Apple and Google are interested in hiring a new CEO.  Both firms have the same set of final candidates for the CEO position: Indra, Cao, and Virginia. Both firms need to decide who to make a job offer to, and the hiring process is such that they each only make one job offer. If, say, Apple makes a job offer to Indra and Google makes a job offer to one of the other candidates, then Apple’s probability of success in hiring Indra is pIndra. The same is true for Google.  If they both make a job offer to Indra, each has probability pIndra/2 of success.  It has been estimated that pIndra = 20%, and pCao =  pVirginia = 30% (Note that these probabilities need not add up to 100%).

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Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions
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Apple and Google are interested in hiring a new CEO.  Both firms have the same set of final candidates for the CEO position: Indra, Cao, and Virginia. Both firms need to decide who to make a job offer to, and the hiring process is such that they each only make one job offer.

If, say, Apple makes a job offer to Indra and Google makes a job offer to one of the other candidates, then Apple’s probability of success in hiring Indra is pIndra. The same is true for Google.  If they both make a job offer to Indra, each has probability pIndra/2 of success.  It has been estimated that pIndra = 20%, and pCao =  pVirginia = 30% (Note that these probabilities need not add up to 100%).

Suppose that both Apple and Google attach a valuation of 10 to successfully hiring Indra, and a valuation of 7 to successfully hiring each of the other candidates.  A hiring attempt, if unsuccessful, has a valuation of zero. 

  • Convert this story into a game by completing the following game table;

 

 

Google

 

 

 

 

Indra

Cao

Virginia

Apple

Indra

(1, 1)

 

 

 

Cao

 

 

 

 

Virginia

 

 

(1.05, 1.05)

 

Find any (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria in the game

**Transcription:**

2. Apple and Google are interested in hiring a new CEO. Both firms have the same set of final candidates for the CEO position: Indra, Cao, and Virginia. Both firms need to decide who to make a job offer to, and the hiring process is such that they each only make one job offer.

If, say, Apple makes a job offer to Indra and Google makes a job offer to one of the other candidates, then Apple’s probability of success in hiring Indra is \(p_{Indra}\). The same is true for Google. If they both make a job offer to Indra, each has probability \(p_{Indra}/2\) of success. It has been estimated that \(p_{Indra} = 20\%\), and \(p_{Cao} = p_{Virginia} = 30\%\) (Note that these probabilities need not add up to 100%).

Suppose that both Apple and Google attach a valuation of 10 to successfully hiring Indra, and a valuation of 7 to successfully hiring each of the other candidates. A hiring attempt, if unsuccessful, has a valuation of zero.

(a) Convert this story into a game by completing the following game table:

|           | Google    |           |           |
|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
|           | Indra     | Cao       | Virginia  |
| Apple     |           |           |           |
| Indra     | (1, 1)    |           |           |
| Cao       |           |           |           |
| Virginia  |           |           | (1.05, 1.05) |

(b) Find any (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria in the game.
Transcribed Image Text:**Transcription:** 2. Apple and Google are interested in hiring a new CEO. Both firms have the same set of final candidates for the CEO position: Indra, Cao, and Virginia. Both firms need to decide who to make a job offer to, and the hiring process is such that they each only make one job offer. If, say, Apple makes a job offer to Indra and Google makes a job offer to one of the other candidates, then Apple’s probability of success in hiring Indra is \(p_{Indra}\). The same is true for Google. If they both make a job offer to Indra, each has probability \(p_{Indra}/2\) of success. It has been estimated that \(p_{Indra} = 20\%\), and \(p_{Cao} = p_{Virginia} = 30\%\) (Note that these probabilities need not add up to 100%). Suppose that both Apple and Google attach a valuation of 10 to successfully hiring Indra, and a valuation of 7 to successfully hiring each of the other candidates. A hiring attempt, if unsuccessful, has a valuation of zero. (a) Convert this story into a game by completing the following game table: | | Google | | | |-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------| | | Indra | Cao | Virginia | | Apple | | | | | Indra | (1, 1) | | | | Cao | | | | | Virginia | | | (1.05, 1.05) | (b) Find any (pure-strategy) Nash equilibria in the game.
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