Exercise 6.8. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs: 1 2 1 0 000 0 P 010 1 1 1 Σ R 3 a 1 player's payoff O player 2's payoff O player 3's payoff σ 2 1 2 222 000 0 0 (a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Which ones are also subgame perfect? (b) [This is a more challenging question] Prove that there is no mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where Player 1 plays Mwith probability strictly between 0 and 1.

Exercise 6.8. Consider the following extensive-form game with cardinal payoffs: 1 2 1 0 000 0 P 010 1 1 1 Σ R 3 a 1 player's payoff O player 2's payoff O player 3's payoff σ 2 1 2 222 000 0 0 (a) Find all the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Which ones are also subgame perfect? (b) [This is a more challenging question] Prove that there is no mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where Player 1 plays Mwith probability strictly between 0 and 1.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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