P-TV and QRS-TV are planning their fall line-up. Suppose that sit-coms are more popular than reality shows, and so generate more advertising revenue than do reality shows, but they are more expensive to produce since real actors must be hired. In the following decision tree, QRS-TV announces its decision first and P-TV observes that choice before it decides whether to air a sit- com in the same time slot or a reality show. Both stations know all of the information shown in this diagram when they make their decisions. QRS-TV Sit-com Reality P-TV. P-TV Sit-com Reality Sit-com Reality -QRS-TV eams - $5 million; P-TV earns -$5 million QRS-TV earns +$5 million; P-TV cams +$20 million QRS-TV earns +$20 million, P-TV earns +$5 million QRS-TV earns +$10 million; P-TV eams +$10 million Given the information in this decision tree, this season programming in this time slot on QRS-TV and P-TV will be: Select one: O a. a sit-com on QRS-TV and a reality show on P-TV. O b. only sit-coms. O c. only reality shows. d. a reality show on QRS-TV and a sit-com on P-TV.

P-TV and QRS-TV are planning their fall line-up. Suppose that sit-coms are more popular than reality shows, and so generate more advertising revenue than do reality shows, but they are more expensive to produce since real actors must be hired. In the following decision tree, QRS-TV announces its decision first and P-TV observes that choice before it decides whether to air a sit- com in the same time slot or a reality show. Both stations know all of the information shown in this diagram when they make their decisions. QRS-TV Sit-com Reality P-TV. P-TV Sit-com Reality Sit-com Reality -QRS-TV eams - $5 million; P-TV earns -$5 million QRS-TV earns +$5 million; P-TV cams +$20 million QRS-TV earns +$20 million, P-TV earns +$5 million QRS-TV earns +$10 million; P-TV eams +$10 million Given the information in this decision tree, this season programming in this time slot on QRS-TV and P-TV will be: Select one: O a. a sit-com on QRS-TV and a reality show on P-TV. O b. only sit-coms. O c. only reality shows. d. a reality show on QRS-TV and a sit-com on P-TV.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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