THE NEXT TWO QUESTIONS ARE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING SITUATION: We havethree voters and three alternatives: Triangle, Circle, and Square. There are threepossible lists of individual preferences:I: Voter 1: T, C, SVoter 2: S, T, CVoter 3: C, T, SII: Voter 1: T, C, SVoter 2: S, T, CVoter 3: T, S, CIII: Voter 1: S, C, TVoter 2: C, S, TVoter 3: T, S, C6. In which of the three lists do voters have single-peaked preferences? (HINT:Think about ordering the shapes either alphabetically or by number of corners.)a) All of them.b) II only.c) None of them.d) I and II only.e) I only.7. Suppose that a given social choice procedure chooses T as the winner inSituation I, and chooses C and S as the winners in Situation II. Which propertiescan we conclude are violated by that social choice procedure?a) The Pareto condition but not the Independence of Irrelevant Alternativescondition.b) The Pareto condition, the Condorcet condition, and the Independenceof Irrelevant Alternatives condition.c) The Condorcet condition but not the Pareto condition.d) The Always a Winner condition.e) The monotonicity condition but not the Condorcet condition.

(6) (b) II only.Here's why:Single-peaked preferences mean a voter has a most-preferred option (the…

Answered: THE NEXT TWO QUESTIONS ARE BASED ON THE…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Suppose national income is Y = $4,000, household consumption is C = $2,900, and savings is S = 700. Then, Group of answer choices A) taxes are T = 1,100. B) none of the other options. C) taxes are T = 400. D) taxes are T = 300. E) taxes are T = 1,800.
When Tanner watches a movie on Netflix, their viewing is . in consumption because other people able to watch the movie at the same time. Select an answer and submit. For keyboard navigation, use the up/down arrow keys to select an answer. nonrival; are b rival; are rival; are not nonrival; are not
First-mover advantage is more important. Multiple Choice than in a repeated sequential game; in a one-round sequential game in a repeated game, in a sequential game in an ultimatum game; in a repeated game to those who have less to bargain with, to those who have more to bargain with What is moral hazard? Multiple Choice The tendency for people to behave in a riskier way or put forth less effort when they do not face the full consequences of their actions The tendency for people to engage in behavior that is considered highly desirable by the person who bears the cost of the behavior An agreement made between buyers and sellers who have the same information about the quality of a good or the riskaness of a situation A situation in which buyers and sellers have different information about the quality of a good or the riskiness of a situation
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Exercise 1.4. There are two players. Each player is given an unmarked envelope and asked to put in it either nothing or $300 of his own money or $600. A referee collects the envelopes, opens them, gathers all the money, then adds 50% of that amount (using his own money) and divides the total into two equal parts which he then distributes to the players. (a) Represent this game frame with two alternative tables: the first table showing in each cell the amount of money distributed to Player 1 and the amount of money distributed to Player 2, the second table showing the change in wealth of each player (money received minus contribution). (b) Suppose that Player 1 has some animosity towards the referee and ranks the outcomes in terms of how much money the referee loses (the more, the better), while Player 2 is selfish and greedy and ranks the outcomes in terms of her own net gain. Represent the corresponding game using a table. (c) Is there a strict dominant-strategy equilibrium?
Suppose the market for used cars has 50% good cars (peaches) and 50% bad cars (lemons). There are an unlimited number of potential buyers. Buyers are willing to pay $9,000 for a good car and $3,000 for a bad car. Sellers value good cars at $6,500 and bad cars at $1,000. p1. If both buyers and sellers know whether cars are good or bad, which cars will sell in the market and at what price or prices? p2. If neither buyers nor sellers know whether cars are good or bad, which cars will sell in the market and at what price or prices? p3. If only sellers know whether cars are good or bad, which cars will sell in the market and at what price or prices? Justify your answer.
QUESTION 2 You work for a big retail chain that operates in a large number of regional markets and you want to investigate the effect of increased marketing spending on sales. You randomly select half of the markets and increase the marketing budget in these markets by 10%. The rest of the markets are allocated the same marketing budget as before. Then comparing the average sales in the markets with increased marketing budget and average sales in the remaining markets will give an unbiased estimate of the true causal effect of increased marketing spending on sales. True O False
Q1 Market-clearing Prices Consider a standard position auction. There are two positions: Top (T) and Bottom (B). Position T receives rr = 150 clicks per day and position B receives rg = 50 clicks per day. There are four bidders (B1-B4) with the following dollar values per click: v = 8, v 6, vs = 4, vs 2. (a) Find the efficient assignment. (b) Find the lowest per click market-clearing prices. (c) Find the highest per click market-clearing prices, (d) Fully specify and draw the complete set of ALL per click market-clearing prices.
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