THE NEXT TWO QUESTIONS ARE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING SITUATION: We have three voters and three alternatives: Triangle, Circle, and Square. There are three possible lists of individual preferences: I: Voter 1: T, C, S Voter 2: S, T, C Voter 3: C, T, S II: Voter 1: T, C, S Voter 2: S, T, C Voter 3: T, S, C III: Voter 1: S, C, T Voter 2: C, S, T Voter 3: T, S, C 6. In which of the three lists do voters have single-peaked preferences? (HINT: Think about ordering the shapes either alphabetically or by number of corners.) a) All of them. b) II only. c) None of them. d) I and II only. e) I only. 7. Suppose that a given social choice procedure chooses T as the winner in Situation I, and chooses C and S as the winners in Situation II. Which properties can we conclude are violated by that social choice procedure? a) The Pareto condition but not the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition. b) The Pareto condition, the Condorcet condition, and the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition. c) The Condorcet condition but not the Pareto condition. d) The Always a Winner condition. e) The monotonicity condition but not the Condorcet condition.
THE NEXT TWO QUESTIONS ARE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING SITUATION: We have three voters and three alternatives: Triangle, Circle, and Square. There are three possible lists of individual preferences: I: Voter 1: T, C, S Voter 2: S, T, C Voter 3: C, T, S II: Voter 1: T, C, S Voter 2: S, T, C Voter 3: T, S, C III: Voter 1: S, C, T Voter 2: C, S, T Voter 3: T, S, C 6. In which of the three lists do voters have single-peaked preferences? (HINT: Think about ordering the shapes either alphabetically or by number of corners.) a) All of them. b) II only. c) None of them. d) I and II only. e) I only. 7. Suppose that a given social choice procedure chooses T as the winner in Situation I, and chooses C and S as the winners in Situation II. Which properties can we conclude are violated by that social choice procedure? a) The Pareto condition but not the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition. b) The Pareto condition, the Condorcet condition, and the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition. c) The Condorcet condition but not the Pareto condition. d) The Always a Winner condition. e) The monotonicity condition but not the Condorcet condition.
Chapter19: Externalities And Public Goods
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 19.12P
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Transcribed Image Text:THE NEXT TWO QUESTIONS ARE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING SITUATION: We have
three voters and three alternatives: Triangle, Circle, and Square. There are three
possible lists of individual preferences:
I: Voter 1: T, C, S
Voter 2: S, T, C
Voter 3: C, T, S
II: Voter 1: T, C, S
Voter 2: S, T, C
Voter 3: T, S, C
III: Voter 1: S, C, T
Voter 2: C, S, T
Voter 3: T, S, C
6. In which of the three lists do voters have single-peaked preferences? (HINT:
Think about ordering the shapes either alphabetically or by number of corners.)
a) All of them.
b) II only.
c) None of them.
d) I and II only.
e) I only.
7. Suppose that a given social choice procedure chooses T as the winner in
Situation I, and chooses C and S as the winners in Situation II. Which properties
can we conclude are violated by that social choice procedure?
a) The Pareto condition but not the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
condition.
b) The Pareto condition, the Condorcet condition, and the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives condition.
c) The Condorcet condition but not the Pareto condition.
d) The Always a Winner condition.
e) The monotonicity condition but not the Condorcet condition.
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