Suppose the game tree instead looks as follows R&D No R&D E No R&D &&D (0, 20). (10, 5). (10, 10). Copy it License Deny R&D In the revised game, how many strategies does I have? 4. 8. 16. 32. Acc. Fight 25,0 Acc. Fight Grant 10, 10 5,5 0, 20 -5,0 10,5 5, 20 What does the dashed line indicate? When I finds itself at one of the nodes that are connected by the dotted line, I will not know whether E has undertaken R&D or copied its product. After E moves, E will not know at which of the nodes that are connected by the dotted line I is located. The nodes that are connected by the dotted line lead to equivalent expected payoffs for I. The nodes that are connected by the dotted line lead to equivalent expected payoffs for E. 30, 5 In the revised game, what are the payoffs associated with the outcome that is derived through backward induction? Indeterminate, because we cannot resolve I's decisions without making additional assumptions about beliefs.

Suppose the game tree instead looks as follows R&D No R&D E No R&D &&D (0, 20). (10, 5). (10, 10). Copy it License Deny R&D In the revised game, how many strategies does I have? 4. 8. 16. 32. Acc. Fight 25,0 Acc. Fight Grant 10, 10 5,5 0, 20 -5,0 10,5 5, 20 What does the dashed line indicate? When I finds itself at one of the nodes that are connected by the dotted line, I will not know whether E has undertaken R&D or copied its product. After E moves, E will not know at which of the nodes that are connected by the dotted line I is located. The nodes that are connected by the dotted line lead to equivalent expected payoffs for I. The nodes that are connected by the dotted line lead to equivalent expected payoffs for E. 30, 5 In the revised game, what are the payoffs associated with the outcome that is derived through backward induction? Indeterminate, because we cannot resolve I's decisions without making additional assumptions about beliefs.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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