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1 Khan 260958548 Running head: The New World Order? The New World Order? MENA’s Attitudes towards Sino-Russian Partnership and Forming Eastern Bloc POLI 340: Developing Area/Middle East Muhammad Khan (Student ID: 260958548) Professor Douek Thursday, April 6, 2023

2 Khan 260958548 Research Question: What is the strategic role and significant of MENA, in the context of the contemporary geopolitical blocs of China-Russia and the US/+allies? What driving factors within foreign policy, are influencing MENA states, considering growing multilateral coalitions/partnerships? Is the Middle East endorsing the ‘ East’s ’ comeback? And if so, what is the Middle East and North Africa’s (MENA) role in shaping, influencing, and impacting this “new world order”. Recent developments highlight the establishment of key strategic partnerships between actors, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC states) and other Middle Eastern nations; demonstrating the creation of a political bloc, one that directly challenges the United States previous hegemony across the MENA region and internationally. The latest news illustrates the following geopolitical developments: (1) the Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement brokered by China (Soleimany, 2023 ) , (2) BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) nations, the world’s fastest-growing and emerging economies, abandoning the American dollars for trade (Young, 2023), (3) Saudi Arabia alongside Russia and other OPEC members ( Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) collectively limiting oil production (1.15 million barrels per day) until end of 2023 (El Dahan & Rasheed, 2023), and (4) Saudi Arabia joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Watkins, 2023). Though recent developments, strong relationships between the MENA region and China-Russia have been brewing for the past two decades; however, the speed in which these relationships have manifested lately is worth analysis and indicates the altering international political climate, one in which the United States influence is declining. According to a survey conducted by Burson Cohn & Wolfe, the Arab youth regard and favor China, Russia, and Turkey as greater allies than

3 Khan 260958548 historical regional powerhouses, the US, United Kingdom, and France; with 73% of respondents advocating for US disengagement from the region (ASDA’A BCW, 2022). One may pose, why has the decline of American influence in the region simultaneously been met with the increase of Sino-Russian influence? To explain the changes in MENA’s foreign policy initiatives and endeavours, this paper will examine the driving themes of Islamism, geopolitics, and authoritarianism/militarism, in influencing the Middle East’s strategic partnerships with China and Russia. This essay will demonstrate and analyze the decline of American influence in the ME, relative to China-Russia, as a culminating ripple effect reinforced by the symbolic and political value of Islamism in the region, the role of strategic geopolitical and economic opportunities, and the prevalence of authoritarian governments that sustain civil relations using militarism as a mechanism of maintaining legitimacy/authority. The essay will focus its scope on the driving factors that influence foreign policy trends in MENA and why those factors have shaped MENA’s strategic alliances with the coming ‘Eastern bloc’; arguing that Russia and China’s non-interventionist approaches to MENA has made them an appealing alternative to the US. Symbolic Value of Islamism and Narrative of the ‘West’ Since its 7 th century advent in the Middle East, Islam maintains a monopolizing effect over the customs, values, and norms, of the MENA region and Muslim societies across Asia and Africa. Theologically, it has significantly shaped the fabric of MENA’s identity and culture. However, Islam’s role in MENA is not restricted to its theological entailments, Islam as a force cultivates its influence as a mobilizing mechanism, one that asserts, upholds, and sustains its involvement socially and politically. Islam has repeatedly been equipped as an instrument of

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4 Khan 260958548 mass mobilization and political legitimacy. Though the political theology of Islamism is not applied universally or even similarly, across the region, its political utilization and popular support remain predominant. As noted by Baxter and Akbarzadeh, the contemporary use of Islamism sustains the desire of Muslim peoples to maintain their societal tenets and individual lives according to the “directives of the Islamic faith” (72). Currently, the propagandizing effect that Islamism plays, functions reactionarily to the supposed sentiments of Western intervention in MENA (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 72). Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey’s Former Prime Minister, asserts that MENA’s political regimes should “derive their legitimacy from Islam” (Ozkan, 16). Davutoglu touches upon the inapplicability of the ‘Western Model’ to the Islamic world, as Western governments justify their legitimacy through democratic processes and parliamentary institutions, fundamentally lacking religious values that “keep them in check” (16). To examine Davutoglu paranoia about Western influence disparaging MENA’s socio-religious values, one can highlight how Islamist movements gained its political symbolism in the region. Between the 1950’s to 1970s, the underlying aim of Islamist movements pursued ‘Islamic modernity’, in this sense, Islamism was the focus on restrengthening Islamic tenets within civil life as a means of combatting Western intervention and influences (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 75). Now one can tie this back to Davutoglu’s conclusions; the ‘West’ is accused of having a “crisis of values”, a phenomenon that he wishes to save the Islamic world from. Ideologically, the retort of “Islam is the solution” gained greater justification as the United States continued to intervene and assert its presence within MENA. Islamist thinkers pushed narratives of the US’ presence in MENA, as a threat to the region’s socio-religious values because it explicitly became one. In the case of Turkey and Iran, domestic policies of secularization were imposed by incumbent pro-Western administrations (72). Subsequently, the US’ continued presence and engagements in MENA,

