3. Breakdown of a cartel agreementConsider a town in which only two residents, Jacques and Kyoko, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Jacques and Kyoko can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. 3. Breakdown of a cartel agreementConsider a town in which only two residents, Jacques and Kyoko, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Jacques and Kyoko can pump andsell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water.PriceQuantity DemandedTotal Revenue(Dollars per gallon)(Gallons of water)(Dollars)3.002.7550$137.502.50100$250.002.25150$337.502.00200$400.001.75250$437.501.50300$450.001.25350$437.501.00400$400.000.75450$337.500.50500$250.000.25550$137.50600Suppose Jacques and Kyoko form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $per gallon, and the totaloutput isgallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Jacques and Kyoko agree to split production equally. Therefore, Jacques's profit isand Kyoko's profit is $Suppose that Jacques and Kyoko have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopolyquantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Jacques says to himself, "Kyoko and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my production to50 gallons more than the cartel amount, I can increase my profit even though her profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow."%3D

Answered: Image /qna-images/answer/bfe6667d-ca94-4cd3-97d0-969f018960b1.jpg

Consider a town in which only two residents, Jacques and Kyoko, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Jacques and Kyoko can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) 3.00 2.75 2.50 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.00 0.75 quantity Th 0.50 0.25 0 Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) 0 50 100 150 200 I 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 Suppose Jacques and Kyoko form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ output is $ Total Revenue (Dollars) 0 $137.50 $250.00 $337.50 $400.00 $437.50 $450.00 $437.50 $400.00 $337.50 $250.00 $137.50 0 per gallon, and the total gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Jacques and Kyoko agree to split production equally. Therefore, Jacques's profit is and Kyoko's profit is $ Suppose that Jacques and Kyoko have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly Jacque himself "Kyoko

Consider a town in which only two residents, Jacques and Kyoko, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Jacques and Kyoko can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) 3.00 2.75 2.50 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.00 0.75 quantity Th 0.50 0.25 0 Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) 0 50 100 150 200 I 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 Suppose Jacques and Kyoko form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ output is $ Total Revenue (Dollars) 0 $137.50 $250.00 $337.50 $400.00 $437.50 $450.00 $437.50 $400.00 $337.50 $250.00 $137.50 0 per gallon, and the total gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Jacques and Kyoko agree to split production equally. Therefore, Jacques's profit is and Kyoko's profit is $ Suppose that Jacques and Kyoko have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly Jacque himself "Kyoko

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter15: Monopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7PA

See similar textbooks

3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement

Expert Solution

This question has been solved!

Explore an expertly crafted, step-by-step solution for a thorough understanding of key concepts.

This is a popular solution!

SEE SOLUTION Check out a sample Q&A here

Given:

part (a)

Part (b)

Part (c)

Trending now

This is a popular solution!

Step by step

Solved in 4 steps with 1 images

SEE SOLUTION Check out a sample Q&A here

Knowledge Booster

Learn more about

Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.

