. • We now look at some experimental results from Ultimatum and Dictator games. 31 / 69

Ultimatum game • Setup: I Two players — there is a “proposer” and a “responder.” I The proposer is given a certain amount of money. • Procedure: I Step 1: The proposer offers some of the money to the responder. I Step 2: The responder — knowing the offer and the total amount of money — has to either accept or reject the offer. • Outcome: I If the responder accepts, she gets to keep the offer and the proposer keeps the rest. I If the responder rejects, then neither player receives anything. 32 / 69

Dictator game • The Dictator game is exactly the same as the Ultimatum game except that the responder is not given an opportunity to accept or reject the offer. • Instead, the proposer (dictator) merely dictates the division. 33 / 69

experiments and culture • Subjects play anonymously. I Would not know if they were playing with the same player twice, making this a one-shot game. I No fear of reprisals or expectation of later rewards. I No concern about reputation. • Stakes of the game denominated in money. • Typically, subjects’ comprehension of the game is tested beforehand. 34 / 69

Ultimatum game • What should the players do in the Ultimatum game? I If players are self-interested we would expect the proposer to offer , where is arbitrarily close to zero, and keep the rest (1 - ) for himself. I We would expect the responder to accept this offer because > 0. 35 / 69

Dictator game • What should the players do in the Dictator game? I If players are self-interested we would expect the proposer to offer zero and keep everything for himself. • The Dictator game offers an interesting contrast to the Ultimatum game because it allows the researcher to see if a proposer makes a positive offer out of a sense of fairness or fear of rejection. 36 / 69

Ultimatum game • Ultimatum games have been played in numerous experimental settings using students in virtually all of the industrialized democracies of the world. • The self-interested prediction is not supported in any society studied. • Proposers nearly always make significant offers. The mean offer is typically between 40 and 45 percent. The modal (most common) offer is typically 50 percent. • Responders reject many positive offers, especially if they are low. Offers of less than 20 percent are rejected about half the time. 37 / 69

Ultimatum game • Several scholars wondered whether these deviations from the theoretical predictions were evidence of a universal pattern of human behavior or whether they varied with an individual’s economic and cultural setting. • Do some cultures exhibit behaviors that more closely resemble the theoretical predictions than others? 38 / 69

WEIRD people The weirdest people in the world? Joseph Henrich Department of Psychology and Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver V6T 1Z4, Canada joseph.henrich@gmail.com http: // www.psych.ubc.ca / ≏ henrich / home.html Steven J. Heine Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver V6T 1Z4, Canada heine@psych.ubc.ca Ara Norenzayan Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver V6T 1Z4, Canada ara@psych.ubc.ca Abstract: Behavioral scientists routinely publish broad claims about human psychology and behavior in the world’s top journals based on samples drawn entirely from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. Researchers – often implicitly – assume that either there is little variation across human populations, or that these “standard subjects” are as representative of the species as any other population. Are these assumptions justified? Here, our review of the comparative database from across the behavioral sciences suggests both that there is substantial variability in experimental results across populations and that WEIRD subjects are particularly unusual compared with the rest of the species – frequent outliers. The domains reviewed include visual perception, fairness, cooperation, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, moral reasoning, reasoning styles, self-concepts and related motivations, and the heritability of IQ. The findings suggest that members of WEIRD societies, including young children, are among the least representative populations one could find for generalizing about humans. Many of these findings involve domains that are associated with fundamental aspects of psychology, motivation, and behavior – hence, there are no obvious a priori grounds for claiming that a particular behavioral phenomenon is universal based on sampling from a single subpopulation. Overall, these empirical patterns suggests that we need to be less cavalier in addressing questions of human nature on the basis of data drawn from this particularly thin, and rather unusual, slice of humanity. We close by proposing ways to structurally re-organize the behavioral sciences to best tackle these challenges. BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2010), Page 1 of 75 doi:10.1017 / S0140525X0999152X Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. 39 / 69

experiments and culture • Fifteen small-scale societies: I Three foraging societies. I Six slash-and-burn horticulture societies. I Four nomadic herding groups. I Two sedentary, small-scale agriculture societies. • These societies exist in a wide range of cultural and economic environments. 40 / 69

