Suppose the wage in the second period is such that the worker will choose to work at this firm and will exert high effort. b) What is the minimum level of the wage for which a young worker will choose to work at this firm and will exert high effort? Interpret your result.. = Suppose -0.2, co= Cy= 100, and vo vy= 200. c) What is the minimum level of wages in period 1 and 2 so that the worker exerts high effor in both periods and is willing to work at this firm in both periods?

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Suppose the wage in the second period is such that the worker will choose to work at this firm
and will exert high effort.
b) What is the minimum level of the wage for which a young worker will choose to work at
this firm and will exert high effort? Interpret your result..
Suppose -0.2, co=cy = 100, and v
Yo=Vy=200.
%3D
c) What is the minimum level of wages in period 1 and 2 so that the worker exerts high effort
in both periods and is willing to work at this firm in both periods?
Transcribed Image Text:Suppose the wage in the second period is such that the worker will choose to work at this firm and will exert high effort. b) What is the minimum level of the wage for which a young worker will choose to work at this firm and will exert high effort? Interpret your result.. Suppose -0.2, co=cy = 100, and v Yo=Vy=200. %3D c) What is the minimum level of wages in period 1 and 2 so that the worker exerts high effort in both periods and is willing to work at this firm in both periods?
Consider a worker who works for at most two periods (say, when young and when old) at a
particular firm. Each period, the worker can choose between exerting high effort and exerting
low effort. The worker's cost of exerting high effort are
Cy
when
young
and
Co
when old. The
worker's cost of exerting low effort are zero. The effort of the worker is difficult to observe
by the firm. With probability T, the firm observes the worker's effort at the end of a period.
With the remaining probability, the firm does not observe the worker's effort. The firm can
only fire the worker when it observed that the worker has shirked. In that case, the firm is also
allowed to withhold the worker's wage for the period in which the worker was caught
shirking. When exerting high effort, the worker's productivity is q, when young and q, when
old. When exerting low effort, the worker's productivity is zero. The worker's value of
alternative job opportunities is
when young and v, when old. For simplicity, the discount
rate is assumed to be zero.
a) What is the minimum level of the wage for which an old worker will choose to work at this
firm and will exert high effort? Interpret your result.
Transcribed Image Text:Consider a worker who works for at most two periods (say, when young and when old) at a particular firm. Each period, the worker can choose between exerting high effort and exerting low effort. The worker's cost of exerting high effort are Cy when young and Co when old. The worker's cost of exerting low effort are zero. The effort of the worker is difficult to observe by the firm. With probability T, the firm observes the worker's effort at the end of a period. With the remaining probability, the firm does not observe the worker's effort. The firm can only fire the worker when it observed that the worker has shirked. In that case, the firm is also allowed to withhold the worker's wage for the period in which the worker was caught shirking. When exerting high effort, the worker's productivity is q, when young and q, when old. When exerting low effort, the worker's productivity is zero. The worker's value of alternative job opportunities is when young and v, when old. For simplicity, the discount rate is assumed to be zero. a) What is the minimum level of the wage for which an old worker will choose to work at this firm and will exert high effort? Interpret your result.
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