Assume both players have equal bargaining weights. Describe the negotiation equilibrium of this game. What happens to the hold-up problem once investment becomes unverifiable to player B? (in other words, does S choose a high level of investment in the negotiation equilibrium of this game?).

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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3. Now consider the following twist on the previous problem: Suppose that player B
cannot verify the investment made by S. Therefore, in the first stage negotiation
they negotiate a single fee, p, which player B agrees to pay to S. The extensive form
representation now looks like this (again the payoffs to B are listed first):
18 -P.P - 10
R
B. S
-p.p - 10
7 -P.P
Default
R
-p.p
0, 0
Assume both players have equal bargaining weights. Describe the negotiation
equilibrium of this game. What happens to the hold-up problem once investment
becomes unverifiable to player B? (in other words, does S choose a high level of
investment in the negotiation equilibrium of this game?).
Transcribed Image Text:3. Now consider the following twist on the previous problem: Suppose that player B cannot verify the investment made by S. Therefore, in the first stage negotiation they negotiate a single fee, p, which player B agrees to pay to S. The extensive form representation now looks like this (again the payoffs to B are listed first): 18 -P.P - 10 R B. S -p.p - 10 7 -P.P Default R -p.p 0, 0 Assume both players have equal bargaining weights. Describe the negotiation equilibrium of this game. What happens to the hold-up problem once investment becomes unverifiable to player B? (in other words, does S choose a high level of investment in the negotiation equilibrium of this game?).
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