5 Khan 260958548 including the ‘liberation’ of Kuwait and invasion of Iraq, produced an Islamist backlash that significantly damaged American’s foreign approval and regional agenda (Baxter & Akbarzadeh, 133). As previously stated, contemporary Islamism is reactionary, it seeks to challenge the prevalence of "foreign interreference in Arab/Muslim affairs” (76); as the US’ foreign policy in MENA became increasingly interventionist, Islamism sought to address two challenges. First, Islamist organizations championed themselves as adversaries to the West, specifically the US, this opposition was derived out of the explicit interference of Western powers within MENA states. Second, Islamism aimed to confront and deter secularizing trends within the Middle East (76). The US’ prolonged presence in MENA, while actively exerting influence over states such as Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, exacerbated notions of “Anti-Americanism” that Islamist movements used to garner support. The MENA states were not oblivious to the US foreign policy strategy, as polling data from 2007 demonstrates that over half of the Jordanian population viewed the US’ presence as sustained by “the desire to control Middle Eastern oil, world-domination, a vendetta against Muslim states” (170). The US played a driving role in its declining influence over the MENA region, their engagements in MENA revealed themes of “intervention, the use of influence, alliance-building, questions regarding the parity value ascribed to human suffering, geo-political strategy” (185). Though fundamentally, it was Islamism that embellished the regions discontent with American regional policy, producing a ripple effect of widespread anti-American narratives that would ultimately establish the ‘West’s’ role in MENA, as an ideological, social, and religious threat to Islamic values, an incompatibility that reinforces the region’s gradual shift to Eastern powers.

6 Khan 260958548 Impact of Strategic Geopolitics and Economic Corridors: FP strategies of GCC states with regional actors and US, China & Russia Role of Strategic Geopolitics in GCC The Gulf States, being Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, are an economic hub of foreign investment, rich in natural resources, with a long- time friendly and engaging relationship with Western, particularly American, powers. Due to the distinctive regional qualities, predominantly adhering to a monarchic government structure (apart from Iraq), their foreign policy agenda differs from actors in the MENA (Szalai, 155). The Middle East is a region heavily concerned with the establishing of strategic alliances, but within the Gulf states, these alliances are formed on the bases of power dynamics. Politically and economically weaker states exercise “small state behaviour”, finding “security umbrellas” under stronger states, who in turn have historically joined the security folds of stronger foreign (again, Western) powers (Szalai, 159). To analyze this behaviour, one must address the role of economic competition between Gulf states, within the context of how these influence their respective foreign policy endeavours. The dominant capital-rich Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE have all profited from the historical exportation of crude oil, largely to the American market. The US interest in the Gulf sparked sharply in the 1970s, an interest solely dependent on stabilizing the oil market from ensuing domestic military conflicts, i.e., Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, which disrupted US domestic gas prices and international oil markets (Temiz, 62). Regional instabilities compel smaller states, such as Bahrain and Kuwait, to develop relationships in hopes of limiting and deterring “being dominated by a larger power” (Szalai, 159). According to Szalai, Bahrain and Kuwait hold their position in the Gulf as highly susceptible to instability (prompted by

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7 Khan 260958548 external interference and aggression), forcing their leadership to prioritize their foreign policy initiatives based on their security needs (175). Saudi Arabia has seldom seen their position regionally unstable, one of the wealthiest nations in the world and possessing one of the largest oil reserves globally; the reigning Saud family has been the culprit of hosting Western forces and having longstanding positive relationships with the West, but its influence is exclusively that of a strong actor. Qatar and the UAE, while small states, do not regard their regional position as weak; the same cannot be said for Oman, who’s cautious leadership refrains from “overly visible political projects, but has cooperated closesly with the USA since the 1980s” (175). These smaller states employ the use of strategic alliances as means of ensuring security, as witnessed by Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, when they cut ties with Egypt to appease its rival hegemon, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (157). During the Iranian revolution, actors Bahrain and Kuwait, in attempts to strengthen their position with Saudi Arabia, began to persecute and politically pressure their respective Shia populations and subsequently reinforce notions and sentiments of fundamentalist Sunni Islam (159). US Influences in GCC The US has capitalized on the historical instability of the Gulf, according to Baxter & Akbarzadeh, the power vacuum left after Saddam Hussein’s tenure, allowed the US to coin and assert themselves as the “Gulf’s protector” (131). Though this policy of security has been continually criticized as a guise to leverage and legitimize US presence in the oil-rich Gulf, playing the role of the ‘friendly watchdog’ (131). Subsequently, the US utilized smaller Gulf states as “logistical hubs for the execution of American foreign policy”, which was coupled simultaneously with the rise of anti-American rhetoric and sentiments in the GCC, inciting the

