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Covert Action and Congressional Oversight Alex J. Lindsey American Military University NSEC611 Dr. Brian Blodgett August 28, 2022

Abstract Covert action is the product of the Cold War between the United States and Soviet and democracy vs communism. Covert action was utilized by the United States to stop the spread of communism in the world. However, covert action became subject of interest for Congressional Oversight after the passage of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment in 1974. The Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980 dictates the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence. The Act was incorporated into the National Security Act of 1947, and the Hughes-Ryan Amendment has a small connection with the 1980 Act. The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 was a piece of legislation that was written to combine different legislative acts into a new amendment to the National Security Act. Thus, closing the loopholes in covert action that was made public after the Iran-Contra Affair during President Reagan’s administration. These loopholes are discussed along with other issues that concern intelligence sharing, ban on assassination, accountability, and policy guidance for covert action. Keyword: Covert action, Congressional Oversight

Covert Action and Congressional Oversight Introduction During the early 1970s, the United States was witnessing an unfriendly political climate under President Nixon and his administration. The nation was embedded in conflict against communist North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, while supporting South Vietnam against the unification. On the American Homefront, the citizens were divided by the impact of the Watergate scandal. Watergate which became a prime example for political historian about the abuse of presidential powers in the aspect of domestic espionage involving the illegally acquiring top secret documentation, cover-ups, and wiretapping. The legislative bodies that conducted oversight on covert action began constructing different changes to revitalize the existing Congressional Oversight on covert action that were imperative for U.S. national security. Congressional Oversight is critical as it provides the legal parameters for the Intelligence Community and covert action. This review will examine Congressional Oversight that is placed on covert action, the exploitations that were responsible for intelligence oversight, and the magnitude of oversight that is sufficient for covert operation to continue. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence were created during the 1970s after reports detailing abuse of power by the Intelligence Community. The Congressional reports described the abuses committed by the Intelligence Community and Congress decided to respond by creating these committees as a watchdog. Notwithstanding the modifications, over time the intelligence committees have constantly operated in the same manner since their creation. The intelligence committees have

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applied classified oversight in a fashion that encouraged legislative oversight and accountability on the Executive Branch, all while protecting national interest and security. However, the system has been scrutinized because of the expanding number of unauthorized releases that have affected intelligence activities and the accuracy of Congressional oversight to be plagued with scrutiny by the American public. Since the 1970s, Congressional oversight over the Intelligence Community has been the main element to safeguard that the Intelligence Community is held accounted for the actions of their programs that support the U.S. national security. This is clearly true for covert actions and clandestine operations since these have considerable risk of being compromised and have long-term effect on foreign relations. Because of the sensitive nature, Congressional oversight on intelligence operations is different from public government activities. Furthermore, Congressional oversight allows for the American people to have some assurance that intelligence operations are being operated in an ethically, legally, and effectively manner. Also, gives assurance that accountability and sensible use of power. Thus, providing a “checks and balances” within the Intelligence Community who must disseminate quality analysis and warning that threaten interest and security of the United States while abiding by the law and the rights of U.S. citizens. Yet, like other systems out there, it comes with its faults and there is a continued debate to change the current structure of the intelligence committees. Oversight of intelligence agencies that conducted covert action and clandestine Congressional Oversight

The creation of the National Security Act of 1947 assigned the responsibility of oversight to Congressional Subcommittees and has been enacted for the last 75 years. The enactment and passing of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 was in response to Watergate. The Watergate investigation combined by the Senate Select Committee’s review of governmental operations in reference to intelligence activities revealed abuse by the Intelligence Community (Berger, 2018). The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence were created during the 1970s after reports detailing abuse of power by the Intelligence Community. The Congressional reports described the abuses committed by the Intelligence Community and Congress decided to respond by creating these committees as a watchdog. Notwithstanding the modifications, over time the intelligence committees have constantly operated in the same manner since their creation. The intelligence committees have applied classified oversight in a fashion that encouraged legislative oversight and accountability on the Executive Branch, all while protecting national interest and security. However, the system has been scrutinized because of the expanding number of unauthorized releases that have affected intelligence activities and the accuracy of Congressional oversight to be plagued with scrutiny by the American public. Since the 1970s, Congressional oversight over the Intelligence Community has been the main element to safeguard that the Intelligence Community is held accounted for the actions of their programs that support the U.S. national security. This is clearly true for covert actions and clandestine operations since these have considerable risk of being compromised and have long-term effect on foreign relations.

