1.a) If the three executives of a fraudulent organization report nothing to the authorities, each gets a payoff of 100. If at least one of them blows the whistle, then those who reported the fraud get 28, while those who didn’t get -100. Suppose they play a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where each is silent (does not report fraud) with probability p. What is p? A, 0.1 B, 0.28 C, 0.5 D, 0.8 b) In a two-player game, with strategies and (some known and some unknown) payoffs as shown below, suppose a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists where 1 plays C with probability 3/4, and Player 2 randomizes over X, Y, and Z with equal probabilities. What are the pure-strategy equilibria of this game? A, (A, Y) and (B, X) B, (A, Z) and (C, Y) C, (B, X) and (C, X) D, (C, X) and (C, Y)
1.a)
If the three executives of a fraudulent organization report nothing to the authorities, each gets a payoff of 100. If at least one of them blows the whistle, then those who reported the fraud get 28, while those who didn’t get -100. Suppose they play a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where each is silent (does not report fraud) with probability p. What is p?
A, 0.1
B, 0.28
C, 0.5
D, 0.8
b)
In a two-player game, with strategies and (some known and some unknown) payoffs as shown below, suppose a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists where 1 plays C with probability 3/4, and Player 2 randomizes over X, Y, and Z with equal probabilities.
What are the pure-strategy equilibria of this game?
A, (A, Y) and (B, X)
B, (A, Z) and (C, Y)
C, (B, X) and (C, X)
D, (C, X) and (C, Y)
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