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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE US Army Command and General Staff School Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core H100: History, Theory, Doctrine, Practice H110: The Birth of Modern Combined Arms Warfare Reading H110RB The Offensive Tactics of 1918 (Excerpt from Chapter 2) by Timothy T. Lupfer In the second half of 1917, strategic conditions were developing that would offer the Germans an opportunity to concentrate their military power on the western front in 1918. Russia, suffering from internal convulsions as well as the extreme demands of the war, could not sustain the war effort. As peace negotiations with Russia began, German units traveled from east to west. The number of German divisions in the west went from 150 in October 1917 to 192 in March 1918. 1 The opportunity for force concentration in the west had to be seized quickly, for the United States had declared war on Germany in April 1917. The Germans calculated that it would require one year for the United States to exert any decisive influence on operations in the west. Therefore, the changing strategic situation and deteriorating economic and political conditions in Germany (due to the effects of the Allied blockade of Germany) only permitted the Germans one final attempt at victory in the west. On 11 November 1917, OHL decided that the great offensive would begin in the spring of 1918. Between this decision and the initiation of the offensive on 21 March 1918, the German Army developed the appropriate doctrine and prepared as many units as possible for the attack. In order to destroy the Allied forces, the Germans attempted to solve the tactical dilemma which had frustrated the Allies for more than three years. The preferred German maneuver in prewar doctrine, the envelopment, was impossible to achieve in the west. Therefore, a successful penetration was required, to be followed up by force sufficient to achieve a strategic breakthrough. Although in two and one-half years the Germans had conducted only one major offensive on the western front (Verdun), the German Army still had considerable experience from which to draw. Units in the east had been participating in several major offensives throughout the war. More recently, in October 1917, a German field army (Fourteenth Army under General Otto von Below), having been formed with units from the western, eastern, and Rumanian fronts, was sent by OHL to northern Italy to cooperate with the Austrians in an offensive against the Italians. General von Below’s order to his forces before battle stated: Every column on the heights must move forward without hesitation; by doing so opportunities will be created for helping neighbors who cannot make progress, by swinging round in the rear of the enemy opposing him. 2 At the Battle of Caporetto the Germans and Austrians smashed through the Italian forces, achieving a strategic penetration, and drove the Italians back to the Piave River. The other Allied powers responded, sending French and British units to Italy to strengthen the front. Italy, although badly shaken, remained in the war. The Germans and Austrians had not eliminated Italy from the war, but the Central Powers success had been most impressive. Italy lost 305,000 soldiers, including 275,000 prisoners. 3 Lupfer, Timothy T. “ The Offensive Tactics of 1918.” In The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War , Leavenworth Papers No. 4, 37–54. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, July 1981. CGSC Copyright Registration #22-765 E H110RB-486

The offensive successes in the east and in Italy had occurred within the unique conditions of each theater. OHL, in considering the peculiar nature of the western front, did not blindly adopt techniques derived outside the west and try to apply them immediately to the western front. Instead, OHL examined each combat experience with respect to the particular conditions in which it had occurred. Also, the German forces on the western front were better prepared for offensive operations than their record of recent experiences in major offensives indicated. Although Verdun had been an offensive with a limited objective and the 1918 offensive plan sought a strategic breakthrough, the Verdun battles had demonstrated several useful points: the value of sudden concentrated artillery fire in depth before the assault, the need for centralized control of artillery, the value of surprise, and the need for greater combined arms cooperation. The Germans had tried several tactical techniques, such as attaching a horse- drawn artillery battery to an infantry regiment in the attack, in order to provide the infantry better fire support. 