There are two firms. Firm 1 is the incumbent, which is currently producing the monoply output level and can credibly commit to producing this output in the future. Firm 2 is a potential entrant. These quantity-setting firms face the inverse market demand p= 93 - Q, where Q= q, + q2. Each firm has a marginal cost of $53 per unit. Firm 2 has a fixed cost of entry of $150. Firm 2 will enter the market and will earn a profit of $. (Enter a numeric response using an integer.)

There are two firms. Firm 1 is the incumbent, which is currently producing the monoply output level and can credibly commit to producing this output in the future. Firm 2 is a potential entrant. These quantity-setting firms face the inverse market demand p= 93 - Q, where Q= q, + q2. Each firm has a marginal cost of $53 per unit. Firm 2 has a fixed cost of entry of $150. Firm 2 will enter the market and will earn a profit of $. (Enter a numeric response using an integer.)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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