The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (9₁) and Firm 2 (92) areandThe Cournot equilibrium price isProfit for Firm 1 isand profit for Firm 2 is9₁ = 30 unitsand9₂= 60 units. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.)p=$70.x₁ = $900*₂ =$ 3600.To block entry, the incumbent appeals to the government to require that the entrant incur extra costs. What happens to the Cournot equilibrium if the legal requirement causes the marginal cost of the second firm to rise to that of the first firm,$40?The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (9₁) and Firm 2 (9₂) are9₁ = units9₂-units.

An economic model called the Cournot duopoly examines how two businesses engage strategically in a…

The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (9₁) and Firm 2 (9₂) are and The Cournot equilibrium price is Profit for Firm 1 is and profit for Firm 2 is To block entry, the incumbent appeals to the government $40? The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (9₁) and Firm 2 (9₂) are and 9₁30 units 9₂= 60 units. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.) p=$70 x₁ = $900 *₂ = $3600 require that the entrant incur extra costs. What happens to the Courot equilibrium if the legal requirement causes the marginal cost of the second firm to rise to that of the first firm, 9₁ = units 9₂-units.

The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (9₁) and Firm 2 (9₂) are and The Cournot equilibrium price is Profit for Firm 1 is and profit for Firm 2 is To block entry, the incumbent appeals to the government $40? The Cournot equilibrium quantities for Firm 1 (9₁) and Firm 2 (9₂) are and 9₁30 units 9₂= 60 units. (Enter numeric responses using real numbers rounded to two decimal places.) p=$70 x₁ = $900 *₂ = $3600 require that the entrant incur extra costs. What happens to the Courot equilibrium if the legal requirement causes the marginal cost of the second firm to rise to that of the first firm, 9₁ = units 9₂-units.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