4 The German Army’s defensive experiences in 1917 provided another very important source of offensive expertise. The aggressive tenor of the elastic defense-in-depth, especially the counterattack, nurtured offensive excellence. To train the army for this defense, units acquired the spirit of the counterattack, and OHL had codified storm trooper techniques to assist this training. Having accumulated considerable counterattack experience in 1917, the German Army in the west already had a deceptively solid base of doctrine and experience for offensive operations. The Germans had another source of experience on the conduct of the offense. They had defended against the Allied attacks for three years, and recognized that the Allies had been showing them what not to do. 5 Reliance on massive firepower to destroy the enemy was clearly not the solution. In any event, the Germans could not match the Allied expenditure of munitions, so a different offensive technique was required. A French captain inadvertently provided one important source of inspiration for developing such new techniques. On 9 May 1915, Capt. Andre Laffargue led an attack on a German position. Afterwards, Laffargue reflected upon the problems of the attack and expressed his ideas in a pamphlet, “The Attack in Trench Warfare.” The French Army published the pamphlet, but distributed it for information only; it did not become French doctrine. The British did not translate it. 6 Early in the summer of 1916, the Germans captured a copy of the pamphlet, translated it at once, and issued it to units. Ludwig Renn wrote that Laffargue’s ideas had immediate use as a tactical manual for German infantry. 7 Laffargue personified that resource of talent which exists at the small unit level and develops in combat; he was a part of the “human canister” of combat who did not want to die, but to succeed. 8 Exclaiming, “Let us prepare our business down to the slightest detail in order to conquer and live,” he set out to record his experiences and ideas. 9 Laffargue advocated a sudden attack to achieve a deep penetration. His attack resembled a gulp, not a nibble. 1 The momentum of the in-depth attack would disrupt the enemy, keep him off balance, and prevent him from organizing an effective response. To capitalize on disruption, the assault had to advance as far as possible. The first wave would identify—not reduce—defensive strongpoints and subsequent attack waves would destroy them. An artillery bombardment applied suddenly in depth throughout the enemy area would precede the infantry assault. Disruption of enemy artillery batteries was particularly important to protect the infantry advance. 1 The metaphor likening attacks to consumption of food was popular in the First World War. Joffre described his 1915 strategy of numerous attacks with limited objectives by stating, “I am nibbling at them.” The German attack regulations of 1918 used the same metaphor and described “devouring” the enemy position. H110RB-487

Ludendorff had expected greater success, but he was still pleased with the results of the counterattack because it had been achieved by troops who had not been specially trained for an offensive. 15 Analyzing the recent experiences almost immediately, Crown Prince Rupprecht’s Army Group staff quickly circulated to its units a memorandum that stressed the importance of surprise as demonstrated at Cambrai. 16 This analysis of recent tactical experience was a characteristic German Army method. British General Headquarters also circulated to its units a pamphlet describing a successful action of three British divisions in the defense against the German counterattack. The British Official History noted that this effort by British GHQ was “unusual.” 17 The Offensive Doctrine On 1 January 1918 OHL published The Attack in Position Warfare (hereafter referred to as Attack ), which became the basic document for the German offensives of 1918. Just as Principles had described a defense that incorporated the entire battlefield in depth instead of emphasizing only the front line, Attack described an attack-in-depth, a devouring 1 of the entire enemy position instead of nibbling away at the enemy front line. Once again that “mere captain,” Hermann Geyer, was instrumental in writing the text. 18 The objective of the major German offensive was to achieve a breakthrough after penetrating the Allied line. In their efforts to penetrate the German defenses, the Allies had relied upon massive artillery fire. The tank was another possible solution, but appropriate tank tactics did not emerge until Cambrai. The Germans could not rely on a long destructive artillery bombardment to give them their penetration, for they lacked the huge quantities of ammunition (their industrial production did not match that of the Allies), and more importantly, they knew such tactics had not worked. The Germans did not seek a solution through technological