Assume a firm faces two customers in the market. Customer 1 has an inverse demand of p=100-9₁. and Customer 2 has an inverse demand of p=200-9₂- Marginal cost per unit is constant and equal to $30. Determine the profit-maximizing price and identical lump-sum fee charged to these two customers. For the following questions, assume the firm will always sell to both customers. The profit-maximizing price is $. (Enter a numeric response using a real number rounded to two decimal places.) The lump-sum fee is $. (Enter a numeric response rounded to the nearest penny.)

Assume a firm faces two customers in the market. Customer 1 has an inverse demand of p=100-9₁. and Customer 2 has an inverse demand of p=200-9₂- Marginal cost per unit is constant and equal to $30. Determine the profit-maximizing price and identical lump-sum fee charged to these two customers. For the following questions, assume the firm will always sell to both customers. The profit-maximizing price is $. (Enter a numeric response using a real number rounded to two decimal places.) The lump-sum fee is $. (Enter a numeric response rounded to the nearest penny.)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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