1.1. What is a game in normal form? What is a strictly dominatedstrategy in a normal-form game? What is a pure-strategy Nashequilibrium in a normal-form game?1.2. In the following normal-form game, what strategies surviveiterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies? What are thepure-strategy Nash equilibria?LC RT 2.0 1,1 4,2M3,41,2 2,3B1,3 0,2 3,0 $11.3. Players 1 and 2 are bargaining over how to split one dollar.Both players simultaneously name shares they would like to have,S₁ and 52, where 0 ≤ $1,52 ≤ 1. If $₁ + $2 ≤ 1, then the playersreceive the shares they named; if 8₁ + $2 > 1, then both playersreceive zero. What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria of thisgame?

Game theory is the study of how interdependent decisions made by economic agents result in outcomes…

1.1. What is a game in normal form? What is a strictly dominated strategy in a normal-form game? What is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game? 1.2. In the following normal-form game, what strategies survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies? What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria?

1.1. What is a game in normal form? What is a strictly dominated strategy in a normal-form game? What is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game? 1.2. In the following normal-form game, what strategies survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies? What are the pure-strategy Nash equilibria?

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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