experiments and culture 7: The Cultural Determinants of Democracy and Dictatorship 257 For example, the Machiguenga rejected only one offer even though 75 percent of the offers made were below 30 percent. In some groups, though, the experimenters found that rejec- Group Country Environment Economic base Machiguenga Peru Tropical forest Horticulture Quichua Ecuador Tropical forest Horticulture Achuar Ecuador Tropical forest Horticulture Hadza Tanzania Savanna-woodlands Foraging Aché Paraguay Semi-tropical woodlands Foraging and horticulture Tsimané Bolivia Tropical forest Horticulture Au Papua New Guinea Mountainous tropical Foraging and forest horticulture Gnau Papua New Guinea Mountainous tropical Foraging and forest horticulture Mapuche Chile Temperate plains Small-scale farming Torguud Mongolia High-altitude desert, Pastoralism seasonally flooded grassland Khazax Mongolia High-altitude desert, Pastoralism seasonally flooded grassland Sangu (farm/herd) Tanzania Savanna-woodlands, Agro-pastoralists seasonally flooded grassland Orma Kenya Savanna-woodlands Pastoralism Lamelara Indonesia Tropical island coast Foraging-trade Shona Zimbabwe Savanna-woodlands Farming Fifteen Small-Scale Societies T ABLE 7.4 41 / 69

experiments and culture F IGURE 7.3 Offers from an Ultimatum Game Note: The size of the bubble at each location along each row represents the proportion of the sample that made a particular offer. The right edge of the lightly shaded horizontal gray bar gives the mean offer for that group. Source: Henrich and colleagues (2005). Lamelara Aché Pittsburg Shona Orma Au Achuar Sangu Gnau Tsimané Khazax Torguud Mapuche Hadza Machiguenga Quichua 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 0.1 0 42 / 69

Ultimatum game results • There is much more variation in these offers than what we observe in advanced industrialized countries. • Mean offers range from 26 percent (Machiguena) to 58 percent (Lamelara). • All groups had mean offers of at least 25 percent. • Rejection rates also show a lot of variation: Machiguena rejected only one offer despite the fact that 75 percent of offers were below 30 percent. • In other cases, rejection rates were high even for offers above 50 percent. 43 / 69

Ultimatum game results • 50 percent of offers made by Tsimane were below 30 percent. The mean offer among the Machiguena was only 26 percent. I Members of the Tsimane and Machiguena societies rarely work together and are almost entirely economically independent at the family level. • Lamelara had mean offer of 58 percent. I Lamelara are whale hunters and hunt together. 44 / 69

Ultimatum game results • Au and Gnau rejected both unfair and hyper-fair offers. I Reflects culture of gift-giving in these societies. I Accepting gifts commits one to reciprocate at some future time to be determined by the giver. I Thus, excessively large gifts are often rejected because the recipients are worried about the strings attached. 45 / 69

experiments and culture • How can we explain these results in a more systematic manner? • How about individual characteristics of the players such as their age, gender, relative wealth, and education? None of these factors was found to be important. 46 / 69

experiments and culture • What about social institutions or cultural norms of fairness? I Payoffs to cooperation — How important and how large is a group’s payoff from cooperation in economic production with non-immediate kin? I Market integration — How much do people rely on market exchange in their everyday lives? • Higher market integration and higher payoffs to cooperation led to higher mean offers in the Ultimatum game. These two factors alone account for 68 percent of the variation in offers. 47 / 69

culture and democracy • Explanation: I When faced with a novel situation, players looked for similar situations in their everyday lives, saying, “What familiar situation is this game like?” They then acted in a way that was appropriate for the analogous situation. I Culture can be seen as a shared way of acting in strategic situations that has evolved over many years. Life is made up of lots of strategic situations (“games”) and culture affects how we “play” them. • What are the implications of these experiments for the relationship between culture and democracy? 48 / 69

culture and democracy • We can think of democracy as a “game” that individuals must play. • Some countries will find it easier to support democracy than others because the individuals in those countries will have analogous games in their everyday lives that make it beneficial and easier for them to play the democracy game. • In other words, culture — a shared way of acting in strategic situations — may well affect the emergence and/or survival of democracy. 49 / 69

coordination and democracy game • Weingast (1997) argues that limited government can only be sustained when citizens can coordinate their beliefs about I What types of government actions are unacceptable I When they ought to take action against the government in response to such actions • Countries in which citizens have coordinated their beliefs might be said to be characterized by a civic culture. In such countries, democracy is “self-enforcing.” 50 / 69

coordination and democracy game Coordination and Democracy Game F IGURE 7.4 Note: A and B = citizen groups; S = state. Transgress (2, 8, 8) Status quo Not Transgress Challenge (8, 1, 2) Unsuccessful challenge (0, 7, 7) Successful challenge (8, 2, 1) Unsuccessful challenge (8, 2, 2) No challenge Acquiesce Acquiesce Acquiesce Challenge Challenge A B B S • The dotted line connecting player B’s two choice nodes indicates an information set: Player B does not know what player A chose when making his choice. 51 / 69

