Global Terrorism Final Project

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1 Final Project Introduction: The Bali Nightclub bombing is considered one of the worst terrorist attacks in Indonesia. On October 12, 2002 within the Kuta area of the Indonesian island, Bali, three separate bombs were detonated on the same day. The three bombs ranged in size, however the largest bomb was estimated to be a 1,200-kilogram bomb. The first bomb to explode on October 12 th , 2002 was in a backpack placed within a bar. After the initial blast about 20 seconds later the large 1,200- kilogram bomb was detonated (History, n.d.). The third bomb was set off in front of the United States Embassy however this bomb did not create any casualties. Of the two largest bombs, 202 people died, along with over 200 injured. Some of those injured had severe burns (History, 2020). The reasoning for the high death count is because of the location. The location is a popular tourist destination. The primary nationality of those killed in the bombings were Australians. The attack itself was carried out by a group known as Jemaah Islamiyah which follows close ideological views of al-Qaida (History, 2020). This group has been operating in Southeast Asia for many years, carrying out numerous attacks across different Southeastern Asian countries. While some countries have attempted to eradicate Jemaah Islamiyah from their countries, Indonesia did not take suggestions from Western countries. If Indonesia took the suggestions to crack down on Jemaah Islamiyah the 2002 Bali Nightclub bombings may have not happened or have been as severe. Background on the Attack: It’s important to understand the background on the attack such as the geographical location and those who executed such a horrendous crime. Jemaah Islamiyah began in the late 1980’s or

2 1990’s, yet the exact date is unknown. The group was created by two individuals by the names Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. The two individuals were able to flee to Malaysia in order to not be sentenced to prison in another country (Stanford University, n.d.). Once comfortable in Southeast Asia, the two began to evolve Jemaah Islamiyah through the Islamic movement known as Darual Islam which has origins in Indonesia. Dural Islam also was used as an influencer for Usama bin Laden’s methodology and ideology, who founded al-Qaeda which that group would eventually work closely with Jemaah Islamiyah in later years (United Nations Security Council, 2011). Jemaah Islamiyah’s primary objective was to revive the purest form of Islam, which believe to be under constant attack, referred to sometimes as the holy war. As Jemaah Islamiyah grew, Islamists would begin traveling to Afghanistan to fight the Russians. As Jemaah Islamiya were fighting, it allowed the group to connect much larger with al-Qaeda. The relationship began to grow with al-Qaeda through the giving of resources, training, and fighting tips (United Nations Security Council, 2011). Throughout the 1990’s Jemaah Islamiyah’s dominance in the Philippines. More so, the group was able to get a footing in Indonesia during the country’s economic crisis. The event resulted in President Suharto resigning from office (Stafford University, n.d.). Jemaah Islamiyah also had the objective to overthrow the government and crate a pan-Islamic state within Southeast Asia (Stanford University, n.d.). While unsuccessful, Muslims in Indonesia and Christians in the country began to have conflict during Indonesia’s attempt to transfer into a democracy. Jemaah Islamiyah was able to use this to their advantage through carrying out numerous attacks. For example, Jemaah Islamiyah was responsible for many church bombings

3 within the country that killed at least 18 and other bombings in Manila within the same month that killed 22 (Stanford University, n.d.). As Jemaah Islamiyah continued to grow throughout the Southeastern Asian countries, governments began to crack down and eradicate the group from their borders, for example, the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia. However, one country that did not put forth the effort was the Indonesian government. Western countries such as the United States recommended Indonesia to act against Jemaah Islamiyah given the groups terroristic past, however the recommendations were ignored due to internal pollical and corruption scandals (Stanford University, n.d.). From the early 2000’s Jemaah Islamiyah started to target the United States (Stanford University, n.d). Given the lack of effort from the Indonesian government to crack down on Jemaah Islamiyah and the groups now goal of targeting the United States, this set the stage for the 2002 Bali Nightclub bombings, which was intended to kill Americans. Analysis of the Attack: The Bali Nightclub bombing is considered a terrorist attack. The reason for this event being considered a terrorist attack can be seen through the 12 Core Components of Terrorism. For example, the Bali Nightclub bombing was intended to instill fear, dread, panic, or mere anxiety (Schmid, 2011). For example, “… inside a bar that funneled panicking victims into the street, exposing the crowd to the full blast of a large car bomb parked next to the neighboring Sari club” (Global Security, n.d.). This information links back to the intent to instill fear and panic, which is one of the twelve components of terrorism. Another example that links this event to a terrorist attack instead of an act of violence is seen through another core component of terrorism. This component speaks about the that the victims were not the ultimate target (Schmid, 2011). While the intended goal was to kill American citizens, they were not the ultimate target. The ultimate

