1. Consider a two player, simultaneous move game. The strategies available to each player and payoffs are shown in the following matrix form: T Player 1 M B Player 2 L R 6,4 5,2 8,5 4,4 9,3 5,9 7,5 4,4 5,2 Game 5 a) Find and write down the Nash equilibria in pure strategies, if any exist. b) Say that instead of being a simultaneous move game this game had been sequential. First player 1 will choose a strategy and then player 2 will observe the choice made by player 1 and choose a strategy. The full structure of the game, including all payoffs, is common knowledge to both players. Sketch a game tree to represent the extensive form of this game. Find and write down the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.

1. Consider a two player, simultaneous move game. The strategies available to each player and payoffs are shown in the following matrix form: T Player 1 M B Player 2 L R 6,4 5,2 8,5 4,4 9,3 5,9 7,5 4,4 5,2 Game 5 a) Find and write down the Nash equilibria in pure strategies, if any exist. b) Say that instead of being a simultaneous move game this game had been sequential. First player 1 will choose a strategy and then player 2 will observe the choice made by player 1 and choose a strategy. The full structure of the game, including all payoffs, is common knowledge to both players. Sketch a game tree to represent the extensive form of this game. Find and write down the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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There are three players in this simultaneous move game. Player-3 chooses between game A and game B. Player-1 chooses between U, M and D. Player-2 chooses between L and R. The payoffs are given below: P-1 U M D A P-2 L R 5,5,0 1,4,0 6,4,5 2,5,3 3,1,2 3,3,1 Find all pure strategy N.E. of this game. P-1 U M D L 4,8,0 4,1,3 3,5,1 B P-2 R 2,1,0 3,3,3 0,3,0
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What are the sub games in the following game? Find all subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE)
None
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