QUESTION 38 What are the two routes that we use to process information, according to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM)? O central & minor O central & peripheral O fundamental & peripheral O dominant & central QUESTION 39 Which statement best explains the Extended Parallel Processing Model's take-home message? O Fear appeals are most effective when they get the attention of their audience but are not so intense as to induce too high levels of fear. O The more intense a fear appeal, the less successful it will be at enacting behavior change. O Fear appeals are more successful if they are more intense. O Fear appeals simply do not work in changing behaviors.

QUESTION 38 What are the two routes that we use to process information, according to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM)? O central & minor O central & peripheral O fundamental & peripheral O dominant & central QUESTION 39 Which statement best explains the Extended Parallel Processing Model's take-home message? O Fear appeals are most effective when they get the attention of their audience but are not so intense as to induce too high levels of fear. O The more intense a fear appeal, the less successful it will be at enacting behavior change. O Fear appeals are more successful if they are more intense. O Fear appeals simply do not work in changing behaviors.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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