Match the following according to the criterion. If a candidate receives [Choose ] more than half the first- place votes in an election, then that V[Choose] candidate should be declared the winner. irrelevant If a candidate is favored alternatives when compared separately with every majority other candidate in an election, then that candidate should be declared the winner. monotonicity If a candidate wins an head-to-head election and, in a reelection, the only changes are changes that favor the candidate, then that candidate should win the reelection. If a candidate wins an [ Choose ] election and, in a recount, the only changes are that one or more of the other candidates are removed from the ballot, then that candidate should still win the election. <>

Match the following according to the criterion. If a candidate receives [Choose ] more than half the first- place votes in an election, then that V[Choose] candidate should be declared the winner. irrelevant If a candidate is favored alternatives when compared separately with every majority other candidate in an election, then that candidate should be declared the winner. monotonicity If a candidate wins an head-to-head election and, in a reelection, the only changes are changes that favor the candidate, then that candidate should win the reelection. If a candidate wins an [ Choose ] election and, in a recount, the only changes are that one or more of the other candidates are removed from the ballot, then that candidate should still win the election. <>

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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