4.6. A person purchases a dozen eggs and must take them home. Although making trips home is costless, there is a 50 percent chance that all of the eggs carried on one trip will be broken during the trip. This person con- siders two strategies: Strategy 1: Take the dozen eggs in one trip. Strategy 2: Make two trips, taking six eggs in each trip. a. List the possible outcomes of each strategy and the probabilities of these outcomes. Show that, on aver- age, six eggs make it home under either strategy. b. Develop a graph to show the utility obtainable under each strategy. c. Could utility be improved further by taking more than two trinc? How would a .

4.6. A person purchases a dozen eggs and must take them home. Although making trips home is costless, there is a 50 percent chance that all of the eggs carried on one trip will be broken during the trip. This person con- siders two strategies: Strategy 1: Take the dozen eggs in one trip. Strategy 2: Make two trips, taking six eggs in each trip. a. List the possible outcomes of each strategy and the probabilities of these outcomes. Show that, on aver- age, six eggs make it home under either strategy. b. Develop a graph to show the utility obtainable under each strategy. c. Could utility be improved further by taking more than two trinc? How would a .

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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5. The Stag Hunt is a famous coordination game where two hunters must work together to hunt a stag but each one has the option to go solo and hunt a hare. The following payoff matrix depicts such a game: a. b. Hunter A Stag Hare Stag 5,5 4,0 Hunter B Hare 0,4 4,4 List any pure strategy Nash equilibria if they exist. Does the game have a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium? If so, solve for it.
Consider the game with the payoffs below. Which of the possible outcomes are MORE efficient than the Nash Equilibrium (NE)? Note, they do NOT need to be Nash equilibria themselves, they just need to be more efficient than the NE. Multiple answers are possible, but not necessary. You need to check ALL correct answers for full credit. JILL High Medium LowMAGGIE Left 3,4 2,3 2,2Center 4,8 9,7 8,7Right 7,6 8,5 9,4Group of answer choices (Left, Low) There is no strategy combination that is more efficient than the Nash equilibrium for this game. (Right, Medium) (Left, High) (Center, Medium) (Center, High) (Center, Low) (Left, Medium) (Right, Low) (Right, High)
Question 2. Two students are working together to submit their Microeconomics mid-semester group coursework. Each student i can put in the effort x; that costs c(x;), in which x; E [0, 1]. This gives each student the utility of u(x1, x2). Formu- late this situation as a strategic game.
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6. There are two players. The strategy of player 1 is x, the strategy of player 2 is y. The payoffs are U (x, y) = 2xy – x² and U2(x, y) = 12y + xy – y². What is the NE?
Sub : EconomicsPls answer ASAP.Dnt CHATGPT.I ll upvote. Thank You
1. Use the following game tree to answer parts a & b. At a chance node (Nature's turn) or when a player is indifferent between strategies, each branch has equal likelihood (50% chance they take either path). Nature receives no payoff. Assume players are mistake proof. Use a complete strategy when discussing the results of this game and provide a payoff, even if that payoff is an expected one. Recall that an expected payoff is the "average" payoff: for example if with 50% chance we receive a payoff of 5 and with 50% chance we receive a payoff of 2, the expected payoff is .5 x 5+ .5 x 2 = 3.5 a. What is the outcome of the game? Assume players are risk neutral (i.e., they see no difference in getting a payoff of 5 vs an expected payoff of 5). Red 0, 1, 3, 3 3, 2, 3, 2 Dorothy Blue Top 1, 4, 3, 2 Scarecrow 50% Green Nature Right Bottom 0, 2, 3, 1 Lion 50% 1, 3, 4, 2 3, 4, 3, 2 50% Left Nature 3, 2, 1, 2 Up 50% Red. 1, 3, 4, 2 Down Tinman Blue 0, 3, 3, 3 Yellow Dorothy 4, 3, 4, 2…
1.a) If the three executives of a fraudulent organization report nothing to the authorities, each gets a payoff of 100. If at least one of them blows the whistle, then those who reported the fraud get 28, while those who didn’t get -100. Suppose they play a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where each is silent (does not report fraud) with probability p. What is p?A, 0.1B, 0.28C, 0.5D, 0.8 b) In a two-player game, with strategies and (some known and some unknown) payoffs as shown below, suppose a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists where 1 plays C with probability 3/4, and Player 2 randomizes over X, Y, and Z with equal probabilities. What are the pure-strategy equilibria of this game? A, (A, Y) and (B, X)B, (A, Z) and (C, Y)C, (B, X) and (C, X)D, (C, X) and (C, Y)
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What are Nash Equilibria in the following game? Select all that apply. Pizza Jazz 7 meats Seafood Jazz Veggie 20,7 9,8 9,8 Tasty Pizza BBQ 20, 13 9, 12 18, 12 Prawn 20, 7 9,9 18, 17 (Veggie, 7 meats) (Veggie, Seafood) (Veggie, Jazz) (BBQ, 7 meats) (BBQ, Seafood) (BBQ, Jazz) (Prawn, 7 meats) (Prawn, Seafood) (Prawn, Jazz) (9,8) O (20,13) (18,7)
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