8) Consider the following game: There are 10 players. Each player is asked to write a number between 0 and 100. The player whose choice is closest to half of the average is the winner. Describe the game and discuss what would you expect to be the average number if the game were played in class with your colleagues. Do you expect them to play the Nash equilibrium strategy? Explain.

8) Consider the following game: There are 10 players. Each player is asked to write a number between 0 and 100. The player whose choice is closest to half of the average is the winner. Describe the game and discuss what would you expect to be the average number if the game were played in class with your colleagues. Do you expect them to play the Nash equilibrium strategy? Explain.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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