Consider a market with demand p(q) = 10 - q. There are infinitely many firms that could enter this market, numbered i = 1, 2,..., o. The game proceeds in two stages. 1 The firms simultaneously decide whether to enter the market or not. At the end of this stage, all firms observe which firms entered. 2 The firms that entered simultaneously choose their quantities. Each firm that enters must pay a fixed entry cost of F = 2. Each firm that enters then may produce any quantity at zero cost. The firms' products are all identical. We will find a subgame perfect equilibrium in this game using backward induction.
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- 1. The market (inverse) demand function for a homogeneous good is P(Q) = 10 - Q. There are two firms: firm 1 has a constant marginal cost of 2 for producing each unit of the good, and firm 2 has a constant marginal cost of 1. The two firms compete by setting their quantities of production, and the price of the good is determined by the market demand function given the total quantity. a. Calculate the Nash equilibrium in this game and the corresponding market price when firms simultaneously choose quantities. b. Now suppose firml moves earlier than firm 2 and firm 2 observes firm 1 quantity choice before choosing its quantity find optimal choices of firm 1 and firm 2.Problem 3. Consider the following game with three firms. First, firms 1 and 2 si- multancously choose quantities q1 and q2 respectively. After observing firm 1 and 2's quantities, firm 3 chooses its quantity q3. There is no production cost and the inverse demand function is p= 12 – (91 +2 + 93). (a) Compute the SPNE of this game. (b) Give an example of Nash equilibrium s* with s = 4 and s, = 6 , that is not subgame perfect. game theory questionConsider the following normal form representation of the standard competition between firm A and firm B. Each firm can choose either standard A or standard B. Their payoffs are given as follows: Firm B A В A Firm A В 1 1 3 1 (1) (10 points) What's Nash equilibrium (NE) in this game? If there are more than one, find them all. But there is no NE, state that there is no NE. (2) (10 points) If you find a NE (or multiple Nash equilibria), is it (or are they) Pareto efficient?
- There are two firms in the market (duopoly). These two firms are competingsimultaneously. The first firm chooses its output level (x) by predicting the second firm’soutput (y). Let c denote the total cost function c(x) = x and c(y) = y. Also, let’s assumethat the inverse demand function is p(Y) = 7 - Y where Y = x + y. (1) Obtain the reactionfunction of the first firm. (2) Find the equilibrium (output and profit of each firm) whentwo firms simultaneously compete2. An industry contains two firms that have identical cost functions C(q)=10+2q. The inverse demand function for the market is P=50-2Q where Q is the total industry output. Assuming the firms compete in quantities: Find the firms' best response functions. b. Solve for the Cournot Nash Equilibrium of the game. What is the total industry output in equilibrium? What is the equilibrium price? с. i. If both firms could collude, what would the industry output and price be? Suppose they decide that each firm produces half of the industry output found in part (i). Is this agreement self-enforcing? Explain. ii. a.The inverse market demand for fax paper is given by P=100-Q. There are two firms who produce fax paper. Firm 1 has a cost of production of C1= 15*Q1 and firm 2 has a cost of production of C2=20*Q2 a) Suppose that firm play a Stackelberg game. First firm 1 sets the quantity in t=1, then, knowing which quantityfirm 1 has set, firm 2 chooses the quantity in t=2. What are the Stackelberg quantities and prices? What arethe profits od firm 1 and 2? Compared to part a) which firm benefits and which firm loses?
- . OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, was founded in 1969. Their original objective was to form a cartel to increase the price that they receive for their oil exports. Create a prisoner’s dilemma type game for two large members of OPEC (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Indonesia). Create numbers, where payoffs are total annual oil export revenues for each of these two countries. Verbally explain how you got your numbers. Find the Nash equilibrium. Based on this model, what strategy is in the oil exporters’ best interest (Nash or otherwise)? How do they make it happen? Create another prisoner’s dilemmamodel for all of OPEC on one side, and all non OPEC oil exporting nations on the other side. Create numbers, where payoffs are total annual oil export revenues for each of the two sides. Verbally explain how you created your numbers. Also create your numbers applying the fact that OPEC’s total production capacity is greater than total non OPEC exports…consider a market with inverse demand P(Q) = 10 − Q and two firms with cost curves C1(q1) = 2q1 and C2(q2) = 2q2 (that is, they have the same marginal costs and no fixed costs). They compete by choosing quantities. Now consider a modified game, which goes as follows: First, Firm 1 decides whether to enter the market or not. As in the previous question, there is no fixed cost, even if the firm decides to enter. Next, Firm 2 observes Firm 1’s entry choice and decides whether to enter or not.Firm 2 has no fixed cost as well. If no firm enters, the game ends. If only one firm enters, that firm chooses quantity, operating as a monopolist. If both firms enter, then Firm 1 chooses quantity q1. Then, Firm 2 observes Firm 1’s choice of q1 and then chooses q2 (like in the previous question). If a firm does not enter, it gets a payoff of zero. Which of the following statements is consistent with the SPNE of this game? Hint: you don’t need complicated math to solve this problem.(a) Neither firm…The payoff matrix below shows the payoffs for Firm A and Firm B, each of whom can either "cooperate" or "cheat." The numbers in parentheses are (payoff for A, payoff for B). Firm B Cooperate Cooperate (30, 30) (x, 10) Cheat (10, X) (20, 20) Firm A Chent If x = 40, the Nash equilibrium is. O a. (Firm A: cheat, Firm B: cheat) O b. (Firm A: cooperate, Firm B: cheat) O c. (Firm A: cheat, Firm B: cooperate) O d. (Firm A: cooperate, Firm B: cooperate) O e. There is no Nash equilibrium for this value of x.
- . Using a payoff matrix to determine the equilibrium outcome Suppose there are only two firms that sell tablets: Padmania and Capturesque. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn, depending on whether it sets a high or low price for its tablets. Capturesque Pricing High Low Padmania Pricing High 9, 9 3, 15 Low 15, 3 7, 7 For example, the lower-left cell shows that if Padmania prices low and Capturesque prices high, Padmania will earn a profit of $15 million, and Capturesque will earn a profit of $3 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Padmania and Capturesque are both profit-maximizing firms. If Padmania prices high, Capturesque will make more profit if it chooses a price, and if Padmania prices low, Capturesque will make more profit if it chooses a price. If Capturesque prices high, Padmania will make more profit if it chooses a price, and if Capturesque prices low, Padmania…Suppose that Fizzo and Pop Hop are the only two firms that sell orange soda. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn depending on whether or not it advertises: Рop Hop Advertise Doesn't Advertise Advertise 8, 8 15, 2 Fizzo Doesn't Advertise 2, 15 11, 11 For example, the upper right cell shows that if Fizzo advertises and Pop Hop doesn't advertise, Fizzo will make a profit of $15 million, and Pop Hop will make a profit of $2 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Fizzo and Pop Hop are both profit-maximizing firms. If Fizzo decides to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ million if Pop Hop advertises and a profit of $ million if Pop Hop does not advertise. If Fizzo decides not to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ million if Pop Hop advertises and a profit of $ million if Pop Hop does not advertise. If Pop Hop advertises, Fizzo makes a higher profit if it chooses If Pop Hop doesn't advertise, Fizzo makes a higher…Pay-offs (in terms of profit) for the two firms are give Firm2 startegies Firm1 Strategies C B W C [4, 4] [0, 5] [-1, 5] [5, 0] [2, 2] [-1, 1] W [5, -1] [1, -1] [0, 0] a)What is a dominant strategy for each player? b)What are the possible pure strategy Nash equilibrium/equilibria to the one-shot play of this game? c) Explain the likely out the game