innovation. For example, they did not attempt to develop the tank on a large scale, but chose to accomplish the attack-in-depth with existing combat means in a carefully coordinated attack relying on surprise. The doctrine in Attack was as applicable to the deliberate counterattacks of the defense as it was to the main attack of an offense to achieve a breakthrough. The introduction to Attack clearly stated this and it demonstrated the close tactical connection between the counterattack and the offensive. Attack noted that the strategic breakthrough was the ultimate goal of the penetration. In order to achieve that goal the attack had to strike deeply into the enemy position. Acknowledging the impossibility of destroying all enemy forces in such a deep penetration, the German tactical doctrine did not require complete destruction. Instead, disruption of enemy units and communications was essential. Throughout the doctrine, keeping the enemy off balance, pressing the attack continuously, and retaining the initiative received great emphasis. The authors of Attack described all artillery missions (preparatory fire, creeping barrage, isolating the objective) with the acknowledgment that total destruction of enemy forces could not be achieved. For instance, artillery would neutralize, not necessarily destroy, enemy artillery batteries; the Attack strongly recommended gas shells because of their disruptive characteristics. The Attack clearly identified the need to move artillery and ammunition forward to maintain the attack. Also, the authors devoted 21 of the 113 paragraphs of Attack to air forces, which received an increased role in strafing enemy positions. Attack stressed infantry-artillery cooperation and recommended pyrotechnics to control creeping barrages. Special horse-drawn artillery batteries provided mobile artillery to infantry regiments, a technique used at Verdun and in some storm battalion organizations. The doctrine encouraged any techniques that could assist the artillery in keeping up with the infantry, for in the German attack the infantry, not the artillery, determined the speed of the attack: 1 The German text of this regulation, Der Angriff im Stellungskrieg , used the word fressen , meaning to devour or to consume. H110RB-489

The momentum of the infantry must not be dependent on the barrage, but vice versa, otherwise the dash of the infantry will be checked in the rigid curtain of fire. 19 While the Attack urged German infantrymen to exploit the effects of artillery, it also reminded them that success depended on their own skill. No amount of munitions could relieve the infantryman from his responsibility to close with the enemy. 20 To conduct the attack, the German infantry organized in depth. Speed and depth were the means of securing their flanks and rear: speed to keep the enemy from reacting in time to the attack, and depth to provide the follow-up units which would isolate the bypassed pockets of resistance and prevent these remnants from interfering with the continuation of the attack. 21 There has been some confusion about the name of these new German offensive tactics. After the German offensive of 1918, the French called the tactics “Hutier tactics,” attributing them to General Oskar von Hutier. After serving on the eastern front, von Hutier was transferred to the west for the 1918 offensives, during which his Eighteenth Army achieved the greatest successes against the enemy. The French credited him with the invention of the offensive tactics, and perhaps this erroneous conjecture provides another example of the personality-dominant thinking of the Allies. The first Allied reaction to the new German tactics was to attempt to identify an individual inventor. The Germans themselves never used the term “Hutier tactics,” and recent research has established clearly that von Hutier did not invent these tactics. 22 The tactics were the product of an effective corporate effort. A better term is “infiltration tactics.” While the German text does not use the equivalent German word, “infiltration” is a satisfactory description of the infantry technique of bypassing resistance and pushing forward as far as possible. However, “infiltration” connotes individual movement, whereas the German movement was in small units, and the word is too exclusively infantry oriented. The German effort emphasized the coordination ( das Zusammenwirken ) of all arms, especially infantry and artillery: just as no one personality was the source of tactical wisdom, there was no one weapon or technique that exclusively carried the German attacks. Like the efforts of the officers in developing doctrine, the efforts of the various arms blended in a complementary fashion. The Attack Organization In Attack as in Principles , the Germans considered the division the basic unit capable of conducting independent battlefield operations. The offensive doctrine, however, established one relationship that differed greatly from the elastic defense-in-depth. Whereas in the defense the forward division commander had the authority to order counterattack units outside his own division organization to deliver an immediate counterattack, in the offensive the higher headquarters retained control of the follow-up units. 