Similar questions

6. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Sean and Yvette, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Sean and Yvette can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 6.00 5.50 45 248 5.00 90 450 4.50 135 608 4.00 180 720 3.50 225 788 3.00 270 810 2.50 315 788 2.00 360 720 1.50 405 608 1.00 450 450 0.50 495 248 540
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Jake and Latasha, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Jake and Latasha can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 5.40 0 0 4.95 40 $198.00 4.50 80 $360.00 4.05 120 $486.00 3.60 160 $576.00 3.15 200 $630.00 2.70 240 $648.00 2.25 280 $630.00 1.80 320 $576.00 1.35 360 $486.00 0.90 400 $360.00 0.45 440 $198.00 0 480 0 Suppose Jake and Latasha form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Jake and Latasha agree to split production equally. Therefore, Jake's profit is , and Latasha's profit is . Suppose that Jake and…
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Daniel and Gabrielle, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Daniel and Gabrielle can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 4.20 0 0 3.85 40 $154.00 3.50 80 $280.00 3.15 120 $378.00 2.80 160 $448.00 2.45 200 $490.00 2.10 240 $504.00 1.75 280 $490.00 1.40 320 $448.00 1.05 360 $378.00 0.70 400 $280.00 0.35 440 $154.00 0 480 0 Suppose Daniel and Gabrielle form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ output is per gallon, and the total gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Daniel and Gabrielle agree to split production equally. Therefore, Daniel's profit is and Gabrielle's profit is $
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Musashi and Rina, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Musashi and Rina can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 3.60 3.30 35 $115.50 3.00 70 $210.00 2.70 105 $283.50 2.40 140 $336.00 2.10 175 $367.50 1.80 210 $378.00 1.50 245 $367.50 1.20 280 $336.00 0.90 315 $283.50 0.60 350 $210.00 0.30 385 $115.50 420 Suppose Musashi and Rina form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Musashi and Rina agree to split production equally. Therefore, Musashi's profit is %2$ , and Rina's profit is $
e ap sep 0 ja ajaloo Purwas ap o Consider a town in which only two residents, Clancy and Eileen, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Clancy and Eileen can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Tab Caps Lock Price (Dollars per gallon) 6.00 5.50 5.00 4.50 Esc is 81°F Sunny 4.00 3.50 3.00 2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00 ! 0.50 0 7 Q A Quantity Demanded (Gallons of water) 0 45 17 F2 8- @ Suppose Clancy and Eileen form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Clancy and Eileen agree to split production equally. Therefore, Clancy's profit is - C VE 2 W 90 135 S. 180 225 270 315 360 405 450 495 540 F3 0+ #M 3 Total Revenue (Dollars) 0 $247.50 $450.00 $607.50 $720.00 $787.50 $810.00 $787.50 $720.00 $607.50 E F4 BO $450.00 $247.50 0 D $ 4 F5 R F % 5 F6 D T F7 ^ 6 G 4- Y FB J+ & 7 per gallon, and the total…
2. The market for dark chocolate us characterized by Cournot duopolists - Honeydukes and Wonka industries. The market demand for dark chocolate is:P = 8 - 0.005Qdwhere P is the price per bar in dollars and Qd is dark chocolate's daily quantity demanded in bars (use qh to represent the quantity of dark chocolate sold by Honeydukes and qw to represent the quantity of dark chocolate sold by Wonka Industries). Honeydukes has a constant marginal cost of $2.50 per bar, while Wonka Industries has a constant marginal cost of $3.00 per bar. The firms move simultaneously in choosing their profit-maximizing quantity of output.a. Given the firms move simultaneously, what is the equation for Honeydukes' reaction function with qh expressed as a function of qw?b. Given the firms move simultaneously, what is the equation for Wonka's reaction function with qw expressed as a function of qh?c. What quantity of dark chocolate will each firm produce in equilibrium and what price will be established for a…
PRICE (Dollars per engine) 100 90 80 70 60 40 30 & 2 20 10 MO D 0 10 ATC MR Demand 20 30 40 50 60 70 DO 90 QUANTITY (Thousands of engines) 100 Mon Comp Outcome Min Unit Cost Because this market is a monopolistically competitive market, you can tell that it is in long-run equilibrium by the fact that optimal quantity. Furthermore, a monopolistically competitive firm's average total cost in long-run equilibrium is average total cost. at the the minimum
Quèstion 13 Figure#5 $10 MC ATC $7 $6 $5 $4 $3 $2 $1 MR $0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Quantity Refer to Figure#5. This figure depicts a situation in a monopolistically competitive market. In long run, how much output will the monopolistic competition produce and will charge at what price? Price 9876 5A32
Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Sean and Yvette, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Sean and Yvette can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 5.40 0 0 4.95 40 $198.00 4.50 80 $360.00 4.05 120 $486.00 3.60 160 $576.00 3.15 200 $630.00 2.70 240 $648.00 2.25 280 $630.00 1.80 320 $576.00 1.35 360 $486.00 0.90 400 $360.00 0.45 440 $198.00 0 480 0 Suppose Sean and Yvette form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ __________ per gallon, and the total output is __________ gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Sean and Yvette agree to split production equally. Therefore, Sean's profit is $ __________ , and Yvette's profit is __________ .…
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Carlos and Deborah, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Carlos and Deborah can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 3.60 3.30 35 $115.50 3.00 70 $210.00 2.70 105 $283.50 2.40 140 $336.00 2.10 175 $367.50 1.80 210 $378.00 1.50 245 $367.50 1.20 280 $336.00 0.90 315 $283.50 0.60 350 $210.00 0.30 385 $115.50 420 per gallon, and the total Suppose Carlos and Deborah form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Carlos and Deborah agree to split production equally. Therefore, Carlos's profit is 24 and Deborah's profit is $ orice and sell half of the monopoly Suppose that Carlos and Deborah have been successfully…
6. The cartel Consider a town in which only two residents, Rajiv and Simone, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Rajiv and Simone can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price (Dollars per gallon) 6.00 Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 0 0 5.50 45 247.50 5.00 90 450.00 4.50 135 607.50 4.00 180 720.00 3.50 225 787.50 3.00 270 810.00 2.50 315 787.50 2.00 360 720.00 1.50 405 607.50 1.00 450 450.00 0.50 495 247.50 0 540 0 Suppose Rajiv and Simone form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Rajiv and Simone agree to split production equally. Therefore, Rajiv's profit is $ and Simone's profit is $ Suppose that Rajiv and Simone have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of…
9. Do you agree or disagree with the following statements a. The demand eurve facing a monopolistic competitor in a market where all producers charge different prices becomes less elastic when it engages in international trade b. According to the gravity equation, countries closer to each other trade more c. The only gain from trade in monopolistic competition in trade is lower prices d. The closer to 1 the index of intra industry trade is, the greater the difference between exports and imports of the same goods.