Consider a sequential game where there are two players, Jake and Sydney. Jake really likes Sydney and is hoping to run in to her at a party this weekend. Sydney can't stand Jake. There are two parties going on this weekend and each player's payoffs are a function of whether they see one another at the party. The payoff matrix is as follows: Sydney Party 1 Party 2 Party 1 6, 18 18,6 Jake Party 2 24,8 0,24 a) Does this game have a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium? b) What is the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium? c) Now suppose Sydney decides what party she is going to first. Her roommate is friends with Jake and will call him to tell him which party they go to. Write the extensive form of this game (game tree). d) What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium from part c?

Consider a sequential game where there are two players, Jake and Sydney. Jake really likes Sydney and is hoping to run in to her at a party this weekend. Sydney can't stand Jake. There are two parties going on this weekend and each player's payoffs are a function of whether they see one another at the party. The payoff matrix is as follows: Sydney Party 1 Party 2 Party 1 6, 18 18,6 Jake Party 2 24,8 0,24 a) Does this game have a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium? b) What is the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium? c) Now suppose Sydney decides what party she is going to first. Her roommate is friends with Jake and will call him to tell him which party they go to. Write the extensive form of this game (game tree). d) What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium from part c?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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When you are with a young child and want to show them something fun and new, there is the risk that, if they enjoy it, they'll ask for it over and over and over again, and if you ever say no they'll throw a fit, which you will then have to deal with. Consider the following game: First, you decide whether to show them an Old thing again, or a New thing. If you show them the Old thing, you get 2 points and the kid gets 2 points Then, If you showed them the New thing, the kid chooses whether to Ask for it to happen again, or Not Ask. If they choose Not Ask, you get 3 points and the kid gets 3 points If they choose to Ask, you can choose to say Yes, in which case you get 1 point and the kid gets 4 points, or No, in which case they throw a fit, and you get 0 points and the kid gets 2 points Draw the game tree for this game.
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in game theory, when are there player 1 and palyer 2 and the payoff function is as follow (if player 1 get to choose first) (u1, u2). my question is if the order change like player 2 get to choose first, will the order of the payoff change as well like (u2, u1)?
1. Consider the following game: There are two companies: Nike and Adidas. They both need to make a choice: to increase the marketing costs or not change it. If both companies increase, they both will have $100 million profit. If neither company change, each will have a profit of $50 million. If only one company increases marketing costs, its profit will be $120 million and the other airline's profit will be $40 million. Draw the payoff matrix. Find the Nash equilibrium. Explain why this is the Nash equilibrium.
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Consider the following 2-player normal form game. Player 2 Bananas Orange Player 1 Grapes 11, 3 8, 2 Apple 9, 7 6, 5 Player 1's dominant strategy is [Select ] and Player 2's dominant strategy is [ Select ) The Nash Equilibrium of this game is ( Select ) (select all that apply).
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