Because of the sensitive nature, Congressional oversight on intelligence operations is different from public government activities. Furthermore, Congressional oversight allows for the American people to have some assurance that intelligence operations are being operated in an ethically, legally, and effectively manner. Also, gives assurance that accountability and sensible use of power. Thus, providing a “checks and balances” within the Intelligence Community who must disseminate quality analysis and warning that threaten interest and security of the United States while abiding by the law and the rights of U.S. citizens. Yet, like other systems out there, it comes with its faults and there is a continued debate to change the current structure of the intelligence committees. Oversight of intelligence agencies that conducted covert action and clandestine The Hughes-Ryan Amendment is an adjustment of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The Act requires the President of the United States to notify Congressional Committees specifically, the Gang of Eight, about all covert operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Covert operations are considered, “any activity conducted by the United States government that influence diplomatic, economic, or martial conditions with the purpose of concealing those actions from the knowledge of the public.” (Rosenbach, 2009). Furthermore, another passage from the Act, “the President is authorized to utilize covert operations through “presidential finding” stating the necessity of supporting “identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States, in which the findings must be issued with 48 hours (about 2 days) after the declaration of policy of approval for covert action.” (Rosenbach, 2009). However, informing Congressional Committees about intelligence operations comes with limitations in reference to covert action operations. The Executive Branch has a vital part

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in keeping intelligence classification and restricting access only to certain members of Congress, which was created during the Iran hostage crisis (Erwin, 2013). As previously mentioned, the Gang of Eight provides the President with consultation and procurement of the appropriate funds need to conduct the covert action. Yet, the mechanisms in place on intelligence oversight are critical in regulating the intelligence programs within the Intelligence Community. The mechanisms help reduced waste and abuse of federal funds and the possible manipulation of power from those individuals appointed as leaders of the United States. From the public’s perception, Congressional Oversight of the Intelligence Community and covert action is seen as a form of “checks and balances” by the United States government. The Watergate scandal is an accurate example of abuse of authority which had a direct cause for Congressional Oversight Committee over intelligence operations. Wagenen revealed the creation of the Secret Fund during the Revolutionary War, that was used for different intelligence collection operations by previous U.S. Presidents (Wagenen, 1997). With the Watergate investigation, the American public was introduced to domestic espionage on the anti-Vietnam War and Civil Right movements (Wagenen, 1997). Investigative committees structured off the Church and Pike investigative committees, were created by Congress because of the trust issues that started with presidential committees in charge of abuse investigations. The Murphy Commission (Commission on the Reorganization of the Government for Conduct of Foreign Policy) and the Rockefeller Commission (United States President’s Commission on CIA Activities within the United States) were two commission created during a period of conflict between the Executive and Legislative branches of the government (Hastedt, 2012). Both commissions published a report for Congress debating the gap between

domestic and foreign politics. The Murphy Commission suggested the creation of joint Congressional Committees on National Security on oversight for all covert activities but disapprove of the President authorizing covert action. Thus, leading to Executive Order 11905 to limit some of the proposals (Hastedt, 2012). The presence of tension and the evolving issues with Congressional Oversight are existent. Yet, it is vital to understand that it is necessary for intelligence to protect the national security of the United States. Congressional inquiries into the covert action operations of the Central Intelligence Agency were something that they never contemplated until the fund and resource were granted in the early years of the agency’s function (Walker, 2006). Hastedt advised that some comments on what is considered “normal intelligence oversight commission” and advised that oversight commission observe the impact of their recommendations as it affects policymakers (Hastedt, 2012). Furthermore, oversight on the mechanics of the Intelligence Community and covert action needs to be politically unbiased and mission with the objective of safeguarding national interest must be unrestricted. In the interest of national security and public trust, a thin line between Congressional Oversight and policy decision must be made, in particular with covert action. Conclusion This review explored the oversight mechanisms established for strategic covert action, previous exploitation of covert action that created oversight, and the magnitude of oversight that is adequate for the Intelligence Community to continue their mission. However, there are moments when leaders intentionally misdirect the American public with utilization of

espionage and times when espionage used to prevent terrorist attacks. Congressional oversight on strategic covert action is adequate to ease Presidential or CIA misuse of power and keep the intelligence operation apparatus working the way it should. The role of Congressional oversight on strategic intelligence is to adequately disburse the government budget for support operation regarding intelligence collection. Additionally, informing the American public about the operating procedures of the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community structure has been reformed several times over the year by different intelligence oversight commissions. With this, the commissions should be well-rounded on the clear objective of strategic covert action when dealing with national security. Bibliography Berger, Sam. Lesson from Watergate. Center for American Progress. 2018. Erwin, Marshall Curtis. Sensitive Covert Action Notifications: Oversight Options for Congress. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. 2013. Erwin, Marshall Curtis. “Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions.” Congressional Research Service. (April): 1-14. 2013. Hastedt, Glenn. "Investigative Oversight of the American Intelligence Community: Promise and Performance." Praeger Security International Online. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, Dec. 2012.

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Rosenbach, Eric B., Aki Peritz, and Hope LeBeau. “Confrontation Or Collaboration: Congress and the Intelligence Community." Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Harvard Kennedy School. 2009. 10-32. Snyder, Britt L. "The Agency and the Hill: CIA's Cooperation with Congress 1946- 2004." Washington DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2008. 259-310. Wagenan, James S. Van. "A Review of Congressional Oversight: Critics and Defenders." Central Intelligence Agency Library. 1997. Walker, Matthew B. “Reforming Congressional Oversight of U.S. Intelligence.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (December 1, 2006): 702– 720. Retrieved from https://www- tandfonlinecom.ezproxy2.apus.edu/doi/abs/10.1080/08850600500483806.