XYZ is legendary investor and has outperformed the S&P 500 index for 12 years in a row. Suppose that N = 8,935 investment managers follow random uncorrelated strategies, each of which has a 50% probability of beating the S&P 500 index every year. Then, let X be the probability that at least two of the 8,935 managers will beat the S&P 500 for 12 years in a row simply by chance. Also, le tY be a constant equal to 0.01 (in other words Y is equal to 1%). Then the value of X divided by Y is equal to (Round your final answer to 2 decimal places, e.g. 1.13)

XYZ is legendary investor and has outperformed the S&P 500 index for 12 years in a row. Suppose that N = 8,935 investment managers follow random uncorrelated strategies, each of which has a 50% probability of beating the S&P 500 index every year. Then, let X be the probability that at least two of the 8,935 managers will beat the S&P 500 for 12 years in a row simply by chance. Also, le tY be a constant equal to 0.01 (in other words Y is equal to 1%). Then the value of X divided by Y is equal to (Round your final answer to 2 decimal places, e.g. 1.13)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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