Let's say we have a game called "guess 2/3 of the average," where players can choose any number x ∈ [0, 100]. 5% of players are at level N0, 40% at level N1, 35% at level N2, 15% at level N3, and 5% at level N4. Players at level N0 choose a number randomly, while players at higher levels choose a number according to their beliefs, which are as follows: players at higher levels believe that all other players are one level lower than themselves. (a) What will be the winning number and which level players will be the winners? (b) Under the assumptions of classical game theory, the mentioned version of the game "guess 2/3 of the average" has exactly one equilibrium, in which everyone chooses the number 0. Prove that this outcome is indeed a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Let's say we have a game called "guess 2/3 of the average," where players can choose any number x ∈ [0, 100]. 5% of players are at level N0, 40% at level N1, 35% at level N2, 15% at level N3, and 5% at level N4. Players at level N0 choose a number randomly, while players at higher levels choose a number according to their beliefs, which are as follows: players at higher levels believe that all other players are one level lower than themselves. (a) What will be the winning number and which level players will be the winners? (b) Under the assumptions of classical
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