The following information can be used to answer Questions #10-11. Assume that 2 individuals, College Student and Professor, are participating in a game we'll call the Final Exam game. The student must decide between studying for their final exam, vs partying with friends and not studying at all. We'll characterize that choice as study vs party. Our professor must also choose between writing a hard exam and an easy exam. Teaching evaluations are in and our professor has tenure, so we'll assume the professor doesn't worry about the reaction of students to either type of exam (ie, no ex post benefits or costs), and we'll assume that it isn't clear whether one type of exam is easier to grade. We will assume that writing a harder exam does take a lot more effort than writing an easy exam. We will characterize the payoffs for each player as the Net Benefit they derive from each of the four possible outcomes. The professor's Net Benefit is expressed as NBp, and the college student's Net Benefit is expressed as NBS Here are the 4 possible outcomes in this game, along with the payoffs that the two players receive in each outcome. We'll also assume that more net benefit is preferred over less net benefit Outcome 1: The professor chooses to write an easy exam and college student chooses to party. As a result, we get the following payoffs NBp = 3, NBS = 5 Outcome 2: The professor chooses to write an easy exam and college student chooses study. As a result, we get the following payoffs: NBP = 5, NBS = 4 Outcome 3: The professor chooses to write a hard exam and college student chooses to party. As a result, we get the following payoffs NBp=2, NBS 2 Outcome 4: The professor chooses to write a hard exam and college student chooses to study. As a result, we get the following payoffs: NBP 4, NBS-3 Let's assume that this game as played as a sequential game. The questions below ask for the outcome of this game when one player is designated as the first mover, vs the other player. Professor party Student easy exam NB NB 3 5 study 5 party 2 2 hard exam study 4 3 What will be the outcome of this sequential game when the professor is the first mover? Note that you may use the game tree above to answer this question. Oa. Outcome 1: the student will choose to party and the professor will write an easy exam O b. Outcome 2: the student will choose to study and the professor will write an easy exam Oc. Outcome 3: the student will choose to party and the professor will write a hard exam Od. Outcome 4: the student will choose to study and the professor will write a hard exam
The following information can be used to answer Questions #10-11. Assume that 2 individuals, College Student and Professor, are participating in a game we'll call the Final Exam game. The student must decide between studying for their final exam, vs partying with friends and not studying at all. We'll characterize that choice as study vs party. Our professor must also choose between writing a hard exam and an easy exam. Teaching evaluations are in and our professor has tenure, so we'll assume the professor doesn't worry about the reaction of students to either type of exam (ie, no ex post benefits or costs), and we'll assume that it isn't clear whether one type of exam is easier to grade. We will assume that writing a harder exam does take a lot more effort than writing an easy exam. We will characterize the payoffs for each player as the Net Benefit they derive from each of the four possible outcomes. The professor's Net Benefit is expressed as NBp, and the college student's Net Benefit is expressed as NBS Here are the 4 possible outcomes in this game, along with the payoffs that the two players receive in each outcome. We'll also assume that more net benefit is preferred over less net benefit Outcome 1: The professor chooses to write an easy exam and college student chooses to party. As a result, we get the following payoffs NBp = 3, NBS = 5 Outcome 2: The professor chooses to write an easy exam and college student chooses study. As a result, we get the following payoffs: NBP = 5, NBS = 4 Outcome 3: The professor chooses to write a hard exam and college student chooses to party. As a result, we get the following payoffs NBp=2, NBS 2 Outcome 4: The professor chooses to write a hard exam and college student chooses to study. As a result, we get the following payoffs: NBP 4, NBS-3 Let's assume that this game as played as a sequential game. The questions below ask for the outcome of this game when one player is designated as the first mover, vs the other player. Professor party Student easy exam NB NB 3 5 study 5 party 2 2 hard exam study 4 3 What will be the outcome of this sequential game when the professor is the first mover? Note that you may use the game tree above to answer this question. Oa. Outcome 1: the student will choose to party and the professor will write an easy exam O b. Outcome 2: the student will choose to study and the professor will write an easy exam Oc. Outcome 3: the student will choose to party and the professor will write a hard exam Od. Outcome 4: the student will choose to study and the professor will write a hard exam
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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