What is the tragedy of the commons? The tragedy of the commons A. occurs when two firms make a collusive agreement that is not in the best interest of society OB. is the situation that arises when the economy provides too little of a common resource OC. is a situation in which the government, elected by the common people creates inefficiency by its actions OD. is the overuse of a common resource that arises when its users have no incentive to conserve it and use it sustainably The free up of

What is the tragedy of the commons? The tragedy of the commons A. occurs when two firms make a collusive agreement that is not in the best interest of society OB. is the situation that arises when the economy provides too little of a common resource OC. is a situation in which the government, elected by the common people creates inefficiency by its actions OD. is the overuse of a common resource that arises when its users have no incentive to conserve it and use it sustainably The free up of

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Two travelers own an identical suitcase that contains identical antiques. The airline is liable for a maximum of $100 per suitcase. To determine how much to reimburse each traveler, the airline puts them in different rooms (so that they cannot communicate), and ask them to write down an amount (an integer number) between $2 and $100. If both write down the same number, the airline will reimburse both travelers that amount. However, if the two amounts are different, both travelers will be paid the lowest of the two numbers along with a bonus/malus: $2 extra will be paid to the traveler who wrote down the lower value and a $2 deduction will be taken from the person who wrote down the higher amount. What are the travelers’ best response functions? What are the Nash equilbria of the game? Are they Pareto efficient? Explain the intuition why.
Question 5 You negotiate with a retailer over a contract according to which the retailer would buy a large fraction of your current production for next year. The retailer is perfectly informed about consumer demand, but you do not know whether demand is high or low. You only know that the probability for high demand is 80%. If demand is high, the retailer's profit is £5 million minus what he pays to you according to your contract. If demand is low, the retailer's profit is £3 million minus what he pays to you. Your costs of producing the output specified in the contract are £1 million. You can make sequential offers for the retailer's total payment for you to deliver a fixed quantity of your production. As you know that your competitor is also seeking a similar contract with this retailer, and the retailer can only supply one firm due to limited shelf space, you know that you can only make at most two offers. If your first offer is rejected, the retailer will strike the deal with your…
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Nn3 Suppose an incumbent monopoly firm currently earns a profit of $50,000 per period. A potential entrant could enter and make a profit of $15,000 per period while also lowering the incumbent’s profit to $20,000 per period. The monopoly firm could seek to engage in predatory pricing, which would lead to both firms earning a loss of $5,000 per period. (a) Is there a Nash Equilibrium in this game? If so, what is it? (b) Discuss how this game might play out in the real world?
Thelma is indifferent between $100 and a bet with a 0.6 chance of no return and a 0.4 chance of $200. If U(0) = 20 and U(200) = 220, then U(100) = :
[3%] 4. Consider the two-player game shown in the table below. Player 1 chooses between four possible strategies: A, B, C and D. Player 2 can choose among three possible strategies: a, b and c. In each cell of the table, the first number is the payoff for Player 1, the second number is the payoff for Player 2. Higher numbers represent higher payoffs. Player 2 a b C A 2,-2 4,0 -6,-2 B Player 1 4,-4 3,-3 9, 1 C 2,6 -1,4 6,4 D 6,2 0,4 -9,0 (a) Simplify the game as far as possible using the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Clearly explain the steps of your reasoning. [2%] (b) Identify any pure strategy Nash equilibria of the simplified game derived in part (a). [1%] (c) Identify any mixed strategy Nash equilibria of the simplified game derived in part (a). Write down the best response function for each player. Draw these functions Page 3 of 5
Three players (player 1, player 2 and player 3) each chooses a positive integer QE {1, 2, 3, . 100}. If all three players choose the same integer Q, each player gets $100/3. If all three players choose different integers, the player with the largest integer gets $100, and the two other players get $0. If two players choose the same integer Q, and the third player chooses a different integer Q', then the player playing Q' gets $0, and the two players who played Q get $50 each. Find 2 Nash equilibriums in this game. ....
DERIVATIVES Differentiate f(x)=(4x4+3x)(2x4+2x) Let u(x)=(4x4+3x) and v(x)=(2x4+2x)
Bella Robinson and Steve Carson are running for a seat in the U.S. Senate. If both candidates campaign only in the major cities of the state, then Robinson is expected to get 80% of the votes; if both candidates campaign in only rural areas, then Robinson is expected get 75% of the votes; if Robinson campaigns exclusively in the city and Carson campaigns exclusively in the rural areas, then Robinson is expected to get 30% of the votes; finally, if Robinson campaigns exclusively in the rural areas and Carson campaigns exclusively in the city, then Robinson is expected to get 65% of the votes. (a) Construct the payoff matrix for the game. (Enter each percentage as a decimal.) Carson City Rural Robinson CityRural Is the game strictly determined? YesNo (b) Find the optimal strategy for both Robinson (row) and Carson (column). P = Q =
[Cheap Talk] Two players must decide whether to implement a project, which has gross value v E {0, 100, 200} to each player. Both players think each value is equally likely. Player 1 (the sender) learns the true value of the project. Then, he reports a value {high,medium,low} to player 2 (the decider), and player 2 decides whether or not to implement the project. If the project is not implemented, both players get zero. If a project with value v is implemented, payoffs are P1 : v – 75 P2 : – 125 (a) Show that there is no Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in which player 1 always reveals the true value to player 2. (b) Find a PBE in which player 1 reports "high" if the project is worth $200, "low" if the project is worth $0 (and either “low" or "high" when the project is worth $100, figure out which one works). (c) Find another PBE (or, if you believe there are no others, explain).