Your company is bidding for mineral rights to a tract of land for drilling oil. Based on your geological survey reports, your valuation of the mineral rights is $38 million. You believe the distribution of bids will be uniform for the mineral rights, with a high value of $45 million and a low value of $20 million. In a second-price sealed-bid auction, how much should you for bid if there are 5 bidders? O a. $41.40 Million b. $45.00 Million Oc. $38.00 Million d. $34.40 Million

Your company is bidding for mineral rights to a tract of land for drilling oil. Based on your geological survey reports, your valuation of the mineral rights is $38 million. You believe the distribution of bids will be uniform for the mineral rights, with a high value of $45 million and a low value of $20 million. In a second-price sealed-bid auction, how much should you for bid if there are 5 bidders? O a. $41.40 Million b. $45.00 Million Oc. $38.00 Million d. $34.40 Million

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Explain all option compulsary......you will not explain all option then I will give you down upvote...
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Hal and Nick are racing to develop a new brand of coconut milk that they both believe will be the next big soft drink. The payoff matrix shows the economic profit in millions of dollars for the game that Hal and Nick play. O A. Hal and Nick will never cooperate in this research. OB. Hal and Nick will cooperate in this research every time they play the game. Q Search OC. It is possible for cooperation in this research and development game if the game is played repeatedly and cheating on the agreement is punished using a tit-for-tat strategy OD. Hal and Nick will cooperate in this research only if a threat exists that a third firm will enter the coconut milk market Pat's strategies (blue squares) Develop Not develop 0 Hal's strategies (red squares) Develop -1.0 2.5 2.5 1.0 Not develop Next -1.0 1.0
Which one of the following descriptions is CORRECT?
Refer to the following formula for expected payoff: Expected payoff = [Probability of rival matching x Loss from price cut] + [Probability of rival not matching x Gain from price cut] Suppose the payoff for each of four strategic interactions is as follows: Your Company's Action Reduce Price Don't Reduce Price Rival Response Reduce Price Loss = $800 Loss = $6,000 Don't Reduce Price Gain = $50,000 No Loss or Gain Instructions: Enter your responses as a whole number. If you are entering any negative numbers be sure to include a negative sign (-) in front of those numbers. a. If the probability of rivals matching a price reduction is 98 percent, what is the expected payoff of a price cut? b. If the probability of rivals reducing price even though you don't is 5 percent, what is the expected payoff of not reducing price?
Hello, In a) I get qi=2, price=3 and profiti= 4. I had a question on (b), I attached my answer in handwritten, is it correct to do it by showing Lemma 1 result? It is so confusing. So, based on this with q(bar) as capacity constrained, and they are not gigantic capacity, I assumed it is played under pure strategy equilibrium of pricing game. Hence, the "optimal price = market-clearing" price is a Nash Equilibria as in Lemma 1. Pls, can you help me with (b)? Thanks
3. Consider the following game: K Out 2 2 1 9 Player 1 Player 1 X In A Y Player 2 0 2 B 5 5 a) Does the game have perfect information? Why/why not? b) Circle the subgames. c) Find all backward induction solutions. d) Below are written five strategy profiles. One of them is a subgame perfect equilibrium; circle it! One of them is not a Nash equilibrium; write "X" across it! ((Out, X), A) ((Out, Y), A) ((In, Y),B) ((Out, Y), B) ((In, X),B)
Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.
Consider the following matrix Firm A Firm B Low Price High Price Low Price 6,5 High Price 4,11 10,3 8,9 Which of the following statements is true regarding the players' secure strategies? Both firms have a secure strategy to play low price. O Neither firm has a secure strategy to play low price. Ⓒ Only Firm A has a secure strategy to play low price. O Only Firm B has a secure strategy to play low price.