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4 target was the United States, while killing Americans helped Jemaah Islamiyah towards the ultimate target. The ideology of Jemaah Islamiyah can be seen as “the deeply-felt sense of Islamic brotherhood among Muslims, such brotherhood is able to transcend ethnicity and national boundaries” (Ramakrishna, 2004). We can see this with Jemaah Islamiyah’s relationship with al- Qaeda. Islam as a religion has a goal to transform and transcend individuals, however radical Islam is different. Radical Islam’s goal is to transform and transcend societies (Ramakrishna, 2004). It’s important to understand the differences between the ideological difference between traditional Islam and radical Islam, which is what Jemaah Islamiyah can be identified as. Additionally, Jemaah Islamiyah believe that in society a “true Muslim must also be fully prepared to wage active, offensive global jihad against the realm of unbelievers” (Ramakrishna, 2004). These groups also believe that the Dar al-Islam is under attack by “Jewish-Crusaders conspiracy involving the United States, Israel, and other allies”. (Ramakrishna, 2004). The motivation of Jemaah Islamiyah and other groups alike are political in nature focusing on religious change or revenge (Morley, 2006). However, in most cases these groups lack sufficient political power to make such changes. Given Jemaah Islamiyah want to change whole societies, it can be believed that their underlying motivation is to eventually gain control of a country’s politics, which in return allows for full control of individuals within a country regarding religion. The underlying motivation was seen by Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia prior to the 2002 Bali Nightclub bombings. The attacks were intended to bring attention to the United States and its allies’ “barbarity”. During 2001 in Afghanistan the United States dropped thousands of tons of bombs in Afghanistan during Ramadan (Ramakrishna, 2004). In an explanation by a Jemaah Islamiyah

5 militant, many men, women, and babies died at the hands of the United States. The 2002 Bali Bombings was to bring attention to the United States barbaric actions and to take revenge of the killings of the Muslims in Afghanistan. The Bali Nightclub bombings assisted the organization in furthering their global cause of waging a defensive jihad against the United States and their allies (Ramakrishna, 2004). The bombings brought forward the groups global cause regarding the “terroristic” United States and their allies and to defend Islam from such groups. The local response to the Bali Nightclub bombings was rather quick, given the attacks happened around 11pm. By midnight local police, firefighters, and paramedics were on scene handing the logistics and medical extraction of those injured. While there was an initial local response from local police, the Indonesian National Police also became involved in the response. The Indonesian government worked primarily with the Australian government in a joint- investigation. For example, immediately following the attack the Australian Federal Police organized a team consisting of victim identification staff, intelligence officers, security, and administration staff, and communication staff to assist the Indonesian National Police as the investigation progressed (National Museum Australia, n.d.). The United States and the United Kingdom were also part of the response to the bombings. The United States launched an FBI task force to the area to assist the Indonesian, Australian, and British response to the attacks. In addition, the United States listed Jemaah Islamiyah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorists through Executive Order 13224. Throughout the course of many years, Indonesia, Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States worked together to arrest those connected to the bombing. For example, in 2002 Imam Samudra was captured in Indonesia for his role in the attacks (BBC News, 2012).

