Section 1: Two RomanticsAnn and Bob had their first date. Each either felt romantic chemistry (C) or no chemistry (NC) with the otherperson. Each person knows his/her own feeling but does not know the feeling of the other person. Assume acommon prior belief that the other person felt chemistry with probability Pr(C) = p and no chemistry withprobability Pr(NC) = 1-p.Ann and Bob are old-fashioned romantics and they made the following rule after the first date: Notexts/calls/DMs. Instead, they can choose whether to appear (A) or not appear (NA) under the USydQuadrangle clock tower at sunset on the next day. Their payoffs are given as follows:(From a first-person perspective)If I felt chemistry (C) and I appear (A) under the clock tower, my payoff is 100 if the other person also appears(A) and -100 if the other person doesn't (NA).If I felt chemistry (C) and I choose not to appear (NA) under the clock tower, my payoff is -30 regardless of theother person's action (because I won't know anyway).If I felt no chemistry (NC) and I appear (A) under the clock tower, my payoff is 20 if the other person appears(A) and -20 if the other person doesn't (NA).If I felt no chemistry (NC) and I choose not to appear (NA) under the clock tower, my payoff is 10 regardlessof the other person's action.Please use this information to answer the following questions.(Hint: Can you find a similar question from a lecture or tutorial or practice quiz?) Question 1In this game, Ann has[Select]Question 22Question 3Apure strategies.pure strategies and Bob hasIn the game of two romantics, when p = 0.5, there are pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria.Please enter an integer in the box below.====In the game of two romantics, when p = 0.8,let A = Ann's highest expected payoff in any purc-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium;let B = Ann's lowest expected payoff in any pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium.A and B are expected payoffs under the common prior belief. They should be the entries in a game matrixthat you created using methods we learned in L8.What is A-B? Enter your answer in the box below. Round your answer to 1 decimal place if needed.

Game theory is a branch of mathematics that studies strategic decision-making in situations where…

Question 1 In this game, Ann has 2 [Select] Question 2 pure strategies. In the game of two romantics, when p = 0.5, there are Please enter an integer in the box below. Question 3 pure strategies and Bob has ———— pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria. In the game of two romantics, when p = 0.8, let A = Ann's highest expected payoff in any pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium; let B-Ann's lowest expected payoff in any pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A and B are expected payoffs under the common prior belief. They should be the entries in a game matrix that you created using methods we learned in L8. What is A-B? Enter your answer in the box below. Round your answer to 1 decimal place if needed.

Question 1 In this game, Ann has 2 [Select] Question 2 pure strategies. In the game of two romantics, when p = 0.5, there are Please enter an integer in the box below. Question 3 pure strategies and Bob has ———— pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibria. In the game of two romantics, when p = 0.8, let A = Ann's highest expected payoff in any pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium; let B-Ann's lowest expected payoff in any pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A and B are expected payoffs under the common prior belief. They should be the entries in a game matrix that you created using methods we learned in L8. What is A-B? Enter your answer in the box below. Round your answer to 1 decimal place if needed.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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