Match the following according to the criterion. If a candidate receives [Choose ] more than half the first- place votes in an election, then that V[Choose] candidate should be declared the winner. irrelevant If a candidate is favored alternatives when compared separately with every majority other candidate in an election, then that candidate should be declared the winner. monotonicity If a candidate wins an head-to-head election and, in a reelection, the only changes are changes that favor the candidate, then that candidate should win the reelection. If a candidate wins an [ Choose ] election and, in a recount, the only changes are that one or more of the other candidates are removed from the ballot, then that candidate should still win the election. <>

Match the following according to the criterion. If a candidate receives [Choose ] more than half the first- place votes in an election, then that V[Choose] candidate should be declared the winner. irrelevant If a candidate is favored alternatives when compared separately with every majority other candidate in an election, then that candidate should be declared the winner. monotonicity If a candidate wins an head-to-head election and, in a reelection, the only changes are changes that favor the candidate, then that candidate should win the reelection. If a candidate wins an [ Choose ] election and, in a recount, the only changes are that one or more of the other candidates are removed from the ballot, then that candidate should still win the election. <>

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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The question is in the attached image. Please note to only complete sections D and E. ignore a,b and c
Consider the Cobb-Douglas utility function Suppose that a poll tax T = Ti for all i is levied on each of N members of society. Tax revenues are used to finance a public good G. a. Show that the majority voting outcome involves the amount of public good G = αNYm, where Ym denotes the before-tax income of the median voter. b. Now suppose that a proportional income tax Ti = tYi is levied. Show that the majority voting outcome involves the amount of public good is the mean income level. c. When income is uniformly distributed, which outcome is closest to the ancient outcome?
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