THE NEXT TWO QUESTIONS ARE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING SITUATION: We have three voters and three alternatives: Triangle, Circle, and Square. There are three possible lists of individual preferences: I: Voter 1: T, C, S Voter 2: S, T, C Voter 3: C, T, S II: Voter 1: T, C, S Voter 2: S, T, C Voter 3: T, S, C III: Voter 1: S, C, T Voter 2: C, S, T Voter 3: T, S, C 6. In which of the three lists do voters have single-peaked preferences? (HINT: Think about ordering the shapes either alphabetically or by number of corners.) a) All of them. b) II only. c) None of them. d) I and II only. e) I only. 7. Suppose that a given social choice procedure chooses T as the winner in Situation I, and chooses C and S as the winners in Situation II. Which properties can we conclude are violated by that social choice procedure? a) The Pareto condition but not the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition. b) The Pareto condition, the Condorcet condition, and the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition. c) The Condorcet condition but not the Pareto condition. d) The Always a Winner condition. e) The monotonicity condition but not the Condorcet condition.

THE NEXT TWO QUESTIONS ARE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING SITUATION: We have three voters and three alternatives: Triangle, Circle, and Square. There are three possible lists of individual preferences: I: Voter 1: T, C, S Voter 2: S, T, C Voter 3: C, T, S II: Voter 1: T, C, S Voter 2: S, T, C Voter 3: T, S, C III: Voter 1: S, C, T Voter 2: C, S, T Voter 3: T, S, C 6. In which of the three lists do voters have single-peaked preferences? (HINT: Think about ordering the shapes either alphabetically or by number of corners.) a) All of them. b) II only. c) None of them. d) I and II only. e) I only. 7. Suppose that a given social choice procedure chooses T as the winner in Situation I, and chooses C and S as the winners in Situation II. Which properties can we conclude are violated by that social choice procedure? a) The Pareto condition but not the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition. b) The Pareto condition, the Condorcet condition, and the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition. c) The Condorcet condition but not the Pareto condition. d) The Always a Winner condition. e) The monotonicity condition but not the Condorcet condition.

Microeconomics A Contemporary Intro

10th Edition

ISBN:9781285635101

Author:MCEACHERN

Publisher:MCEACHERN

Chapter16: Public Goods And Public Choice

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 3QFR

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Similar questions

Based on the theory of rational ignorance, what should we expect to happen to voter turnout as the internet makes information easier to obtain?
How does rational ignorance discourage voting?
Suppose there is an election for Soft Drink Commissioner. The field consists of one candidate hunt the Pepsi petty and four from the Coca-Cola party. This would seem to indicate a strong preference for Coca-Cola among the voting population, but the Pepsi candidate ends up winning in a landslide. Why does this happen?

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