Hobby hunter Jack decides what to do the next weekend. He can either stay at home and watch movies (Movies), or call his friend Katherine to go hunting (Hunt). If he stays in, both Jack and Katherine get a payoff of 2. If he decides to hunt, he knows the situation with his friend will resemble a classic stag hunt game with simultaneous moves: Hunting a stag is better than hunting a rabbit, but it only works if they cooperate. The hunting subgame is captured as: Katherine Stag Rabbit Jack Stag 3 , 3 0 , 1 Rabbit 1 , 0 1 , 1 1. Write the normal form representation of the full game, including Jack’s initial decision. 2. Identify any pure-strategy Nash equilibria. How does this compare to the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the hunting game alone?
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Hobby hunter Jack decides what to do the next weekend. He can either stay at home and watch movies (Movies), or call his friend Katherine to go hunting (Hunt). If he stays in, both Jack and Katherine get a payoff of 2. If he decides to hunt, he knows the situation with his friend will resemble a classic stag hunt game with simultaneous moves: Hunting a stag is better than hunting a rabbit, but it only works if they cooperate.
The hunting subgame is captured as:
|
Katherine |
|||
|
Stag |
Rabbit |
||
|
Jack |
Stag |
3 , 3 |
0 , 1 |
|
Rabbit |
1 , 0 |
1 , 1 |
1. Write the normal form representation of the full game, including Jack’s initial decision.
2. Identify any pure-strategy Nash equilibria. How does this compare to the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the hunting game alone?
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