2. Walmart (firm 1) and Amazon (firm 2) are a duopoly in the grocery market. They are faced with an inverse demand of P(Q1,Q2) = 4 – 2(Q1 + Q2) and total costs of TC(Q;) = 2Q?, i = 1, 2. Note that the marginal cost is not constant! 1. Obtain the Cournot equilibrium quantities and profits.
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- Consider a duopolistic market in which the two identical firms compete by selecting their quantities. The inverse market demand is P(Q) = 210−Q and each firm has a marginal cost of $15 per unit. Assume that fixed costs are negligible for both firms. Cournot Model Determine the Nash-Cournot equilibrium for this market.(Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.) Firm 1's quantity: q1= ? units. Firm 2's quantity: q2 = ? units. Market price: P= ? Stackelberg Model Determine the Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium for this market, assuming that Firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader. (Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.) Firm 1's quantity: q1 = ? units Firm 2s quantity: q2 = ? units. Market price: P = ?Let ci be the constant marginal and average cost for firm i (so that firms may have different marginal costs). Suppose demand is given by P=1-Q. Calculate the Nash equilibrium quantities assuming there are two firms in a Cournot market. Also compute market output, market price, firm profits, industry prof- its, consumer surplus, and total welfare. Represent the Nash equilibrium on a best-response function diagram. Show how a reduction in firm 1’s cost would change the equilibrium. Draw a representative isoprofit for firm 1.Question 2 Consider a Cournot duopoly, the firms face an (inverse) demand function: Pb=268-10Qb. The marginal cost for firm 1 is given by mc1= 6Q The marginal cost for firm 2 is given by mc2=4Q (Assume firm 1 has a fixed cost of $102 and firm 2 had a fixed cost of $104 What are the profits of firm 2? (hint 567.26) How much consumer surplus is created by industry transactions? (hint 1333.34) Full explain this question and text typing work only We should answer our question within 2 hours takes more time then we will reduce Rating Dont ignore this line ...
- Select the correct statements. Note: Multiple correct, multiple selections. Topics covered: Stackelberg, Cournot, and Bertrand models. O A. Suppose the inverse market demand function is P (y) = a - by, and the marginal cost of each firm is K (same and constant). In this market, the market price will be higher if the market is a Stackelberg duopoly than the market price if it is a Cournot duopoly market. В. A Stackelberg leader will necessarily make at least as much profit as he would if he acted as a Cournot oligopolist. O C. Suppose, in a Stackelberg duopoly, the follower's output is measured on the horizontal axis. Profits to the follower will increase as we move to isoprofit lines that are further to the left. D. The equilibrium in Bertrand duopoly where both firms sell identical products is Pareto efficient. Е. In Cournot duopoly, if each firm has the same marginal MC = K, each firm produces the same level of output and earns the same profit.Part c please Suppose four Cournot competitors face an inverse market demand curve of P = 1620 – 8Q, each with identical costs Ci = 4000 + 60qi. Use the formulae given in exercise 8.15 (pgs. 214-15) for firm profits, market price, and consumer surplus at a Cournot equilibrium to answer the following questions. a. Demonstrate that a merger between F3 and F4 will not be profitable if their costs remain unchanged. (Careful: the “n” in the profit formula changes from 4 to 3.) b. Could the merger be profitable i. if fixed costs fell? If so, how much reduction is necessary? ii. If the variable costs of the merged firm fell by 75%, so that C3|4 = 8000 + 15q? (Fixed cost remains 8000 because we are assuming only variable costs fall.) c. Calculate the consumer surplus created in this market when there are four identical firms. How does it change after a merger occurs between F3 and F4 if: i. no costs savings occur ii. the merged firm reduces its fixed costs by $6000 iii. the merged firm…The firms in a duopoly produce differentiated products. The inverse demand for Firm 1 is The inverse demand for Firm 2 is and P₁ = 52-9₁-0.592. Each firm has a marginal cost of m= $1 per unit. Solve for the Nash-Cournot equilibrium quantities. The Cournot equilibrium quantities are (Enter your responses rounded to two decimal places.) P₂ = 100-92-0.5q1₁. 91 = units 92 units. =
- Suppose the iceberg lettuce industry is a Cournot duopoly with two firms: Xtra Leafy (a) and Yummy Farms (y). Xtra Leafy produces q units of output and Yummy Farms produces qy units of output. Aggregate market output is Q = x + y. The (inverse) market demand schedule is: p = 176 - 2Q Both firms have identical cost structures: MC = MC₁ = ATC₂ = ATC₁ = $12 Find Xtra Leafy's Cournot reaction function of the form: 9x = a + bay Where "a" is the reaction function's intercept and "b" is its slope. Note: Please review the formatting instructions above. If any value is negative, be sure to include its negative sign. a. a= b. b = Hint: One of your answers will be negative. Think about why.40 36 32 28 24 20 16 12 8 47 0 P 4 Firm in oligopoly market MC 2 MR MC 1 D 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 40. Assuming MC2 to be the true marginal cost curve for this oligopoly firm, what price will this firm charge? (a) $8 Ⓒ (b) $12 (c) $15 (d) $20 QPart d please Suppose four Cournot competitors face an inverse market demand curve of P = 1620 – 8Q, each with identical costs Ci = 4000 + 60qi. Use the formulae given in exercise 8.15 (pgs. 214-15) for firm profits, market price, and consumer surplus at a Cournot equilibrium to answer the following questions. a. Demonstrate that a merger between F3 and F4 will not be profitable if their costs remain unchanged. (Careful: the “n” in the profit formula changes from 4 to 3.) b. Could the merger be profitable i. if fixed costs fell? If so, how much reduction is necessary? ii. If the variable costs of the merged firm fell by 75%, so that C3|4 = 8000 + 15q? (Fixed cost remains 8000 because we are assuming only variable costs fall.) c. Calculate the consumer surplus created in this market when there are four identical firms. How does it change after a merger occurs between F3 and F4 if: i. no costs savings occur ii. the merged firm reduces its fixed costs by $6000 iii. the merged firm…
- 7. Jie is a firm manager deciding its sales quantity strategy. His firm is in a market with another competitor, and he is the leader in the sequential game. Collusion is impossible. The market inverse demand function is P = 16 – Q, where Q is the total quantity of q? the production. The cost functions of Jie's firm and the other firm are c(g) and c(q) = q?, respectively. So Jie should set the quantity as С. 4 A. 8 В. 6 D. 2Q2. Consider a two-firms Cournot model with constant returns to scale. Assume also that the inverse demand function is P = 100 – 2Q, with marginal cost equal to 20for both firms, where Q = q1 + q2 . c) Calculate Stackleberg equilibrium. Draw a picture of this outcome using best-response functions and isoprofit contours.1. Perloff Chapter 14, Exercise 3.13 3.13 A duopoly faces an inverse market demand function of p = 120 - Q. Firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 20. Firm 2's constant marginal cost is 40. Calculate the output of each firm, market output, and price in (a) a collusive equilibrium or (b) a Nash-Cournot equilibrium. (Hint: See Solved Problem 14.10.) M