help
Q7
An economy with many consumers (Amy, Hao, ...), many producers, two goods (A and B) and two inputs (L and K) is in a competitive general equilibrium. Which of the following conditions are satisfied in this economy? (Select all that apply) The absolute value of the slope of PPF (with good A on the horizontal axis) is equal to MCA / MCB, the ratio of marginal costs of producing goods A and B, at any point on PPF MRSAB = PA / PB for all consumers O For every possible redistribution of goods among the consumers, some of them will be better off and some of them will be worse off. MRT = MRTS for all firms, whether producing good A or good B MRS = MRT MRS = MRTS OPA = MCA and PB = MCB O MUAMYA = MUHao A MRTS = = PA = PA / PB MUAMYA = MCA and MUAmy B = MCB MRT = w/r, where w is wage and r is the price of capital the quantity of one output cannot be increased without decreasing the quantity of the other MRTS between labour and capital is the same for all firms, whether producing good A or good…
Question 3:Suppose the inverse demand for a good is given by P = 50 – 4Q, where Q is the totalquantity supplied by all firms in the market. Suppose each firm in the market has a constantmarginal cost of 18.Q3 a) Assume the market consists of two firms that set their quantities simultaneously.Calculate the duopoly levels of production and the equilibrium price. Q3 b) Now assume firm 1 chooses its production level before firm 2 does. What will be theequilibrium quantities, price and profits in this case?Q3 c) Now instead suppose that the two firms compete over prices rather than quantities.What will be the equilibrium price and profits of firms 1 and 2 in this case? Finally, if firm 1manages to lower its marginal cost to 14, what will be the new equilibrium price, quantitiesand profits?
Figure 14-2 Xenophone (X Decleion Offer Cable or DSL a service Cable OSL Gigom (0) Decision 图 Offer Cable or DSL service Gigsom (G) Decon Ofer Cable or D Went service Cable DS Cable DSL X 80 million G: 19 milion X: 54 milion G: $45 milion x 55 million G: 16.5 milion X: 50 milion $7 The government of a developing country plans to award two firms, Gigacom and Xenophone, the exclusive rights to share the market for high speed internet service. Gigacom and Xenophone can both provide the service either via television cable lines or via direct subscriber line (DSL). Suppose the government is considering a proposal to delay one firm's entry into the market on the grounds that it wants to prevent "harmful" competition. Figure 14-2 shows the decision tree for this game. Refer to Figure 14-2. Now suppose that the government delays Xenophone's entry and Gigacom moves first, what is the likely outcome in the market? Both offer internet service via cable line: Xenophone earns a profit of $6 million…
Use the photo at exercise 14 to solve the problem below With the Firm Y response function Qy=600-1/2Qx and the Firm XX response function Qx=600-1/2Qy Imagine that firm X chooses their quantity first, then firm Y observes the quantity of firm X and chooses their own quantity. What quantities will they end up choosing? Is there a first or second-mover advantage here? [You may assume that firm X can only choose quantities that are multiples of 200. This prevents you from having to deal with prices that are not on the schedule. just a little thinking about how equilibrium works in a sequential-move game. Oh, and just give me the quantity for each firm, don't worry about giving me a complete strategy for firm Y.]
Please answer each step clearly and how to do it. Thank you
Refer to Figure 14-7. Assume that the market starts in equilibrium at point W in graph (b) and that graph (a) illustrates the cost curves facing individual firms. Suppose that demand increases from D0 to D1. Which of the following statements is not correct? a. Point Z is a long-run equilibrium point. b. Point Y is a long-run equilibrium point. c. Points W, Y, and Z are short-run equilibria points. d. Point W is a long-run equilibrium point. PRICE Graph (a) MC ATC P₂ aa P Q Q QUANTITY PRICE P₂ a a a Graph (b) Q Qy Qx Qz QUANTITY Do D₁
(7) For each situation, solve for the Stackelberg equilibrium 7a) Suppose Sarah's constant MC is $5 but Joe's is $8. (Using P(Q) = 20–0.1Q again and assuming Joe goes first) 7b) Suppose Joe and Sarah have the same marginal cost ($5) but market inverse demand is now P(Q) = 30 – 0.2 Q
1 Consider two identical firms with a unit cost of production of $10 and a market demand of p= 60-y. (a) What is firm 1’s optimal output level as a function of firm 2’s output? (b) What is firm 2’s optimal output level as a function of firm 1’s output? (c) What is the Cournot equilibrium output level for these firms? (d) What is the Cournot equilibrium price level? Show your work step by step.
An economy with many consumers (Amy, Hao, ...), many producers, two goods (A and B) and two inputs (L and K) is in a competitive general equilibrium. Which of the following conditions are satisfied in this economy? (Select all that apply) The absolute value of the slope of PPF (with good A on the horizontal axis) is equal to MCA / MCB, the ratio of marginal costs of producing goods A and B, at any point on PPF MRSAB = PA / PB for all consumers For every possible redistribution of goods among the consumers, some of them will be better off and some of them will be worse off. MRS = MRT MRS MRTS PA = MCA and PB = MCB MUAmy = MUHao A = PA MRTS = PA / PB MUAmy A = MCA and MUAmy B = MCB MRTS between labour and capital is the same for all firms, whether producing good A or good B. the ratio of input marginal products must be equal to the ratio of input prices MRT = MRTS for all firms, whether producing good A or good B For every possible redistribution of inputs among the firms, the quantity…
Use the photo at exercise 14 to solve the problem below With the Firm Y response function Qy=600-1/2Qx and the Firm XX response function Qx=600-1/2Qy Imagine that firm X chooses their quantity first, then firm Y observes the quantity of firm X and chooses their own quantity. What quantities will they end up choosing? Is there a first or second-mover advantage here? [You may assume that firm X can only choose quantities that are multiples of 200. This prevents you from having to deal with prices that are not on the schedule. just a little thinking about how equilibrium works in a sequential-move game. Oh, and just give me the quantity for each firm, don't worry about giving me a complete strategy for firm Y.]