2) Veronica is going to sell two vases to a dealer. She can sell each vase for $10. In order to bring her vases to the dealer, Veronica needs to take a bus. There is a 50% chance that all the vases carried on one bus trip will be broken during the trip and a 50% chance that none of the vases carried on one bus trip will be broken during the trip. A roundtrip bus ticket costs $1. Veronica’s net income is given by the revenues from the sale of her vases minus the cost of her bus trip(s). 2a) How many trips would Veronica make if she were risk-neutral? 2b) Suppose that Veronica's utility from income is u(w)=100ln(x+w), and that she has no wealth other than the vases (also allow her to have negative wealth as in when she takes two vases on the same trip and both break while she paid the fare). What is the expected utility of net income when Veronica takes both vases on one bus trip? And when she makes two trips? What strategy is preferred? 2c) Would Veronica's preferred strategy change if the bus fare were increased to $3?

2) Veronica is going to sell two vases to a dealer. She can sell each vase for $10. In order to bring her vases to the dealer, Veronica needs to take a bus. There is a 50% chance that all the vases carried on one bus trip will be broken during the trip and a 50% chance that none of the vases carried on one bus trip will be broken during the trip. A roundtrip bus ticket costs $1. Veronica’s net income is given by the revenues from the sale of her vases minus the cost of her bus trip(s). 2a) How many trips would Veronica make if she were risk-neutral? 2b) Suppose that Veronica's utility from income is u(w)=100ln(x+w), and that she has no wealth other than the vases (also allow her to have negative wealth as in when she takes two vases on the same trip and both break while she paid the fare). What is the expected utility of net income when Veronica takes both vases on one bus trip? And when she makes two trips? What strategy is preferred? 2c) Would Veronica's preferred strategy change if the bus fare were increased to $3?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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