not use ai please 2. Consider this game with sequential moves:(Player 1, Player 2)C(20, 0)Player 2α1070Player 1d(10, 10)C22710Player 2970b(22,9)APlayer 122721(1,0)(12,20)aPlayer 1BE107921712b(21,10)Player 2F(31,9)(a)Give two examples of strategies available to Player 2 in this game.

Detailed Explanation: Analyzing Player 2's Strategies in a Sequential Game Understanding the Game:…

Answered: 2. Consider this game with sequential…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Player 1 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) If the game has a dominant strategy, what is it? There is none. If the game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, what is it? There is none. Cooperate (C) 3,3 8,0 Cooperate (C) is a dominant strategy for both players. Defect (D) is a dominant strategy for both players. Cooperate (C) is a dominant strategy for 1, and Defect (D) is a dominant strategy for 2. C, C is the only Nash equilibrium. D, D is the only Nash equilibrium. C, C and D, D are both Nash equilibria. Player 2 Defect (D) 0,8 1,1
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3. Consider the game represented by the payoff matrix below: R S (12, 12) (8,-5) (25, 14) (50, 12) (26,70) (-2.6) (20, 100) (22,75) C (11,0) (3,25) (24, 26) (50,26) D (5,-10) (16,-8) (13,-8) (50,-20) A B a. Find the Nash equilibria of the game using any suitable method. b. Apply Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Actions (IESDA) to this game. Explain the steps as necessary. Do the Nash equilibria found in part a. survive IESDA? c. Apply Iterated Elimination of (Weakly) Dominated Actions (IEDA) to this game by elim- inating all whakly dominated actions in each round. Explain the steps as necessary. Do the Nash equilibria found in part a, survive IEDA
E1
A game involves two players: player A and player B. Player A has three strategies a1, a2 and a3 while player B has three strategies b1, b2 and b3. Player B b1 b2 b3 a1 -40,30 70,20 -10,120 Player A a2 40,60 80,80 60,20 a3 -30,40 -50,110 150, -70 Assuming that this is a one-time game, answer the following questions: Is there any dominant strategy for each player? What is the secure strategy of each player. What is the Nash equilibrium of the game?
26. Consider the following game. There are ten churches in town: nine are Catholic and one is Eastern Orthodox. All churches conduct their services at 10am on Sunday morning. You and your friend, without communication, agree to meet at a church service. If you fail to meet at the same church, then you are sad. What is this game's focal point? Remember that you cannot communicate about this. (A) You meet at any of the Catholic churches. (B) You meet at any of the churches – denomination does not matter. (C) You meet at the Orthodox church. (D) There is no focal point. 27. Which of the following is the best example of Skin in the Game? (A) A politician retires to serve on the board of governors of a prestigious think tank. (B) A wealthy man donates his savings to charity. (C) A general leads his troops into battle. (D) Billie Eilish creates another cringe music video. 28. Public choice theory makes assumptions about the motives of politicians, firms, voters, and bureaucrats. Which of…
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Parameter z = 1 How many pure strategy profiles exist in this game?

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2. Consider this game with sequential moves: (Player 1, Player 2) C (20, 0) Player 2 α 1070 Player 1 d (10, 10) C 22710 Player 2 970 b (22,9) A Player 1 22721 (1,0) (12,20) a Player 1 B E 1079 21712 b (21,10) Player 2 F (31,9) (a) Give two examples of strategies available to Player 2 in this game.