(a) Consider the following games which are commonly used in laboratory exper- iments on social preferences. For each: describe the game, explain how the game would be played by selfish players and summarise the main findings from the experimental evidence. i. Dictator game ii. Ultimatum bargaining game iii. Trust game (b) Carefully comment on the figure below, which shows the percentage of third parties who punish in the dictator game and is taken from Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), "Third party punishment and social norms", Evolution and Human Behavior 25(2). [10 marks] Percentage of punishers E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher/ Evolution and Human Behavior 25 (2004) 63-87 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 A percentage of third parties who punish --percentage of recipients who belief that third parties punish 0 10 20 30 Dictator's transfer to recipient Fig. 1. Percentage of third parties who punished in the dictator game. 40 50 (c) Explain why anonymity of the subjects is an important feature of public good game experiments.
(a) Consider the following games which are commonly used in laboratory exper- iments on social preferences. For each: describe the game, explain how the game would be played by selfish players and summarise the main findings from the experimental evidence. i. Dictator game ii. Ultimatum bargaining game iii. Trust game (b) Carefully comment on the figure below, which shows the percentage of third parties who punish in the dictator game and is taken from Fehr and Fischbacher (2004), "Third party punishment and social norms", Evolution and Human Behavior 25(2). [10 marks] Percentage of punishers E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher/ Evolution and Human Behavior 25 (2004) 63-87 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 A percentage of third parties who punish --percentage of recipients who belief that third parties punish 0 10 20 30 Dictator's transfer to recipient Fig. 1. Percentage of third parties who punished in the dictator game. 40 50 (c) Explain why anonymity of the subjects is an important feature of public good game experiments.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
Related questions
Question
![(a) Consider the following games which are commonly used in laboratory exper-
iments on social preferences. For each: describe the game, explain how the
game would be played by selfish players and summarise the main findings from
the experimental evidence.
i. Dictator game
ii. Ultimatum bargaining game
iii. Trust game
(b) Carefully comment on the figure below, which shows the percentage of third
parties who punish in the dictator game and is taken from Fehr and Fischbacher
(2004), "Third party punishment and social norms", Evolution and Human
Behavior 25(2). [10 marks]
Percentage of punishers
E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher/ Evolution and Human Behavior 25 (2004) 63-87
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
A
percentage of third parties who
punish
--percentage of recipients who
belief that third parties punish
0
10
20
30
Dictator's transfer to recipient
Fig. 1. Percentage of third parties who punished in the dictator game.
40
50
(c) Explain why anonymity of the subjects is an important feature of public good
game experiments.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2Febe020d4-f6d3-4816-bece-43b62e43513a%2F94874564-b7dd-4945-8e38-fe4dde5dbe85%2F2e0gq3i_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:(a) Consider the following games which are commonly used in laboratory exper-
iments on social preferences. For each: describe the game, explain how the
game would be played by selfish players and summarise the main findings from
the experimental evidence.
i. Dictator game
ii. Ultimatum bargaining game
iii. Trust game
(b) Carefully comment on the figure below, which shows the percentage of third
parties who punish in the dictator game and is taken from Fehr and Fischbacher
(2004), "Third party punishment and social norms", Evolution and Human
Behavior 25(2). [10 marks]
Percentage of punishers
E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher/ Evolution and Human Behavior 25 (2004) 63-87
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
A
percentage of third parties who
punish
--percentage of recipients who
belief that third parties punish
0
10
20
30
Dictator's transfer to recipient
Fig. 1. Percentage of third parties who punished in the dictator game.
40
50
(c) Explain why anonymity of the subjects is an important feature of public good
game experiments.
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