coordinate their behaviour.A collusion agreement thatrequires firms to have somesort of communication inwhich they coordinate theirbehaviour.Organization of PetroleumExporting countries is anexample of this type ofmarket behaviour.Competitors in an industrythat make a legal bingingagreement to operate asone firm.1. Explicit cartel2. Implicit cartel3. Horizontal merger Match the concept with the appropriate description.A tacit collusion situation inwhich firms behave "as if"they would be in some sortof agreement that seems tocoordinate their behaviour.A collusion agreement thatrequires firms to have somesort of communication inwhich they coordinate theirbehaviour.Organization of PetroleumExporting countries is anexample of this type ofmarket behaviour.1. Explicit cartel2. Implicit cartel3. Horizontal mergerOC

The cartels refer to the phenomenon where the firms and businesses tend to collude with each other…

coordinate their be A collusion agreement that requires firms to have some sort of communication in which they coordinate their behaviour. Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries is an example of this type of market behaviour. Competitors in an industry 1. Explicit cartel 2. Implicit cartel 3. Horizontal merger

coordinate their be A collusion agreement that requires firms to have some sort of communication in which they coordinate their behaviour. Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries is an example of this type of market behaviour. Competitors in an industry 1. Explicit cartel 2. Implicit cartel 3. Horizontal merger

Principles of Economics 2e

2nd Edition

ISBN:9781947172364

Author:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Publisher:Steven A. Greenlaw; David Shapiro

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligopoly

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18CTQ: When OPEC raised the price of oil dramatically in the mid-1970s, experts said it was unlikely that...