23 The reinforcements were kept well forward, but under the direction of higher headquarters they would reinforce success. 24 To maintain the momentum of an attack, the belligerents had tried several different methods for relieving the leading units in the attack during the war. The French had tried successive waves (the first wave taking one objective, the second wave passing through to take the next one) and the British had used a similar leapfrog technique in 1917. 25 But in Attack lead units were instructed to continue without relief, for the doctrine considered it preferable to maintain the attack and exhaust the lead unit, rather than attempt a succession which would lose time and impetus. 26 Unfortunately, this method resulted in severe losses for the lead units, which would have an adverse effect on the 1918 German offensive. H110RB-490

Artillery support was carefully integrated into the assault plan. Although the infantry missions necessitated decentralization of control, the artillery missions in support of the attack required greater centralization of control over artillery. The Germans wanted to avoid any prolonged artillery fire, for surprise would be lost and an artillery duel would develop in which the Allies, with greater amounts of munitions, would eventually prevail. 32 Therefore, German fire had to be fast and accurate, and its mission was neutralization, rather than elusive and costly destruction. The techniques used to deliver fast and accurate neutralization fire in 1918 were greatly influenced by one very remarkable man, Georg Bruchmüller, the most significant “import” from the eastern front to the western front. He had been on the retired list at the outbreak of the war because of a riding accident. 33 Recalled to active duty during the war, he served on the eastern front. Bruchmüller developed techniques to support attacks with a sudden concentration of accurate fire instead of prolonged preparatory bombardments. In the spring of 1916 he convinced the chief of staff of the Tenth Army to adopt this method of concentration for a major attack at Tarnopol, and the effect in supporting the rapid advance of the infantry was impressive. Bruchmüller’s technique emphasized fire in depth throughout the enemy positions. 34 His support included an accurate creeping barrage, the Feuerwalze , for the advancing infantry. Bruchmüller knew how to derive the greatest benefits from limited means. Attacks received support based upon the estimated minimum number of batteries needed to achieve success. Bruchmüller did not attempt to flatten every enemy position, for this was unnecessary: In a fire action of a few hours only, the complete destruction of enemy trenches, a complete harassing of rear areas, etc., could naturally not be achieved. This was not at all contemplated. We desired only to break the morale of the enemy, pin him to his position, and then overcome him with an overwhelming assault. 35 Bruchmüller developed several techniques to achieve this disruption, which required strict control of all artillery assets. Each battery of each type of weapon received specific fire missions with specific timetables. He organized the stages of delivery of fire in this way: First Stage: Surprise concentration, hitting headquarters, phone links, command posts, enemy batteries, and infantry positions. Fire is sudden, concentrated, and makes extensive use of gas. Second Stage: Most batteries reinforce those batteries already firing on enemy batteries. Third Stage: Fire for effect on designated targets according to range. Some batteries continue to shell infantry positions, and heavy pieces engage long range targets. 36 Surprise was essential to achieve maximum disruptive effect on the enemy. Therefore, the Germans had to conceal their attack preparations very carefully and their initial target data had to be very accurate. The relationship between infantry and artillery in all armies often became strained during the war. In 1915, for example, French infantry in one sector wore conspicuous linen cloth on their backs in a vain attempt to avoid being shelled by their own artillery. 37 To develop mutual confidence between infantry and artillery, Bruchmüller began conducting lectures with the infantry unit before an operation. Bruchmüller took great pride in gaining the confidence of the infantry: “The thanks of the infantry, in my opinion, must be treasured more by every artilleryman than all orders and citations.” 38 He discussed his targets in detail, describing the timing of the preparation, the conduct of the rolling barrage, and any other H110RB-492

