its capacity constraint so that the collusive equilibrium can si 1? (Hint: The idea here is that, by limiting its own output, Firm 1 have a greater market share. As a result, Firm 1's gain of from the collusive agreement would be smaller.)

its capacity constraint so that the collusive equilibrium can si 1? (Hint: The idea here is that, by limiting its own output, Firm 1 have a greater market share. As a result, Firm 1's gain of from the collusive agreement would be smaller.)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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