Helton Hotels, a major hotel chain, and Beautiful Burgers, a popular chain of burger restaurants, have agreed on a joint venture, where Beautiful Burger restaurants will be placed within Helton hotel properties. They each have to decide whether to make a small ($5 million) or large ($10 million) investment in the joint venture. These investments will not be observable by the other party until after the restaurants are opened, at which stage it will be too late to make any changes. Because their investments in the project are complementary, if both make a large investment, they will earn $40 million in revenue, while if at least one makes a small investment, they will earn only $24 million in revenue from the venture. In either case, they have agreed to split the revenue equally. Their profits in all possible scenarios is represented by the following pay-off matrix. (Beautiful Burgers' payoffs and strategies are depicted in italics.) Beautiful Burgers Small Large Helton Small Hotels Large 7,7 7,2 2, 7 10, 10 Which of the following strategy profiles are Nash equilibria of this game? O a. (Small, Small) only O b. (Large, Large) only O. Both (Small, Small) and (Large, Large) O d. Both (Large, Small) and (Small, Large) Oe. None of these are Nash equilibria.
Helton Hotels, a major hotel chain, and Beautiful Burgers, a popular chain of burger restaurants, have agreed on a joint venture, where Beautiful Burger restaurants will be placed within Helton hotel properties. They each have to decide whether to make a small ($5 million) or large ($10 million) investment in the joint venture. These investments will not be observable by the other party until after the restaurants are opened, at which stage it will be too late to make any changes. Because their investments in the project are complementary, if both make a large investment, they will earn $40 million in revenue, while if at least one makes a small investment, they will earn only $24 million in revenue from the venture. In either case, they have agreed to split the revenue equally. Their profits in all possible scenarios is represented by the following pay-off matrix. (Beautiful Burgers' payoffs and strategies are depicted in italics.) Beautiful Burgers Small Large Helton Small Hotels Large 7,7 7,2 2, 7 10, 10 Which of the following strategy profiles are Nash equilibria of this game? O a. (Small, Small) only O b. (Large, Large) only O. Both (Small, Small) and (Large, Large) O d. Both (Large, Small) and (Small, Large) Oe. None of these are Nash equilibria.
Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 1QTC
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![Helton Hotels, a major hotel chain, and Beautiful Burgers, a popular chain of burger restaurants, have agreed on a joint venture, where
Beautiful Burger restaurants will be placed within Helton hotel properties. They each have to decide whether to make a small ($5
million) or large ($10 million) investment in the joint venture. These investments will not be observable by the other party until after
the restaurants are opened, at which stage it will be too late to make any changes.
Because their investments in the project are complementary, if both make a large investment, they will earn $40 million in revenue,
while if at least one makes a small investment, they will earn only $24 million in revenue from the venture. In either case, they have
agreed to split the revenue equally.
Their profits in all possible scenarios is represented by the following pay-off matrix. (Beautiful Burgers' payoffs and strategies are
depicted in italics.)
Beautiful Burgers
Small
Large
Helton
Small
7,7
7,2
Hotels
Large
2, 7
10, 10
Which of the following strategy profiles are Nash equilibria of this game?
Oa.
(Small, Small) only
O b. (Large, Large) only
Oc.
Both (Small, Small) and (Large, Large)
O d. Both (Large, Small) and (Small, Large)
O .
None of these are Nash equilibria.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F67019b99-36f4-4ac8-b868-c880a8f991aa%2Fe454045d-9e72-4cd4-8c3a-7ad55aa56496%2Fiuhzl9v_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Helton Hotels, a major hotel chain, and Beautiful Burgers, a popular chain of burger restaurants, have agreed on a joint venture, where
Beautiful Burger restaurants will be placed within Helton hotel properties. They each have to decide whether to make a small ($5
million) or large ($10 million) investment in the joint venture. These investments will not be observable by the other party until after
the restaurants are opened, at which stage it will be too late to make any changes.
Because their investments in the project are complementary, if both make a large investment, they will earn $40 million in revenue,
while if at least one makes a small investment, they will earn only $24 million in revenue from the venture. In either case, they have
agreed to split the revenue equally.
Their profits in all possible scenarios is represented by the following pay-off matrix. (Beautiful Burgers' payoffs and strategies are
depicted in italics.)
Beautiful Burgers
Small
Large
Helton
Small
7,7
7,2
Hotels
Large
2, 7
10, 10
Which of the following strategy profiles are Nash equilibria of this game?
Oa.
(Small, Small) only
O b. (Large, Large) only
Oc.
Both (Small, Small) and (Large, Large)
O d. Both (Large, Small) and (Small, Large)
O .
None of these are Nash equilibria.
![Consider the following pay-off matrix for two players with two possible strategies. (Player B's payoffs and strategies are depicted in
italics.)
Player B
Action X
Action Y
Action X
20, 10
50, - 10
Player A
Action Y
-10, 40
30, 40
Which of the following strategy profiles are Nash equilibria?
O a. (XX) only
O b. (Y,Y) only
Oc.
Both (X,X) and (Y,Y)
O d. Both (X,Y) and (Y,X)
O .
None of these are Nash equilibria.](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F67019b99-36f4-4ac8-b868-c880a8f991aa%2Fe454045d-9e72-4cd4-8c3a-7ad55aa56496%2Ffh5pg6p_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:Consider the following pay-off matrix for two players with two possible strategies. (Player B's payoffs and strategies are depicted in
italics.)
Player B
Action X
Action Y
Action X
20, 10
50, - 10
Player A
Action Y
-10, 40
30, 40
Which of the following strategy profiles are Nash equilibria?
O a. (XX) only
O b. (Y,Y) only
Oc.
Both (X,X) and (Y,Y)
O d. Both (X,Y) and (Y,X)
O .
None of these are Nash equilibria.
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