matter of mutual concern. At the end of his lectures he would entertain questions, including those from the lowest ranking soldiers. 39 Bruchmüller soon earned a great reputation as a superb artilleryman. He rose in position in the east, commanding the artillery of von Hutier’s Eighth Army at Riga in September 1917. When his unit was transferred to the west in late 1917, Bruchmüller arrived in time to participate in the Cambrai counterattack. Ludendorff knew of Bruchmüller's great skill, and by the beginning of the offensive in March 1918, he had disseminated Bruchmüller’s methods to the units in the west. Ludendorff called Bruchmüller “one of the most prominent soldiers of this war.” 40 The skills of Bruchmüller, Rohr, and others were brought together by OHL in the training effort to prepare for the great offensive of 1918. Preparation for the Offensive Major Wetzell, OHL’s chief of operations for the western front, wrote a memorandum about the coming offensive in which he listed three conditions necessary for success in the west in 1918: surprising the enemy, hitting him at a weak point, and training the army “down to the smallest details in accordance with military principles.” 41 Again, the winter became a period of intense activity for the German Army on the western front. Ludendorff knew that the training efforts of the previous winter had to be imitated, only now in preparation for the offensive. 42 German training programs throughout the war strongly emphasized individual training. 43 Recruit training behind the front, which stressed this individual training, quickly incorporated the new offensive doctrine. OHL revised the courses of instruction at the officer schools at Sedan and Valenciennes. Each field army established a special instructional center behind the lines where newly arrived units from the east trained in accordance with the new doctrine. 44 When possible, units withdrew from the front and went to the rear to conduct training exercises. In accordance with OHL training outlines, companies, battalions, and regiments conducted exercises emphasizing assault tactics and coordination of different weapons. The scope of the exercises expanded; complete divisions were able to conduct practice assaults. Pyrotechnic devices were employed in training to develop methods of controlling creeping barrages. Despite a shortage of munitions, the Germans used live ammunition in training to achieve realism. Ernst Jünger’s unit trained according to “Ludendorff’s marvelously clear scheme of training,” 45 and Jünger recalled the dangers of training with live ammunition: Sometimes I made practice attacks with the company on complicated trench systems, with live bombs [grenades], in order to turn to account the lessons of the Cambrai battle [German counterattack of November 1917] . . . we had some casualties. . . . A machine gunner of my company shot the commanding officer of another unit off his horse while he was reviewing some troops. Fortunately the wound was not fatal. 46 The artillery units also trained very extensively. Because surprise was essential in the German concept of the attack, the Germans sought methods to develop accurate artillery fire on a first round basis, that is, accuracy without firing registration rounds on the potential target. This was a technique the British had used with success at Cambrai. An artilleryman, Captain Pulkowsky, developed the following method for the German artillery:  Test fire each artillery piece to determine the peculiar characteristic of the individual H110RB-493

and in the army. Ludendorff began the patriotic training to reverse this decline of morale in the army, for the effects of the blockade and the frustration of the war threatened the ability of the German Army to perform according to the high standards demanded by their tactics. 56 Leadership was an important ingredient in improving morale, and OHL published principles of leadership to guide the offensive training, to encourage small unit initiative, and to remind all levels of command that leaders, including commanding generals and their staffs, belonged on the battlefield. 57 The German Army, however, could not train or equip every division for the offensive. Lack of time, talent, and equipment created an unsatisfactory situation in which 56 divisions out of 192 were designated attack divisions, 1 while the remaining divisions were called trench divisions ( Stellungsdivisionen ). This distinction was unfortunate but unavoidable for economic reasons. The attack divisions received extra care, better rations, and more equipment, creating resentment among soldiers in the trench divisions. 