8 Khan 260958548 transnational Islamist jihadi movement (Szalai, 167); another instance of the Islamist backlash reinforced by American intervention. Role of China’s Arrival in GCC Chinese influence and presence in MENA are not novel, Sino-Arab relationships date back to the historic Silk Road and its trade routes. As Temiz asserts, China’s engagements in MENA are generally positive, with a survey finding that China was favoured over the US by the Arab youth (18–24 year-olds), as the US’ continuous military interventions have resulted in a declining image regionally (67). China’s main interest in MENA are economic, Beijing understand the role of the Middle East geopolitically; the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) presented by China places the Middle East, specifically the Persian Gulf, as a key element in its grand infrastructure project (Fulton, 55). The Gulf states and China have developed strong financial and economic agreements, based around the BRI and other trade deals, the cooperation of these actors demonstrates the GCC motivations to branch out their strategic partnerships, carefully distancing themselves from the US, who’s economic incentives in the Gulf have also reduced. In 2004, then Chinese President Hu Jintao, provided four principles that motivate Beijing to enhance China-Arab relations, being: “e nhance political relations, to enhance bilateral trade, to expand cultural exchanges, and to strengthen cooperation in the international arena in the interest of peace and development.” (53). Whereas the US had been a historically long-time importer of Gulf oil, since it began to domestically produce oil, its reliance and importation of Gulf oil decreased; at a time, which saw China’s imports sustainably increase (62). Though the GCC has started to diversify its economy

9 Khan 260958548 and GDP structure, the significance of its reliance on oil exports plays a focus in their foreign partnerships. China has positioned itself as a great power in MENA, cultivating considerable regional support. Beijing’s foreign policy principles of non-interference in other’s internal affairs, its standard of non-alignment, and notably, its emphasis on exercising collaborative discourse in addressing regional tensions, has prompted the notion of viewing China as an “alternative pole to the US” (55). One can evidently highlight the appeal of China to its Gulf counterparts: the Chinese establish their economic partnerships without involving itself in a state’s political affairs, which is compatible with the Gulf’s paranoia about external interference (85). The starkest of parallels when compared to the US approach in the Gulf and Middle East, at large, China was able to successfully wield its vast soft power channelled through the “ability to instill positive change without force or undue political pressure.” (57). The Middle East’s battles with colonial imposition and then subsequent US and Western interference manifested into the Islamist backlash incited by the Arab street (the youth masses) and the emergence of China as a force of strategic alignment. However, in accordance with geopolitical strategies, the GCC nations have a more regional interest in developing relations with China, as well. With the decline of US influence in the region, the Gulf nations see an opportunity to equalise the loss of services with Chinse imports; however, they are also trying to “hedge against the rising China- Iran relationship” (86). Some of the smaller Gulf states want to use China to counterbalance the dominant role of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the region (86). Simply put, the US’ demising legitimacy in MENA, was followed by China’s exertion of bilateralism in their strategic policy; a tenet viewed as lacking from the American approach. But with Beijing’s increasing appeal comes Russia and Moscow’s role and partnership with the Chinese, and their distinctive interest in the region, coming together to solidify the formation of a strong and vast Eastern bloc.

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10 Khan 260958548 The Authoritarian Need for Guns: How Russia’s arms exports factor into the strategic domestic interests of authoritarian leaders Russia has shared a unique historic and contemporary relation with the Arab world, geographic neighbours with collective interest geopolitically. Firstly, Putin’s post-Soviet Russia has excelled at developing robust economic and military relations with its Arab counterparts, deriving from the MENA’s combative and unstable nature, along with domestic leaders’ heavy reliance on militarism to enforce their legitimacy across their populous; a demand Russia supplies significantly. Nota bene, Russia unlike the US is not compelled by a strict adherence to values and principles, thus making it an “easier and more flexible interlocutor than the US or European powers” (Kozhanov, 133). The Kremlin and Putin have carefully avoided embedding Russian partiality in regional conflicts and uniquely benefits from a range of strong relations with strategic players, the likes of Israel, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, actors who have not always seen eye to eye (Bechev et al, 2). Russia exercises an anodyne approach to its involvement in MENA regional issues, hoping to extract good faith from all parties involved a given case. Moscow does this to protect a predominant component of its involvement in MENA, the supply of arms. Russia views its arms exports as an “important foreign policy investment” (45). Russia returned to the MENA arms market for the first time since the Soviet collapse in 2006, by signing an arms package agreement with Algeria, valuing $7.5 billion dollars (45). Since then, Algeria has become an avid buyer of Russian arms. The MENA region accounted for 36% of Russia’s arms exports in 2015 and is now the largest importer of Russian armaments, “taking almost 50% of the total exports”. From 2003-2011, Iraq had most of its arms supplied by the US, a period which saw an abundance of American troops in Iraq; however, in 2012, Iraq

