Social Interactions Consider two companies who advertise to attract the same customers. If neither company advertises the companies split the market. If both advertise they also split the market, but profits are ower, since each company must spend on advertising. But if one company advertises and the other does not, the one that advertises attracts customers from the other. The game is represented in the following table: Firm B Advertise Don't Advertise Advertise Firm A gets $3M Firm A gets $5 M Firm A Firm B gets $3 M Firm B gets $2 M Don't Advertise Firm A get $2 M Firm A gets $4 M Firm B gets $5 M Firm B gets $4 M

Social Interactions Consider two companies who advertise to attract the same customers. If neither company advertises the companies split the market. If both advertise they also split the market, but profits are ower, since each company must spend on advertising. But if one company advertises and the other does not, the one that advertises attracts customers from the other. The game is represented in the following table: Firm B Advertise Don't Advertise Advertise Firm A gets $3M Firm A gets $5 M Firm A Firm B gets $3 M Firm B gets $2 M Don't Advertise Firm A get $2 M Firm A gets $4 M Firm B gets $5 M Firm B gets $4 M

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Two rival companies competing in the same market need to decide their plans for future expansion of their stores. The Table below shows the possible outcomes of their mutually interdependent actions (payoffs are profits in £m) Giga Company Titanic Conglomerate No Change Refurbishment of existing stores Large Expansion No Change 30, 40 25, 35 15, 24 Refurbishment of existing stores 35, 30 28, 32 18, 33 Large Expansion 12, 22 18, 20 20, 25 The Nash equilibrium: (A) does not exist. (B) occurs when both firms choose Refurbishment of existing stores. (C) occurs when both firms choose Large Expansion. (D) occurs when both firms choose No Change.
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Player 2 Left Right P1: $4 Player 1 Up P2: $1 P1: $10 Down P2:s10 Which of the Nash Equilibrium to this game are efficient? [Check all that apply] A) (up, left) B) (down, left) C None are efficient (D) (up right) E (down, right) Last saved 4:31:15 PM P1:S1 P2: $6 P1: $0 P2: $11 Grading
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which is the nash equilibrium? small pig does press large pig does press (20, 130), small pig doesn't press large pig does press (140, 10), small pig does press large pig doesn't press (-5, 150), small pig does not press large pig doesn't press (0,0).
Consider the following normal form game Player 2 L C R Player 1 U 5, 4 4,5 3,8 8,3 8,0 5,5 6,3 0,8 M D 8,8 Find all the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game.
5. The following problem was first considered by John von Neumann and is a fundamentalresult game theory.A and B play the following game:A writes down either number 1 or number 2, and B must guess which one.If the number that A has written down is i and B has guessed correctly, B receives i units from A.If B makes a wrong guess, B pays 4/5 of a unit to A.First we consider the expected gain of player B.Suppose B guesses 1 with probability p and 2 with probability 1 −p.Let X1 denote B’s gain (or loss) in a game where A has written down 1.Let X2 denote B’s gain (or loss) in a game where A has written down 2.(a) Find the pmf of X1 and X2(b) Find B’s expected gain for these two cases, E[X1] and E[X2].(c) What value of p maximizes the minimum possible value of B’s expected gain?Now consider the expected loss of player ASuppose that A writes down 1 with probability q and 2 with probability 1 −q.Let Y1 be A’s loss (or gain) if B chooses number 1.Let Y2 be A’s loss (or gain) if B…
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