6 Many would think that Jemaah Islamiyah would lose support and hinder the organizations cause. However, following the 2002 Bali Nightclub bombing and Executive Order 13224, Jemaah Islamiyah’s movement continued to grow and receive funding. It’s been reported that the groups publicity has increased since the bombings by those with similar mindsets (United Nations Security Council, 2011). With this publicity Jemaah Islamiyah has been able to find additional finding through “reliance on the hawala system, siphoning funding from charities, and donations from other terrorist groups” (United Nations Security Council, 2011). Even more surprising, Jemaah Islamiyah lined businesses and individual members contribute 5 percent of the earnings and salaries (United Nations Security Council, 2011). With this information it is clear that the 2002 Bali Nightclub bombings benefitted Jemaah Islamiyah, even if countries restricted the groups funding and arrested members following the bombings. Past Response and Alternatives: After the 2002 Bali Nightclub bombings, Indonesia set out to make policies and decisions in order to discourage future terrorism in the future. One policy that was created following the bombings was Perpu No. 1/2002. This policy established specific types of terrorism. For example, within Perpu No. 1/2002, it defined terror threats such as bogus threats, to terrorist attacks using nuclear weapons for example (Lindsey, n.d). This information allowed anti- terrorism task forces to act upon threats and attacks within the country. Even further within Perpu No. 1/2002, those that were suspected of being a terrorist were now able to be detained up to seven days, and the possibility of up to six months if the Indonesian authorities seemed fit (Lindsey, n.d.). Finally, within the Perpu No. 1/2002, those investigating individuals now had the capability to spy and tap into communications, mail, and telephone conversations of those accused of terrorism (Lindsey, n.d.).

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7 While Perpu No. 1/2002 was a step in the right direction towards counter terrorism, some opposed this measure. For example, some members within the Indonesian government were of those who opposed which is why No. 1/2002 stalled in parliament temporarily (McDowell, 2002). During this time, international pressure was applied on the Indonesian government to arrest Abu Bakr Bashir who was in charge of an Islamic boarding school which has been known to teach the messages and inspire individuals about Jemaah Islamiyah (McDowell, 2002). However, Bashir stated he was not involved with the 2002 Bali Nightclub bombing and shouldn’t be arrested. Other unintended consequences came from additional foreign pressure such as Australia and the United States who had already identified the culprits of the terrorist attack as Jemaah Islamiyah. While most of the Indonesian government believed this as well, some members such as the Security Minister believed that Jemaah Islamiyah wasn’t even in Indonesia (McDowell, 2002). With Indonesian government individuals denying the existence of Jemaah Islamiyah in the country, Perpu No 1/2002 being delayed, and fierce international pressure could have unintentionally showed terrorist’s that Indonesia has a hard time combatting terrorism, which could entice terrorism within the country. While it appeared, Indonesia struggled immediately following the Bali Nightclub bombings to establish a clear anti-terrorism plan, Australia was one country that was impacted. However, Australia could be seen as being impacted in a positive way. For example, Australia and Indonesia’s relationship was complicated because of “underlying problems such as an absence of shared historical experience” (Sherlock, 2002). It has been pointed out by Sherlock (2002) “notably Australians and Indonesians have apparently brought the two countries closer… law enforcement agencies have been working in tandem to investigate and track down those

8 responsible”. While at a glance, the delaying of Perpu 1/2002, one would assume that this would strain the relationship with other countries. However, in this case Australia was able to build on their relationship with Indonesia through this tragedy. Following the terrorist attacks, Indonesia showed internal problems while attempting to combat terrorism following the attacks, the country could have done more before the attacks which would have potentially limited the attacks or eliminated them all together. Other Southeastern Asian countries enacted anti-terrorism law and actively attempted to eradicate Jemaah Islamiyah out of their countries, yet Indonesia remained silent. Indonesia correctly worked with foreign countries to respond and tack down those responsible for the bombings along with enacting Perpu 1/2002. However, some government officials offered solidarity to Jemaah Islamiyah which could have potentially hindered the anti-terrorism efforts. For example, Jemaah Islamiyah and other terror organizations could see the Indonesian government rocky response to terrorism, which could potentially amplify terrorism in the future. Indonesia responded decently to the Bali Nightclub bombings, however Indonesia could have actively pursued abolishing the Islamic Boarding school ran by Abu Bakar Bashir given its connection to Jemaah Islamiyah. Indonesia abolishing this school could have potentially decreased the probability of Jemaah Islamiyah recruits and future attacks. As pointed out “These boarding schools have been reported to be a major key in spreading teachings of Jemaah Islamiyah and other Islamist militancy throughout Southeast Asia (Cianflone, et al 2007). Additionally, Indonesia should have better brought the whole of the government together, given that Perpu No. 1/2002 briefly stalled and senior members within the government spoke out about Jemaah Islamiyah being a problem. Such example includes comments from President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono stating that legislation specific as showing Jemaah Islamiyah as a

