Player 1 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) If the game has a dominant strategy, what is it? There is none. If the game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, what is it? There is none. Cooperate (C) 3,3 8,0 O Cooperate (C) is a dominant strategy for both players. Defect (D) is a dominant strategy for both players. Cooperate (C) is a dominant strategy for 1, and Defect (D) is a dominant strategy for 2. OC, C is the only Nash equilibrium. OD, D is the only Nash equilibrium. OC, C and D, D are both Nash equilibria. Player 2 Defect (D) 0,8 1, 1

Player 1 Cooperate (C) Defect (D) If the game has a dominant strategy, what is it? There is none. If the game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, what is it? There is none. Cooperate (C) 3,3 8,0 O Cooperate (C) is a dominant strategy for both players. Defect (D) is a dominant strategy for both players. Cooperate (C) is a dominant strategy for 1, and Defect (D) is a dominant strategy for 2. OC, C is the only Nash equilibrium. OD, D is the only Nash equilibrium. OC, C and D, D are both Nash equilibria. Player 2 Defect (D) 0,8 1, 1

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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