58 Another example of a serious manpower shortage that forced the Germans to adopt a grim expedient was their creating a leader reserve, usually in lead units. Heavy casualties had occurred in the officer and noncommissioned officer ranks throughout the war, and in anticipation of such heavy losses in the spring offensive, the German Army identified officers who would be kept out of the fighting intentionally in order to be available to fill the anticipated vacancies caused by casualties. 59 Despite such difficult conditions, the German Army prepared well for the offensive. Three field armies (Second, Seventeenth, and Eighteenth), designated to conduct the attack on 21 March 1918, contained attack divisions and were ready. Von Kuhl credited this success to Ludendorff’s personal efforts, 60 but Ludendorff’s greatest contribution was his ability to harness the talents of so many to achieve such unity of effort. The Offensive The German offensive began on 21 March 1918. Although the Allies had been expecting a German attack, the extremely rigorous security precautions of the Germans had confused the Allies about the exact location of the main effort. Elaborate German deception measures had convinced the French that the main attack would be delivered in their sector. The major German attack was directed instead against the British positions east of Amiens. (See map.) At 0440 on 21 March 1918 the artillery preparation began. Nearly six thousand guns commenced firing in a seven-phase bombardment plan designed by Colonel Bruchmüller. The elaborately planned bombardment lasted only five hours, and then the infantry assaulted. The concentration of fire in those five hours was terrific. One German artillery observer recalled that, whereas the French and British had pounded the Germans for days during Allied offensives, the Germans had only five hours to return the favor. The fumes from the guns were so intense that many German artillery crews donned their protective masks. 61 On the receiving side, a British soldier remembered his experience: I was impressed by the way it came down with one big crash. We had known of the coming attack—but not the exact day. . . . I had always thought that the bombardment would develop gradually but the full force was almost instantaneous. . . . One moment we were walking along as normal, the next there were shells bursting all about us. We all ran like mad for cover. 62 1 The Germans used the terms Angriffsdivisionen , Stossdivisionen , or Mobilmachungsdivisionen to describe attack divisions. H110RB-495

The Germans used gas shells extensively. In areas where an infantry assault was not planned, they used mustard, a persistent agent. In the areas where the German infantry would penetrate, the Germans delivered high explosive shells mixed with shells of chlorine and phosgene gas. The Germans also fired shells containing lachrymatory gas, a throat irritant. The Germans hoped that the irritant would penetrate the British masks, forcing the British soldiers to remove their masks, and thereby exposing themselves to the more lethal chlorine and phosgene. Despite its intricacy, this complex plan did not work. 6463 The bombardment did achieve the overall desired effect, however. It disrupted British communications and left British units in confusion. The British Official History described the success of the German infantry assault: Forward Zone as a whole was overrun at the first rush, the machineguns still in action hardly firing a shot. Making good use of the valleys, where the fog lay heaviest, the leading waves of German infantry swept onwards towards the Battle Zone, leaving the posts and redoubts still holding out in the Forward Zone to be dealt with by special parties. 64 H110RB-496 http://www.westpoint.edu/history/SiteAssets/SitePages/World%20War%20I/WWOne18.jpg (accessed 23 February 2017)

(who, as overall Allied commander, was Petain’s superior), refused to yield any ground elastically, preferring to mass his infantry in the forward trenches. Duchesne thought he was correctly applying the aggressive principles of Foch, that great advocate of the offensive, by placing forces forward and refusing to yield any ground to a German attack. At 0100 on 27 May 1918 Bruchmüller's 3,179 guns fired on the French positions and about two and one-half hours later the German infantry advanced. French failure to destroy bridges across the Aisne River greatly helped the Germans advance twelve miles in one day. 71 The unenlightened leadership of the French Sixth Army greatly assisted the German efforts at Chemin-des-Dames, but when the Germans faced an enemy arrayed in depth, as other French units were, the Germans could not achieve such dramatic tactical success. The Allies continued to stall the German advances, and the Germans expended their irreplaceable