9 terror group stating “because of insufficient proof it exists” (Cianflone, et al 2007). Even with overwhelming proof from foreign countries and internal investigation that Jemaah Islamiyah was responsible for the 2002 Bali Nightclub bombing. The Indonesian government can be seen to follow a deeply religious government framework, which makes changing of laws or the proposition of new laws difficult. However, Indonesia could have had an alternate approach to the 2002 Bali Nightclub bombings by working with additional Western countries. While Indonesia did work with primarily with Australia and the United States, more could have been done or advocated for. For example, the United States focuses the majority of their military presence in the Middle East (Cianflone et al, 2007). Indonesia could have worked with the United States to establish military resources into the country. This does not necessarily mean to deploy troops, military resources can include training and surveillance, which could deter terrorism and potentially stop other terrorist attacks within the country. Current Approaches and Alternatives: Indonesia’s overall counterterrorism approach since the 2002 Bali Nightclub bombings can be seen as the criminal justice approach. This approach can be defined as “terrorism has been treated foremost as a crime, and a coercive counterterrorism strategy has been adopted by the Indonesian government” (Rucktaschel, 2019). This can be seen by the Indonesian government establishing Densus 88 which can be described as an anti-terrorism unit within the Indonesian Police. Densus 88 has been widely responsible for tracking down and perusing those suspects that were responsible for the 2002 Bali Nightclub bombings. This information shows that Indonesia has followed the criminal justice approach which defines terrorism is treated as a crime. In 2009, Indonesia established the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) as

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10 the national agency responsible for counterterrorism, yet Densus 88 has remained separate from BNPT. The Indonesian government follows the criminal justice approach, which includes Densus 88 and the BNPT in order to combat terrorism within the country, which includes the Indonesian military taking a role within the criminal justice approach. There are arguments, including that of President Widodo advocating for a stronger, more inclusive role for the military within the counterterrorism realm within the country (Rucktaschel, 2019). On the others side, human rights organizations have advocated for President Widodo keep the same or limit the military’s role in regard for counterterrorism which would help limit power abuse from the military (Rucktaschel, 2019). It should be noted that in Surabaya in 2018 Islamic militants conducted a terrorist attack which made way for the Indonesian government to allow the military a larger role within counterterrorism (Rucktaschel, 2019). With this, the arguments to include the Indonesian government more or less into the criminal justice counterterrorism approach that is currently seen within Indonesia. Indonesia follows the criminal justice approach to counterterrorism, which has had debate regarding specific aspects within the approach that has been put forward by the Indonesian government. It is also important to analyze the effectiveness of the country’s current counterterrorism approach. The criminal justice approach is working to a degree within Indonesia. For example, Densus 88 was able to capture many individuals that were responsible for the 2002 Bali Nightclub bombings. More recently in 2020, Densus 88 captured Aris Sumarsono who was the commander of Jemaah Islamiyah at the time of the Bali Nightclub bombings. Although Densus 88 has been successful, terrorism has continued throughout the past two decades. Mujahidin Indonesia Timur,