11 Khan 260958548 signed an arms agreement with Putin’s Russia valuing $4.2 billion dollars, becoming the second largest importer of Russian combat gear after India, in 2014 (47). The supply of arms gives Russia the ability to establish diplomatic relations with their customer nations, as it would for most; but in MENA, the unique case of arms exports sheds light into the prevalence of authoritarian administrations and regimes who require the exercise of militarism, in aim of securing authority within its borders. The regional instabilities of the Middle East prompt the necessity of nations to develop strong military presences and provisions but they also act as a means of ensuring that incumbent leaders maintain their authority, through exercise of force. In 2016, the attempted coup d’etat on Tayyip Erdo ğan’s administration prompted Anakara to sign an arms contract with Russia worth over $2.5 billion dollars, at a time when US-Turkey relations were weakening (50). At a time when the US and the EU sought and placed arms embargos on Syria (131), Russia “vetoed all attempts of Security Council to impose an arms embargo”, protecting its economic interests in the region (4). The theme of militarism across MENA reinforces the reality that arms supplies are a necessity to those authoritarian regimes require for their authority’s continuity. For MENA, more ammo means more ability to exert force; for leaders, regimes, and even militant groups, Russia is a steady and reliable supplier that fulfills their mandates for regional tensions and domestic legitimacy. Conclusion In conclusion, the formation of mutually beneficial relationships between actors in the Middle East and North Africa, Russia, China, challenges the previous hegemony of the United States in the MENA region and internationally. In the aftermath of the US' decline influence in the region, Sino-Russian influence has increased. This paper investigates the impact of Islamism,

12 Khan 260958548 geopolitics, and authoritarianism/militarism on the strategic partnerships between the Middle East and China and Russia. Through this study, it becomes evident that the decline of American influence in the MENA region is reinforced by the symbolic and political value of Islamism, the risk and rewards of strategic geopolitical and economic opportunities, and the strong presence of authoritarian governments that maintain civil relations via militarism to maintain legitimacy/authority. Consequently, MENA's strategic alliances with the Eastern bloc are not only influenced by these factors, but also contribute to the culmination of a ripple effect that challenges the United States' former hegemony. Bibliography Behlül Ozkan (2014) Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism, Survival, 56:4, 119- 140, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2014.941570 Fulton, J. (Ed.). (2021). Routledge Handbook on China–Middle East Relations (1st ed.). Routledge . https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003034520 Szalai, M. (2021). The Foreign Policy of Smaller Gulf States: Size, Power, and Regime Stability in the Middle East (1st ed.). Routledge . https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003158288 Baxter, K., & Akbarzadeh, S. (2008). US Foreign Policy in the Middle East: The Roots of Anti- Americanism (1st ed.). Routledge . https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203928301 Temiz, K. (2021). Chinese Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East (1st ed.). Routledge . https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003180333 “14th annual Asda'a BCW Arab Youth survey”. BCW . (2022, September 21). Retrieved April 11, 2023, from https://bcw-global.com/newsroom/global/14th-annual-asdaa-bcw-arab-youth- survey#! Bechev, D., Popescu, N., & Secrieru, S. (Eds.). (2021). Russia Rising: Putin’s Foreign Policy in the Middle East and North Africa . London: I.B.Tauris. Retrieved April 12, 2023, from http://dx.doi.org/10. 5040/9780755636679

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13 Khan 260958548 Watkins, S. (1970, January 1). “U.S. losing influence as Saudi Arabia joins Shanghai Cooperation Organization”. OilPrice.com . Retrieved April 12, 2023, from https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Middle-East/US-Losing-Influence-As-Saudi-Arabia-Joins- Shanghai-Cooperation-Organization.html Rasheed, A., & El Dahan, M. (2023, April 2). “OPEC+ announces surprise oil output cuts”. Reuters . Retrieved April 12, 2023, from https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/sarabia- other-opec-producers-announce-voluntary-oil-output-cuts-2023-04-02/ Young, M. (2023, March 31). “Russia talks up prospects of BRICS countries developing new currency”. Cointelegraph . Retrieved April 12, 2023, from https://cointelegraph.com/news/russia-talks-up-prospects-of-brics-countries-developing- new-currency Soleimany, S. (n.d.). “Iran-saudi arabia rapprochement threatens to upend US-led Regional Order”. Retrieved April 12, 2023, from https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense- policy/middle-east/iran-saudi-arabia-rapprochement-threatens-to-upend-us-led-regional- order/