Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions.         Player 2       Strategy  X Y Player 1  A      30, 30              16, -50 B     -50, 16        50, 50 A. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication.  check all that apply (16, −50) (−50, 16) (30, 30) (50, 50) Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? multiple choice (16, −50) (50, 50) (−50, 16) (30, 30) B. Suppose player 1 is permitted to “communicate” by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter? multiple choice  A or B What outcome do you think would occur as a result? multiple choice  (−50, 16) (16, −50) (30, 30) (50, 50) c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2’s choice before making her decision, and that th

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Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions.

        Player 2
      Strategy  X Y
Player 1  A      30, 30              16, -50
B     -50, 16        50, 50

A. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. 

check all that apply

(16, −50)

(−50, 16)

(30, 30)

(50, 50)

Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely? multiple choice

(16, −50)

(50, 50)

(−50, 16)

(30, 30)

B. Suppose player 1 is permitted to “communicate” by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently make their decisions. What should player 1 utter? multiple choice 

A

or

B

What outcome do you think would occur as a result? multiple choice

 (−50, 16)

(16, −50)

(30, 30)

(50, 50)

c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2’s choice before making her decision, and that this move structure is known by both players. What outcome would you expect? multiple choice 

(30, 30)

(16, −50)

(50, 50)

(−50, 16)

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