The Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function is a widely used specifica- tion of preferences in economics that captures risk aversion and intertemporal consump- tion smoothing. The CRRA utility function has the desirable property that the degree of risk aversion is constant and independent of the level of consumption. This means that as a household's consumption grows, its willingness to take risks remains the same. The coefficient of relative risk aversion (σ) measures the extent to which households are risk- averse and prefer a smooth consumption path over time. A higher value of σ indicates a greater degree of risk aversion and a stronger preference for consumption smoothing. Consider a two-period endowment economy with a large number of identical house- holds. Each household has the following lifetime utility function: U (j) = C₁(j)¹-0-1 (C++1(j)¹–σ — 1` - +B -

The Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function is a widely used specifica- tion of preferences in economics that captures risk aversion and intertemporal consump- tion smoothing. The CRRA utility function has the desirable property that the degree of risk aversion is constant and independent of the level of consumption. This means that as a household's consumption grows, its willingness to take risks remains the same. The coefficient of relative risk aversion (σ) measures the extent to which households are risk- averse and prefer a smooth consumption path over time. A higher value of σ indicates a greater degree of risk aversion and a stronger preference for consumption smoothing. Consider a two-period endowment economy with a large number of identical house- holds. Each household has the following lifetime utility function: U (j) = C₁(j)¹-0-1 (C++1(j)¹–σ — 1` - +B -

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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answer this properly, remember (0.35x50)+(0.65x10)=£24 here
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