attack divisions in their vain efforts to get the strategic breakthrough. By August 1918, despite impressive territorial gains—by First World War standards—the German Army was exhausted. It had not broken the Allies and had not obtained the strategic breakthrough, despite several impressive tactical victories. The Allies, with superior resources, now took the initiative. Once again the Germans were on the defensive, now in a more desperate condition from the losses caused by their offensive. They also occupied large salients and now defended ground they had not had time to prepare. The Allies, especially forces of the British Empire, now displayed greater tactical finesse in their attacks than they had shown in previous years, using short artillery bombardments and integrating large numbers of tanks and aircraft in well executed attacks. 72 The German Army was no longer the effective force to stop these offensives. When it appeared to OHL that political, economic, and social conditions in Germany were going out of control, causing the German Army itself to be barely controllable, the German military leaders (now the virtual rulers of Germany) agreed to a cessation of hostilities. The Imperial German Army and Germany itself had been worn down by the Allies. That the army itself had not been crushed on the battlefield would create the frustration and bitterness of the “stab in the back” sentiment. H110RB-498

1 Notes . Martin Middlebrook, The Kaiser’s Battle (London, 1978), p. 20. 2 . Von Below’s order, as recorded in Österreich-Ungarne Letzter Krieg , vol. 6, p. 501, quoted in Ronald Seth, Caporetto: The Scapegoat Battle (London, 1965), p. 146. Erwin Rommel fought as a captain at Caporetto in a Würtemberg mountain infantry unit, and won the Pour le mérite for his actions there. Rommel has described his First World War experiences in a book, Infanterie Greift An , published in 1937. While the book is an excellent description of company tactics and small unit leadership, I do not feel that it represented the epitome of assault tactics in the First World War (I feel the storm units do), nor do I believe that Rommel’s book foreshadowed the concept of blitzkrieg, as some have suggested. 3 . S.L.A. Marshall, The History of World War I , (New York, 1964), p. 215. 4 . Crown Prince Wilhelm, pp. 169, 172; Balck, pp. 4, 79; Lucas, p. 72. 5 . Crown Prince Wilhelm, p. 292. 6 . Wynne, p. 57. Wynne’s claim is particularly damaging to the British, for the U.S. Infantry Association translated Laffargue in 1916. Another influential captain, B. H. Liddell Hart, wrote in his memoirs (1926) that in 1916 he had written a pamphlet on his experiences as a company commander, which the War Office had refused to publish for security reasons. 7 . Renn, p. 110. 8 . Andre Laffargue, The Attack in Trench Warfare , translated for the Infantry Journal (Washington, 1916), p. 6. 9 . Laffargue, p. 37. 10 . Ludendorff , 1:401, on introduction of light machine gun. 11 . Wynne, p. 58. I have not yet seen evidence which would connect Laffargue’s ideas with the techniques of Nivelle, but the similarities make such a connection possible. 12 . For example, Sixth German Army, Use of Artillery in Combat Against Tanks , 25 March 1917, trans. the American Expeditionary Forces from an earlier French translation (U.S. Army War College, 1918). 13 . British Official History , 1917, vol. 3, p. 177. 14 . C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, A History of the Great War 1914–1918 , 2d ed. (Oxford, 1936), p. 476. 15 . Ludendorff , 2:112. 16 . Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, Mein Kriegstagebuch , vol. 3, p. 193. 17 . British Official History , 1917, vol. 3, p. 221, see footnote. 18 . Donald J. Goodspeed, Ludendorff: Genius of World War I , (Boston, 1966), p. 244. 19 . German General Staff, Der Angriff im Stellungskrieg , 1 January 1918, trans. B.E.F. Intelligence as The Attack in Position Warfare (G.H.Q., 1918), p. 12 (26 January 1918 Amendment). Hereafter cited as Attack . 20 . Attack , p. 10 (26 January 1918 Amendment). 21. Attack , p. 4. 22 . Laszlo M. Alfoldi, “The Hutier Legend,” Parameters 5, no. 2 (1976): 69–74. 23 . Balck, p. 266. 24 . Attack , p. 7. 25 . Balck, pp. 62, 81, 91; Lucas, pp. 43, 102. 26 . Attack , p. 5. 27 . Attack , p. 16. 28 . Ludendorff , 2:206. 29 . Gruss, pp. 65, 90, 121. 30 . Gruss, p. 73. 31 . Gruss, p. 101; Middlebrook, pp. 54–55. 32 . Ludendorff , 2:205. 33 . Georg Bruchmüller, The German Artillery in the Breakthrough Battles of the World War , 2d ed. (Berlin, 1922), trans. J. H. Wallace and H. D. Kehrn (U.S. Army Field Artillery School, Ft. Sill, n.d.), p. 41. 34 . Bruchmüller, p. 65. His successful use of his techniques on a large scale in 1916 was at Tarnopol, July 1916. See Wynne, p. 294. 35 . Bruchmüller, p. 72. 36 . Bruchmüller, p. 70. 37 . Balck, p. 244.