Consider the race for governor of a small state. The population of the state is evenly divided between three cities-Riverville, Hanover, and Danbury. The governor's race is between Ron Ruskin (the mayor of Riverville) and Ted Topple (the mayor of Hanover). Assume that no matter what is said during the campaign, Ruskin can count on the support of 100% of the Riverville population, and Topple can count on the support of 100% of the Hanover population. Assume 100% voter participation. According to the result of majority-rule voting, the next governor will be the one preferred by the majority of the residents of The two candidates are asked in a debate about their support of recreational subsidies. Public opinion polls in the city you just identified have shown the following about the level of recreational subsidies desired: • 70% want a low level • 20% want a medium level • 10% want a high level Assuming that voters prefer outcomes closer to their preferred choices to outcomes further away, the median voter model predicts that the candidates will support a level of recreational subsidies.

Consider the race for governor of a small state. The population of the state is evenly divided between three cities-Riverville, Hanover, and Danbury. The governor's race is between Ron Ruskin (the mayor of Riverville) and Ted Topple (the mayor of Hanover). Assume that no matter what is said during the campaign, Ruskin can count on the support of 100% of the Riverville population, and Topple can count on the support of 100% of the Hanover population. Assume 100% voter participation. According to the result of majority-rule voting, the next governor will be the one preferred by the majority of the residents of The two candidates are asked in a debate about their support of recreational subsidies. Public opinion polls in the city you just identified have shown the following about the level of recreational subsidies desired: • 70% want a low level • 20% want a medium level • 10% want a high level Assuming that voters prefer outcomes closer to their preferred choices to outcomes further away, the median voter model predicts that the candidates will support a level of recreational subsidies.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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