Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions.Player 2Player 1-80, 1214, 14a. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without anycommunication.(14, 14)StrategyABInstructions: In order to receive full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box once toplace a check mark. For incorrect answer(s), click twice to empty the box.✔(30, 30)30, 3012, -80O (30, 30)(12, -80)(-80, 12)Which of these outcomes would you consider most likely?(-80, 12)(14, 14)(12, -80) b. Suppose player 1 is permitted to "communicate" by uttering one syllable before the players simultaneously and independently maketheir decisions. What should player 1 utter?AOBWhat outcome do you think would occur as a result?(14, 14)O(12,-80)(30, 30)(-80, 12)c. Suppose player 2 can choose its strategy before player 1, that player 1 observes player 2's choice before making her decision, andthat this move structure is known by both players. What outcome would you expect?(-80, 12)(14, 14)(30, 30)(12, -80)

Nash Equilibrium: A condition in which no player has an incentive to change their existing strategy…

Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 2 Player 1 X 30, 30 12, -80 -80, 12 14, 14 a. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. Strategy A Instructions: In order to receive full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box once to place a check mark. For incorrect answer(s), click twice to empty the box. (30, 30) ? (14, 14) ? (12,-80) 7 (-80, 12)

Use the following payoff matrix for a one-shot game to answer the accompanying questions. Player 2 Player 1 X 30, 30 12, -80 -80, 12 14, 14 a. Determine the Nash equilibrium outcomes that arise if the players make decisions independently, simultaneously, and without any communication. Strategy A Instructions: In order to receive full credit, you must make a selection for each option. For correct answer(s), click the box once to place a check mark. For incorrect answer(s), click twice to empty the box. (30, 30) ? (14, 14) ? (12,-80) 7 (-80, 12)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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8) Consider the following game: There are 10 players. Each player is asked to write a number between 0 and 100. The player whose choice is closest to half of the average is the winner. Describe the game and discuss what would you expect to be the average number if the game were played in class with your colleagues. Do you expect them to play the Nash equilibrium strategy? Explain.
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Part 1 Sam and Ray do not like each other and will be miserable if they attend the same event. Both are going out Friday night to either the bar or a concert; and Sam will publicly tweet where he is going before Ray makes his plans. Each will get 6 payoff from going to a concert and 2 benefit from going to the bar if the other is not there. If both go to the same venue, they will get a payoff of zero. Write a game tree for this game and find the equilibrium strategy and equilibrium payoffs clearly labeling both. Part 2 Take the game from the question above and switch the order of the decisions. Write a game tree for this game and find the equilibrium strategy and equilibrium payoffs clearly labeling both. Has the equilibrium strategies and payoffs changed from the question above? Explain why.
Note: The answer should be typed.
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