coordination and democracy game Group Subgame F IGURE 7.5 Acquiesce Acquiesce Challenge Challenge Group A Group B 8, 2, 2 8, 2, 1 8, 1, 2 0, 7, 7 • Note that the first payoff in each cell belongs to the state, which is not a player in this subgame. • This is a pure coordination game. There are two NE — (Acquiesce; Acquiesce) and (Challenge; Challenge). • The expected outcome associated with (Acquiesce; Acquiesce) is No challenge. The payoff to the state is 8, the payoff to group A is 2, and the payoff to group B is 2. The expected outcome associated with (Challenge; Challenge) is a Successful challenge. The payoff to the state is 0, the payoff to group A is 7, and the payoff to group B is 7. 52 / 69

coordination and democracy game • If the state thinks that the two groups of citizens will acquiesce, then it will transgress against them and receive a payoff of 8 rather than 2 (the payoff to the state if it does not transgress). • If the state thinks that the two groups of citizens will challenge, then it will prefer to not transgress (because 2 > 0). • In this game, citizens are able to prevent predatory actions taken by the state only if both groups can coordinate. • If these different groups do not have cultural norms or practices that allow them to coordinate with each other, then the state can more easily transgress against them. 53 / 69

coordination and democracy game • If higher numbers of ethnic or cultural groups exist in a society, citizens’ ability to coordinate effectively against predatory actions on the part of the state might be lower. • This prediction is supported by the statistical evidence we saw earlier that ethnic and cultural diversity seem to be bad for democratic survival. • The same might be true if different groups of citizens believe in radically different “ground truths.” For example, we would expect coordination to be more difficult in a media environment that creates echo chambers and actively promotes conspiracy theories. 54 / 69

coordination and democracy game • The game suggests that both cultural modernization theory and its critics got it wrong: Civic culture does not cause democratization, nor does experience with democratic institutions cause a civic culture. • A stable democracy does not simply arise because citizens happen to have the relevant set of values. The necessary condition for a democracy to be stable is for citizens to resolve their coordination dilemma about limits on state behavior. • If citizens are able to coordinate their behavior, the result will be a stable democracy and a shared set of cultural norms commonly called a civic culture. 55 / 69

Bright Line Watch surveys • A team of political scientists drew on Weingast’s argument to evaluate the health of American democracy during the first half of the Trump administration. • The Bright Line Watch surveys are a series of surveys both of political scientists (“experts”) and the general US public. • These surveys measure the perceived importance of key democratic principles and the extent to which they are perceived to be upheld in the United States. 56 / 69

Bright Line Watch surveys 57 / 69

Bright Line Watch surveys Figure 2 Expert and public responses to “How important are these characteristics for democratic government?” Special Issue Article | Searching for Bright Lines in the Trump Presidency 58 / 69

Bright Line Watch surveys Figure 3 Responses from Trump approvers and disapprovers to “How important are these characteristics for democratic government?” Special Issue Article | Searching for Bright Lines in the Trump Presidency 59 / 69

Bright Line Watch surveys • The surveys show substantial alignment across Trump supporters and opponents on democratic priorities. • A majority in both groups ranked almost every principle as important or essential to democracy, suggesting some support for Weingast’s first condition for self-enforcing democracy. 60 / 69

Bright Line Watch surveys Figure 4 Experts and public responses to “How well does the statement describe the U.S. today?” 61 / 69

Bright Line Watch surveys Figure 7 Responses from Trump approvers and disapprovers to “How well does the statement describe the U.S. today?” Special Issue Article | Searching for Bright Lines in the Trump Presidency 62 / 69

Bright Line Watch surveys • The public is most polarized over U.S. democratic performance precisely on the principles that stand out as potential bright lines in the expert surveys. • Not only do the public and experts disagree on many democratic priorities, but the areas of greatest concern to political scientists are typically the most divisive among the public. • Given that the American public cannot agree on whether key democratic principals are being violated by the (early) Trump administration, it fails the second of Weingast’s criteria for self-enforcing democracy. • More recent events show even more dramatic polarization over facts related to the 2020 election and January 6. 63 / 69

Bright Line Watch surveys 64 / 69

Bright Line Watch surveys 65 / 69

Correlates of Republicans’ antidemocratic attitudes 66 / 69

Correlates of Republicans’ antidemocratic attitudes • No strong correlation between socio-demographic attributes of respondents and antidemocratic attitudes. 67 / 69

Correlates of Republicans’ antidemocratic attitudes 68 / 69

Correlates of Republicans’ antidemocratic attitudes • Very strong relationship between antidemocratic attitudes and ethnic antagonism scale. • Source: Bartels, Larry M. 2020. “Ethnic antagonism erodes Republicans’ commitment to democracy.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 117 (37): 22752–22759. 69 / 69