11 a well-known terrorist organization in Indonesia, along with Jemaah Islamiyah continued to carry out terrorist attacks. The continued attacks allowed the military to continue become more involved in the criminal justice approach. The Indonesian military carried out successful operations against Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, yet the local Indonesian population suffered from poverty and homelessness following the operation (Rucktaschel, 2019). There have been arguments on the military’s role within the current counterterrorism approach, which could hinder the effectiveness of the overall government’s approach, some of the argument can be drawn from the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur operations. Parts of the operation were successful, yet at the cost of Indonesian citizens. While the criminal justice approach is effective for Indonesia, they could incorporate aspects of another counterterrorism approach to have a more comprehensive approach. Indonesia should examine the defensive counterterrorism approach. This approach can be described as “measures aimed at presenting terrorist attacks from taking place” (Rucktaschel, 2019). There are many physical examples of this approach that can be examined and incorporated into Indonesia. Some examples include “mitigation efforts such as physical improvements to structures that have potential to become a target, surveillance, and increased security measures outside buildings along with inside that could become a target” (Rucktaschel, 2019). This approach being incorporated into the countries current criminal justice approach can help deter and possibly limit the severity of future attacks. With this, the tourist and Indonesian population could possibly feel a sense of security that Indonesia is taking steps in the right direction. Looking to the future, Indonesia incorporating the defensive counterterrorism approach with their criminal justice approach will have crucial benefits to combatting terrorism within the county. The defensive counterterrorism approach helps limit the destruction caused by terrorists

12 within Indonesia, and protects infrastructure, which in return will save lives. This has been described by Schell (2003) “physical barriers can help increase the separation between vehicles and buildings or crowds… these barriers would reduce the population density of an area a vehicle bomb could affect”. While the defensive counterterrorism approach will not necessarily stop terrorism completely within Indonesia, if paired with the country’s current criminal justice approach, it can give the country a more correlated and inclusive approach.

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13 Reference: BBC News. (2012). The 12 October 2002 Bali Bombing Plot. https://www.bbc.com/news/world- asia-19881138 Chew, A. (2020). Indonesia: Densus 88 Captures Suspected Jemaah Islamiyah Commander. Retrieved from. https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/indonesian/commander- captured-12122020145510.html Cianflone, M. et al. (2007). Anatomy of a Terrorist Attack: An In-depth Investigation Into the 2002 Bali, Indonesia, Bombings. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/50173/07_Bali.pdf Global Security. (n.d.). Bali Nightclub Bombing. https://www.globalsecurity.org/security/ops/bali.htm History. (2020). Terrorists Kill 202 in Bali. https://www.history.com/this-day-in- history/terrorists-kill-202-in-bali Morley, B. (2006). Terrorist bombings: Motives, methods, and patterns of injuries. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1574626706000759 National Museum Australia. (n.d.). Bai Bombings. https://www.nma.gov.au/defining- moments/resources/bali-bombings Lindsey, T. (n.d.). Indonesia’s New Anti-Terrorism Law: Damned if you Do, Damned if you Don’t. https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/1546316/Indonesias_new_Anti_T errorism_Law_Damned_if_you_do_Damned_if_you_dont1.pdf McDowell, R. (2002). Indonesia Pledges Terrorism Crackdown. https://tulsaworld.com/archive/indonesia-pledges-terrorism-crackdown/article_121d518a- 2d3d-55de-ba5b-3daeea364d45.html Ramakrishna, K. (2004). Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Ideological and Political Dimensions. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27913251?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents Rucktaschel, K. (2019). Tracing Indonesia’s Counterterrorism Measures Since 2002 Bali Bombing. Retrieved from https://thediplomat.com/2019/09/tracing-indonesias- counterterrorism-measures-since-the-2002-bali-bombings/ Schmid, A. P. (Ed.). (2011). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. London, UK: Routledge. http://snhu- media.snhu.edu/files/course_repository/graduate/cj/cj530/cj530_module_one_terrorism_ definition.pdf

14 Sherlock, S. (20020). The Bali Bombing: What it Means for Indonesia. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Li brary/Publications_Archive/CIB/cib0203/03Cib04 Schell, T. (2003). Designing Airports for Security. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP251.html Stanford University. (n.d.). Jemaah Islamiyah. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/jemaah-islamiyah United Nations Security Council. (2011). Jemaah Islamiyah. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/entity/je maah-islamiyah

Global Terrorism Final Project

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