Consider a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information where players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose actions a₁ and a₂ in stage 1 and players 3 and 4 simultaneously choose actions a3 and a4 in stage 2. Provide the notation for the Nash equilibrium in stage 2. How come players 1 and 2 can anticipate this outcome in stage 2?

Consider a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information where players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose actions a₁ and a₂ in stage 1 and players 3 and 4 simultaneously choose actions a3 and a4 in stage 2. Provide the notation for the Nash equilibrium in stage 2. How come players 1 and 2 can anticipate this outcome in stage 2?

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.7P

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2. Consider a two-stage game of complete but imperfect information where players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose actions a₁ and a₂ in stage 1 and players 3 and 4 simultaneously choose actions a3 and a in stage 2. Provide the notation for the Nash equilibrium in stage 2. How come players 1 and 2 can anticipate this outcome in stage 2?
Game Theory and Strategic Choices – End of Chapter Problem The Old Familiar and The Beehive are the only two bistros in town. Each is trying to decide whether or not it should advertise in the local newspaper. The accompanying payoff table gives their weekly profits under each possible outcome. The Beehive The Beehive does advertise does not advertise The Old Familiar The Old Familiar earns $X in profits. earns $3,500 in profits. The Old Familiar does advertise The Beehive The Beehive earns $Y in profits. earns $2,250 in profits. The Old Familiar The Old Familiar earns $2,000 in profits. earns $2,500 in profits. The Old Familiar does not advertise The Beehive The Beehive earns $4,000 in profits. earns $3,500 in profits. a. Which combination or combinations of X and Y would make a situation in which The Old Familiar does not advertise and The Beehive advertises a Nash equilibrium?
I need question 3, question 2 is only for background informati
Consider the following game : Stag Rabbit Stag 9, 9 0, 8 Rabbit 8, 0 7, 7 The first payoff is that of player 1 and the second that of player 2. a. ) Draw the extensive form of the simultaneous game. Find all the Nash equilibrium. p. Suppose player 1 moves first or we are in a sequential game now. Draw the extensive form in the sequential version. c. What is the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in the sequential version? d. ) Explain why it is an SPNE.
Use the following payoff matrix to answer the following questions Suppose this is a one-shot game: a. Determine the dominant strategy for each player. If such strategies do not exist, explain why not. b. Determine the secure strategy for each player. If such strategies do not exist, explain why not. c. Determine the Nash equilibrium of this game. If such an equilibrium does not exist, explain why not.
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5. Consider a simultaneous game in which player A chooses one of two actions (Up or Down), and B chooses one of two actions (Left or Right). The game has the following payoff matrix, where the first payoff in each entry is for A and the second for B.(8 points) B Right Left 3,3 5,1 Down 2,2 4,4 a. Find the Nash equilibrium or equilibria. b. Which player, if any, has a dominant strategy? A Up
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1.a) If the three executives of a fraudulent organization report nothing to the authorities, each gets a payoff of 100. If at least one of them blows the whistle, then those who reported the fraud get 28, while those who didn’t get -100. Suppose they play a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where each is silent (does not report fraud) with probability p. What is p?A, 0.1B, 0.28C, 0.5D, 0.8 b) In a two-player game, with strategies and (some known and some unknown) payoffs as shown below, suppose a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists where 1 plays C with probability 3/4, and Player 2 randomizes over X, Y, and Z with equal probabilities. What are the pure-strategy equilibria of this game? A, (A, Y) and (B, X)B, (A, Z) and (C, Y)C, (B, X) and (C, X)D, (C, X) and (C, Y)
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