The situation is the case of 'Partially Aligned Interests: Financial Adviser and Investor' in Chapter 9. You will complete a similar analysis for the case where the adviser's report has to be the coarser choice between B or "not B." In this case, the game is represented as the following tree: Nature ● B (1/3) M (1/3) G (1/3) Bad Adviser ● Not Bad Adviser • Not Bad Adviser ● Not Bad You You You Invest Not Invest Not i Invest I Not Not Invest "Not 2,-52 0,0 2-L, -52 0,0 2.2, -1.2 0,0 13, 42 0, 0 where L is the cost of lost reputation from exaggeration. The babbling Nash Equilibrium of this game is
The situation is the case of 'Partially Aligned Interests: Financial Adviser and Investor' in Chapter 9. You will complete a similar analysis for the case where the adviser's report has to be the coarser choice between B or "not B." In this case, the game is represented as the following tree: Nature ● B (1/3) M (1/3) G (1/3) Bad Adviser ● Not Bad Adviser • Not Bad Adviser ● Not Bad You You You Invest Not Invest Not i Invest I Not Not Invest "Not 2,-52 0,0 2-L, -52 0,0 2.2, -1.2 0,0 13, 42 0, 0 where L is the cost of lost reputation from exaggeration. The babbling Nash Equilibrium of this game is
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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Question
![The situation is the case of 'Partially Aligned Interests: Financial Adviser and Investor' in Chapter 9. You will complete a similar analysis for the case where the adviser's report has to be the coarser choice between B or "not B." In this case, the game is represented as the
following tree:
Nature
●
O
O
O
B (1/3)
M (1/3)
G (1/3)
Bad
Adviser
●
Not Bad
Adviser
●
Not Bad
Adviser
O
Not Bad
(Always NB, Invest if NB)
(NB only if M or G, Invest if NB)
(Always NB, Not if NB)
You
(NB only if M or G, Not if NB)
You
I
●
You
Invest
Not
Invest
Not
1
You !
!Not
I
Invest
'Invest
Not
2,-52
0, 0
where L is the cost of lost reputation from exaggeration. The babbling Nash Equilibrium of this game is
2-L, -52
0, 0
2.2, -1.2
0, 0
13, 42
0, 0](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F8a3ca03b-6570-48d2-9389-54ae2514335b%2F4479f407-b636-4869-9187-4f51d43d5f58%2Fl0htoc9_processed.png&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:The situation is the case of 'Partially Aligned Interests: Financial Adviser and Investor' in Chapter 9. You will complete a similar analysis for the case where the adviser's report has to be the coarser choice between B or "not B." In this case, the game is represented as the
following tree:
Nature
●
O
O
O
B (1/3)
M (1/3)
G (1/3)
Bad
Adviser
●
Not Bad
Adviser
●
Not Bad
Adviser
O
Not Bad
(Always NB, Invest if NB)
(NB only if M or G, Invest if NB)
(Always NB, Not if NB)
You
(NB only if M or G, Not if NB)
You
I
●
You
Invest
Not
Invest
Not
1
You !
!Not
I
Invest
'Invest
Not
2,-52
0, 0
where L is the cost of lost reputation from exaggeration. The babbling Nash Equilibrium of this game is
2-L, -52
0, 0
2.2, -1.2
0, 0
13, 42
0, 0
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