5. The following represents the payoffs in a one period game in prices HI and LO. A НІ LOW B HI (100, 100) (200,0) LOW (0, 200) (50, 50) (a) If A and B were playing this game only once, what strategy should A choose, and why? (b) A and B are playing the same game an infinite number of times and each has a discount rate of 50% (.50). Firm B adopts a trigger strategy and selects HI in the first round. What would be A's present value of profits from cooperation (HD)? What would be its present value from

5. The following represents the payoffs in a one period game in prices HI and LO. A НІ LOW B HI (100, 100) (200,0) LOW (0, 200) (50, 50) (a) If A and B were playing this game only once, what strategy should A choose, and why? (b) A and B are playing the same game an infinite number of times and each has a discount rate of 50% (.50). Firm B adopts a trigger strategy and selects HI in the first round. What would be A's present value of profits from cooperation (HD)? What would be its present value from

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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11. What are the subgame perfect equilibria of the following game? Out In T B 7,21 L R L/R 9,3 1,1 1,1 3,9 (a) (InT, L), (OutB, R) and (OutT+OutB, L + R). (b) (InT, L) and (OutB, R). (c) Out and (InT, L). (d) (InT, L), (OutB, R) and (OutT+OutB, L + R). (e) (InT, L). 2
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Wal-Mart's dominant strategy is to pick a price of $. Target Price = $30 Price = $17 %3D What is the Nash equilibrium for this game? $6,000 $1,500 O A. The Nash equilibrium is for Target to choose a price of $17 and Wal-Mart to choose a price of $30. Price = $30 $6,000 $11,000 O B. The Nash equilibrium is for Target and Wal-Mart to both choose a price of $30. Wal - Mart C. The Nash equilibrium is for Target to choose a price of $30 and Wal-Mart to choose a price of $17. $11,000 $4,500 Price = $17 %3D $1,500 $4,500 O D. The Nash equilibrium is for Target and Wal-Mart to both choose a price of $17. South OE. O E. A Nash equilibrium does not exist for this game.
3. Consider the following payoff matrix for a complementary investment game: WCG a. Do Not Invest C. Invest b. What is the Nash equilibrium? Do Not Invest What is the maximin solution? 0 Does either firm have a dominant strategy? -100 BB 0 0 Invest 0 20 d. How do your answers change if BB loses 5 if it invests and WCG doesn't invest? 110 10
1. Consider the following game matrix. Player A Answer: Top Bottom Left a, b e, f Player B Right c, d g, h (a) If top and left are strictly dominant strategies, then what do we know the relationship of the parameters? (b) If (top, left) is a Nash equilibrium, then what do we know the relationship of the parameters? Answer: (c) If top and left are strictly dominant strategies, will (top, left) be a Nash equilibrium? Why? Answer: (d) If (top, left) is a Nash equilibrium, must the strategies be strictly dominant strategies? Why? Answer:
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A 201.
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11. The following payoff table involves two players each of whom has three possible moves. L M N L 30,15 45,35 55,25 M 25,35 20,20 30,50 N 15,35 35,40 15,15 a. Are there any dominant strategies in this game?
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3. Consider the following game: K Out 2 2 1 9 Player 1 Player 1 X In A Y Player 2 0 2 B 5 5 a) Does the game have perfect information? Why/why not? b) Circle the subgames. c) Find all backward induction solutions. d) Below are written five strategy profiles. One of them is a subgame perfect equilibrium; circle it! One of them is not a Nash equilibrium; write "X" across it! ((Out, X), A) ((Out, Y), A) ((In, Y),B) ((Out, Y), B) ((In, X),B)