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mether to produce a low output or a high output. nese output strategies with corresponding profits are depicted in the ayoff matrix to the right. Kuwait's profits are in red and Saudi Arabia's are in blue. Suppose the two countries form a cartel. What is the cooperative equilibrium? Kuwait O A. The cooperative equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a high output and Kuwait to produce a high output. Low Output High Output O B. A cooperative equilibrium does not exist for this game. $125 $75 Low Output O C. The cooperative equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a low output and Kuwait to produce a high output. $8 $13 Saudi Arabia O D. The cooperative equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a high output and Kuwait to produce a low output. $98 $70 E. The cooperative equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to broduce a low output and Kuwait to produce a low output. High Output What is the Nash equilibrium for this game? O A. The Nash equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a high…
. When Chinese automakers began exporting cars, rather thanfocusing on developed nations in the West, they shippedautos to emerging markets in countries such as Algeria, Russia,Chile, and South Africa. In these markets, even used vehiclesfrom multinational manufacturers are relatively scarce—andrelatively expensive. The Chinese automakers, who prioritizelow cost rather than design or even safety, applied a penetration-pricing strategy. A woman in Santiago, Chile, who boughta new Chery S21 explained, “The price factor is fairly decisive.I paid $5,500 new and full. Toyota with similar features costsaround $12,000.” Why do you think Chinese automakerschose that pricing strategy? Do you think it was successful?As Chinese regulators pressure these manufacturers to maketheir cars safer, do you think they will be able to keep theirprices low compared with those of the international automakers? Why or why not?26
consider the market for oil. Suppose for simplicity that there are only two oil roducing countries-Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Both countries must choose hether to produce a low output or a high output. These output strategies with corresponding profits are depicted in the ayoff matrix to the right. Kuwait's profits are in red and Saudi Arabia's are in blue. Kuwait Suppose the two countries form a cartel. What is the cooperative equilibrium? Low Output High Output O A. The cooperative equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a high output and Kuwait to produce a high output. $125 $75 Low Output $8 $13 O B. A cooperative equilibrium does not exist for this game. O C. The cooperative equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a low output and Kuwait to produce a high output. Saudi Arabia $98 $70 O D. The cooperative equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce a high output and Kuwait to produce a low output. High Output $5 $8 O E. The cooperative equilibrium is for Saudi Arabia to produce…
G The formula t xC Where Does X b My Questions X BC Broward C cmillanlearning.com/sac/5078081#/5078081/12/-1 Completed 16 out of 20 Question 13 of 20 > Which of these will contribute to a cartel's stability? O a copyright Obrand differentiation O ease of entry into an industry O having few members with similar goals Rain 五0
3. Because cooking soufflés is incredibly difficult, the supply of soufflés in a small French town is controlled by two bak- ers, Gaston and Pierre. The demand for soufflés is given by P=30-20, and the marginal and average total cost of producing soufflés is $6. Because baking a soufflé requires a great deal of work and preparation, each morning Gaston and Pierre make a binding decision about how many souf- flés to bake. HomW buanolinmas-gitalprof a. Suppose that Pierre and Gaston agree to collude, evenly splitting the output a monopolist would make and charging the monopoly price. i. Derive the equation for the monopolist's marginal revenue curve.
how conflicting affecting cartels and like cartels like opec fail to reachto consensus on price and quantity?
The Competition Bureau in Canada wants to increase competition and reduce monopoly power. Thus it it worries about industry concentration in Canada. Let's assume that the Canadian halibut processing industry there are only two firms(duopoly). Under such a market structure, if one of the halibut processing firm increases its price, then the other firm in the halibut processing industry can: keep the price of its processed halibut constant and thus increase its market share. keep its price of its processed halibut constant and thus decrease its market share. decrease its price of its processed halibut and thus decrease its market share. try to achieve economies of scale. increase its price of its processed halibut and thus increase its market share.
Consider the curve in the figure below, which shows the market demand. marginal cost, and marginal revenue curve for firms in an oligopolistic industry. In this example, we assume firms have zero fixed costs. Suppose the firms collude to form a cartel. What price will the cartel charge? What quantity will the cartel supply? How much profit will the cartel earn? Suppose now that the cane] breaks up and the oligopolistic firms compete as vigorously as possible by cutting the price and increasing sales. What will be the industry quantity and price? What will be the collective profits of all firms in the industry? Compare the equilibrium price, quantity, and profit for the cartel and cutthroat competition outcomes.
When OPEC raised the price of oil dramatically in the mid-1970s, experts said it was unlikely that the cartel could stay together over the long term-that the incentives for individual members. to cheat would become too strong. More than fort),r years later, OPEC still exists. Why do you think OPEC has been able to beat the odds and continue to collude? Hint: You may wish to consider non-economic reasons.
Firms J and K produce compact-disc players and compete againstone another. Each firm can develop either an economy player (E)or a deluxe player (D). According to the best available marketresearch, the firms’ resulting profits are given by the accompanyingpayoff table.a. The firms make their decision independently, and each is seeking itsown maximum profit. Is it possible to make a confident predictionconcerning their actions and the outcome? Explain.Firm KE DE 30, 55 50, 60 Firm JD 40, 75 25, 50b. Suppose that firm J has a lead in development and so can move first.What action should J take, and what will be K’s response?c. What will be the outcome if firm K can move first?
bok rint An oligopoly producing a homogeneous product is comprised of three firms that act like a cartel. Assume that these three firms have identical cost schedules. Assume also that if any one of these firms sets a price for the product, the other two firms charge the same price. As long as they all charge the same price they will share the market equally; and the quantity demanded of each will be the same. Below is the total-cost schedule of one of these firms and the demand schedule that confronts it when the other firms charge the same price as this firm. Complete the marginal-cost and marginal- revenue schedules facing the firm. erences Mc Graw Hill Output Total cost Marginal cost Price Quantity demanded Marginal revenue 0 1 23456 7 8 $0 180 300 480 720 1,020 1,380 1,800 2,280 Short Anewor LA JUL 26 $780 720 660 600 540 480 420 360 Toolbar navigation (a) What price would be charged, what output would be produced, and what profit would be made by this firm? (b) If the firms…
When comparing two firms operating as a cartel/colluding and two firms competing in Cournot competition, given the firms face the same inverse market demand and marginal cost is the same for both firms in either situation, which of the following is true? а. The total profit is the same in Cournot competition and collusion. O b. Total output is higher in collusion than in Cournot competition and the price is lower in collusion than in Cournot Competition. Ос. The total profit is lower in Cournot competition than in collusion. O d. Total output is lower in collusion than in Cournot competition and the price is higher in collusion than in Cournot Competition.