Consider two political candidates A and B facing an electorate with ideologicalpositions uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. (To remind you, uniformly distributedmeans there are equal numbers of voters in the interval between 0.4 and 0.6 as between0.8 and 1.0 and any interval of the same length.) Candidates want to maximize their voteshares. Each simultaneously and independently of the other announces a position betweenO and 1. A voter chooses to vote for a candidate who is closest to her but will abstain ratherthan vote for a candidate whose announced position is more than 0.20 distance away.Is there a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies? Explain your answer.

Nash equilibrium is a concept that is used in Game theory mainly. It is used to determine the…

Answered: Consider two political candidates A and…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

THE NEXT TWO QUESTIONS ARE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING SITUATION: We have three voters and three alternatives: Triangle, Circle, and Square. There are three possible lists of individual preferences: I: Voter 1: T, C, S Voter 2: S, T, C Voter 3: C, T, S II: Voter 1: T, C, S Voter 2: S, T, C Voter 3: T, S, C III: Voter 1: S, C, T Voter 2: C, S, T Voter 3: T, S, C 6. In which of the three lists do voters have single-peaked preferences? (HINT: Think about ordering the shapes either alphabetically or by number of corners.) a) All of them. b) II only. c) None of them. d) I and II only. e) I only. 7. Suppose that a given social choice procedure chooses T as the winner in Situation I, and chooses C and S as the winners in Situation II. Which properties can we conclude are violated by that social choice procedure? a) The Pareto condition but not the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition. b) The Pareto condition, the Condorcet condition, and the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives…
In a congressional district somewhere in the U.S., a new representative is being elected. The voters all have one-dimensional political views that can be neatly arrayed on a left-right spectrum. We can define the ”location” of a citizen’s political views in the following way. The citizen with the most extreme left-wing views is said to be at point 0 and the citizen with the most extreme right-wing views is said to be at point 1. If a citizen has views that are to the right of the views of the fraction x of the state’s population, that citizen’s views are said to be located at point x. There are two candidates for the congressional seat and they are forced to publicly state their own political position simultaneously on the zero-one left-right scale. 1.a Suppose voters always vote for the candidate whose stated position is nearest to their own views and suppose each candidate cares only about getting as many votes as possible. In equilibrium, what will be the two candidates’ positions?…
Consider two companies bidding to be at the top of a search engine's results for a given keyword. Company 1 values the top position at v₁ = 8. Both company 1 and company 2 know company 1's value. However, only company 2 knows its own valuation for the top position, which can take two values: v₂ = 6 or v₂ = 10. Company 1 believes that company 2 has a valuation of ₂ = 6 with probability and a valuation of v2 = 10 with probability. Each company chooses simultaneously whether to submit a bid of b = 6 or a bid of b = 8. The company which submitted the highest bid wins the auction and obtains the top position in the search engine. If both firms submit the same bid, then firm 1 wins the auction. A company's payoff is therefore: V₁ = {o vi- bi if it wins the auction if it loses the auction 1) Suppose that company 2 bids b2 = 6 when v2 = 6 and bids b2 = 8 when v2 = 10. What value of b1 is company 1's best response to this strategy? Hint: explain first in which cases company 1 wins, then give…
In a survey of 400 likely voters, 214 responded that they would vote for the incumbent and 186 responded that they would vote for the challenger. Let p denote the fraction of all likely voters who preferred the incumbent at Α the time of the survey, and let p be the fraction of survey respondents who preferred the incumbent. Using the survey results, the estimated value of p is 0.5350. (Round your response to four decimal places.) ^ Using p(1 - p)/n as the estimator of the variance of p, the standard error of the estimator is 0.0249. (Round your response to four decimal places.) The p-value for the test Ho: p = 0.5 versus H₁: p 0.5 is 0.160. (Round your response to three decimal places.) The p-value for the test Ho: p = 0.5 versus H₁: p > 0.5 is (Round your response to three decimal places.)
Exercise 3.14: Challenging Question. In an attempt to reduce the deficit, the government of Italy has decided to sell a 14th century palace near Rome. The palace is in disrepair and is not generating any revenue for the government. From now on we'll call the government Player G. A Chinese millionaire has offered to purchase the palace for $p. Alternatively, Player G can organize an auction among n interested parties (n ≥ 2). The participants to the auction (we'll call them players) have been randomly assigned labels 1,2,...,n. Player is willing to pay up to $p, for the palace, where p, is a positive integer. For the auction assume the following: (1) it is a simultaneous, sealed-bid second-price auction, (2) bids must be non-negative integers, (3) each player only cares about his own wealth, (4) the tie-breaking rule for the auction is that the palace is given to that player who has the lowest index (e.g. if the highest bid was submitted by Players 3, 5 and 12 then the palace is given…
Match the following according to the criterion. If a candidate receives [ Choose ] more than half the first- place votes in an election, then that candidate should be declared the winner. If a candidate is favored [ Choose ] when compared separately with every other candidate in an election, then that candidate should be declared the winner. If a candidate wins an [ Choose] election and, in a reelection, the only changes are changes that favor the candidate, then that candidate should win the reelection. If a candidate wins an [ Choose ] election and, in a recount, the only changes are that one or more of the other candidates are removed from the ballot, then that candidate should still win the election.
When Tanner watches a movie on Netflix, their viewing is . in consumption because other people able to watch the movie at the same time. Select an answer and submit. For keyboard navigation, use the up/down arrow keys to select an answer. nonrival; are b rival; are rival; are not nonrival; are not
Tax liability is given by the function T(y) = -10,000 + 0.25y where y is income. 7. The marginal tax rate in Tuvalu is: 8. The average tax rate in Tuvalu on an income of 40,000 is equal to: 9. The tax system is Tuvalu is; a) progressive b) regressive c) proportional
a Company should never enter a market where political risk is high. A) True B) False

Recommended textbooks for you

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Economics

ISBN:

9780190931919

Author:

NEWNAN

Publisher:

Oxford University Press

Principles of Economics (12th Edition)

Economics

ISBN:

9780134078779

Author:

Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster

Publisher:

PEARSON

Engineering Economy (17th Edition)

Economics

ISBN:

9780134870069

Author:

William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling

Publisher:

PEARSON

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Economics

ISBN:

9780190931919

Author:

NEWNAN

Publisher:

Oxford University Press

Principles of Economics (12th Edition)

Economics

ISBN:

9780134078779

Author:

Karl E. Case, Ray C. Fair, Sharon E. Oster

Publisher:

PEARSON

Engineering Economy (17th Edition)

Economics

ISBN:

9780134870069

Author:

William G. Sullivan, Elin M. Wicks, C. Patrick Koelling

Publisher:

PEARSON

Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)

Economics

ISBN:

9781305585126

Author:

N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:

Cengage Learning

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

Economics

ISBN:

9781337106665

Author:

Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:

Cengage Learning

Managerial Economics & Business Strategy (Mcgraw-…

Economics

ISBN:

9781259290619

Author:

Michael Baye, Jeff Prince

Publisher:

McGraw-Hill Education

SEE MORE TEXTBOOKS